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the southern electric system.

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NON-00104

### May 24, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

# PLANT VOGTLE - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-424 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF MAIN FEED ISOLATION VALVE

# Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits a Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning a manual reactor trip that occurred when a main feedwater isolation valve failed closed.

Sincerely,

~ **¢** 

R. P. McDonald

HC/dmh

Enclosure: LER 50-424/1988-013

c: (see next page)

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c: <u>Georgia Power Company</u> Mr. P. D. Rice Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. Mr. M. Sheibani Mr. L. T. Gucwa GO-NORMS

> U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. J. B. Hopkins, Licensing Project Manager, NRR (2 copies) Mr. J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector-Operations, Vogtle

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NRC Form 366

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OM8 NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88

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#### A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), because there was a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System.

# B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) with the reactor operating in a normal steady state condition at approximately 100% of rated thermal power. The reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were approximately 2240 psig and 588 degrees fahrenheit, respectively.

# C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

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On April 24, 1988, at 0921 CDT, the Loop 4 Main Feed Isolation Valve (MFIV) Accumulator Gas Pressure Low Alarm was received. A few seconds later a Steam Feed Mismatch Alarm was received and loop 4 feedwater flow was observed as approximately one-half of the loop 4 steam flow. The loop 4 MFIV, 1-HV-5230, closed indication was observed and an attempt was made to reopen the valve from the control room. At 0922 CDT, the loop 4 MSIV had not responded to the open signal and Steam Generator (SG) #4 level had decreased from 52% to 42%. Because of the decreasing SG level, the Shift Supervisor ordered the Reactor Operator (RO) to manually trip the reactor. Following the reactor trip, the SG low level setpc ars were reached initiating an expected Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) actuation. At 0950 CDT, the reactor coolant temperature and pressure were stabilized at approximately 557 degrees fahrenheit and 2235 psig, respectively.

During the reactor trip recovery one(1) minor problem occurred. Main Feed Regulating Valve No. 2 did not indicate closed. A plant operator was dispatched to the valve and verified it was shut. A slight adjustment was made to the valve indication limit switch and the valve indication was functioning properly.

After the plant was stabilized, several unsuccessful attempts were made to open the Loop 4 MFIV. An Event Review Team (ERT) was established to investigate the event. The possible causes of the valve failure and the components which could have caused the valve to fail shut were identified. Troubleshooting activities were conducted under the direction of an Engineering Supervisor, but no reason for the malfunction was identified. At approximately 1800 CDT on April 24, 1988, the valve, 1-HV-5230, was satisfactorily opened. The valve remained opened for approximately 15 minutes and fast closed, without any personnel action. After further trouble-shooting failed to identify the problem, the valve was again opened satisfactorily. The valve failure did not repeat itself and further troubleshooting failed to identify the cause of the valve malfunction. There are two (2) redundant control circuits (Trains A and B) for the MFIV and the valve failure could not be isolated to either individual circuit. At approximately 1000 CDT on April 25, 1988, the decision was made to replace the components in both control circuits, which could reasonably have caused the valve to fail closed. These components consisted of two (2) electrically operated air solenoids, four (4) electrical relays, and two (2) timer relays (agastats). The components were replaced prior to the restart of Unit 1.

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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The removed parts were energized in the Maintenance Shop in a configuration which simulated the installation in the plant. All parts initially functioned as designed. After one intermittent failure, one of the air solenoids (1-HY-5230A) failed permanently. The solenoid coil resistance was found to be infinity.

### D. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The direct cause of this event was the closure of the No. 4 MFIV without personnel involvement. The parts removed from the MFIV were tested in the shop and the solenoid valve demonstrated an intermittent failure leading us to conclude that this was the cause of the event.

# E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Accident analysis of a loss of normal feedwater indicate the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system is capable of removing the stored and residual heat of the primary water system. Since the plant was manually tripped well before the steam generator heat transfer capability was reduced and the AFW system functioned properly, the primary system variables never approached a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) condition. Therefore the plant safety and the health and safety of the public was not affected by this event.

#### F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- The components in both Trains (A&B) of the valve's control system circuitry, that could reasonably have caused the valve to fail closed, were replaced. This included a total of two (2) electrically operated air solenoids, four (4) electrical relays, and two (2) "Agastat" timer relays. This action was completed prior to the restart of Unit 1.
- Since the specific cause of the event was not immediately known, instrument monitors were placed across the key components of the No. 4 MFIV control circuits, Trains A&B.
- Engineering will evaluate the current design of the control circuit to determine if changes are needed. This is scheduled to be completed by 6-15-88.

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G.	ADD	DITIONAL INFORMATION																					
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		Air Valve Solenoid - Sk Part No. V5H65590	kinner	Elec	tr	ic	Va 1	lve	Di	vi	sio	n											
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