

REVIEWED BY:

R.R. Keimig

(NAME)

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NRC: RI

(ORGANIZATION)

9-12-88

(DATE)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

Report Nos. 88-31  
88-31

Docket No. 50-277  
50-278

License No. DPR-44  
DPR-56

Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company  
2301 Market Street  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101

Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3

Inspection At: Delta, Pennsylvania

Inspection Conducted: August 27-29, 1988

Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security

Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: July 25-29, 1988

Inspectors:

W. K. Lancaster

W. K. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector

9/8/88

date

W. K. Lancaster

D. F. Cameron, Physical Security Inspector

9/8/88

date

Approved by:

[Signature]

Richard R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section  
Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards  
Branch, DRSS

9-8-88

date

Inspection Summary: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on  
August 27-29, 1988 (Combined Report Nos. 50-277/88-31 and 50-278/88-31)

Areas Inspected: Management Effectiveness and Security Organization  
particularly with respect to the change-over of the security force contractor  
on August 27, 1988.

Results: One apparent violation of the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan  
was identified in the area of Access Control of Personnel to Vital Areas.

## DETAILS

### 1. Key Persons Contacted

#### a. Licensee and Contractor Personnel:

- \*J. Franz, Plant Manager, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS)
- D. Meyers, Support Manager, PBAPS
- R. Weindorfer, Corporate Director, Nuclear Plant Security
- \*F. Larkin, Nuclear Security Coordinator, Limerick Generation Station (LGS)
- \*M. Berner, Acting Chief Security Coordinator, PBAPS
- \*J. Devlin, Acting Nuclear Security Coordinator, PBAPS
- \*R. Bixler, Corporate Analyst, Nuclear Plant Security
- \*P. Supplee, Corporate Analysis, Nuclear Plant Security
- M. Annast, Senior Vice President, Protection Technology, Inc. (PTI)
- \*V. Vitale, Vice President, Regional Director, PTI
- \*C. Brockman, Site Manager, PTI

#### b. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel:

- \*T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector

\*Indicates those present at the exit interview.

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor security personnel.

### 2. Onsite Follow-up of a Non-Routine Event - Circulating Water Pump Structure

#### a. Background

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b. NRC Review

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c. NRC Findings

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The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to comply with the above requirements in the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan, resulting in three vital area barrier degradations with no compensatory action, is an apparent violation of NRC requirements (50-277/88-31-01 and 50-278/88-31-01).

### 3.0 Change-over of Security Force Contractor

On August 27, 1988, at approximately 1800 hours, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) security force contractor changed from Burns International Security Services to Protection Technology, Inc. (PTI). Transition teams comprising contractor, PBAPS and Limerick Generating Station (LGS) personnel were assigned to ensure a complete and orderly transition. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan and Contingency Plan during the transition. The inspectors made this determination by reviewing suitability and training records of PTI Security Force Members (SFM's), interviewed SFM's on post, observing the PTI 12-hour SFM transition training program and by conducting an inventory of all required response force equipment.

Due to manpower shortage (because of previous attrition and due to the fact that PTI did not rehire all former Burns SFM's) PTI SFM's are working the following hours: watchpersons - 4 twelve hour shifts followed by 3 days off; security officers - 4 twelve hour shifts followed by 2 days off; and, alarm station operators - 5 eight hour shifts followed by 2 days off. The new security force contractor plans to continue the twelve hour shifts until sometime in October, 1988, at which time additional SFM's are expected to have been hired, trained, qualified and ready to assume duties as SFM's. The inspectors verified, through a review of post records, that SFM's are being rotated on post approximately every two hours. Also, the inspectors were informed that the PTI 12-hour SFM transition training program was being attended by SFM's on their scheduled day off. It is also anticipated that SFM's will receive future training and/or retraining on their normally scheduled day off. The inspectors expressed a concern to the licensee concerning the SFM's ability to remain attentive to duty while working 12 hour shifts for a prolonged period of time. The licensee agreed to monitor this situation closely.

The inspectors noted that the licensee continues to man an excessive number of compensatory posts with SFM's due to malfunctioning and/or inoperable security equipment/systems. The inspectors again expressed a concern to the licensee regarding this issue (See Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/88-26 and 50-278/88-26). The licensee stated that the malfunctioning and/or inoperable security equipment/systems were being worked on, however, at the time of this inspection the "fixes" were not in place. The inspectors observed that work was being done to eliminate the need for these compensatory posts. The licensee agreed to continue working on the elimination of the long-term compensatory posts.

4. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on August 29, 1988. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection was reviewed and the findings were presented.

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.