



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 117  
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35  
BOSTON EDISON COMPANY  
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
DOCKET NO. 50-293

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 25, 1988, Boston Edison Co (BECo), the licensee, proposed to amend operating license DPR-35 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The amendment would revise the Technical Specifications to remove misleading references to an average power range monitor (APRM) downscale scram function.

2.0 EVALUATION

Specifically the licensee proposed the deletion of 3 APRM downscale scram function requirements as follows:

1. Revise (TS) Table 3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirement, to delete the requirement for an APRM downscale scram.
2. Delete Footnotes 11 and 12 of Technical Specification Table 3.1.1 to remove references to an APRM downscale trip.
3. Delete functional testing requirement for an APRM downscale scram from TS Table 4.1.1.

Technical Specification section 3.1.1 alludes to an APRM scram function by including, in Table 3.1.1, a downscale trip setting and by requiring an APRM downscale scram in TS Table 4.1.1. The APRM downscale contact only acts to bypass the intermediate range monitor (IRM) scram trips when the reactor is in the run mode and the APRMs are not downscale. Once the IRM detectors are removed from the core in the run mode, the IRM Hi Hi and IRM Inop contacts remain closed. If an APRM downscale condition then occurs, no scram trip would result. Thus the APRM downscale contact only acts to provide a bypass of the IRM scram trips in the run mode when the APRMs are not downscale. Footnote 5 of TS Table 3.1.1 states:

"IRM's are bypassed when APRM's are onscale and the reactor mode switch is in the run position."

Therefore the APRM downscale contacts only provide a bypass function and not a scram function. In addition, TS Table 4.1.1 currently requires that the APRM downscale feature of the RPS be functionally tested to a half-scram condition on a weekly basis when in the run mode. The removal of the Technical Specification requirement for weekly testing of the APRM downscale contact to a half-scram is justified because this contact provides no RPS safety function considered in the PNPS safety analysis. Therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated as stated in the Federal Register (53 FR 13012) on April 20, 1988.

### 3.0 SUMMARY

Based on the above discussion, the revisions will not impact the configuration of any plant safety system, operating procedures or the original safety analysis, and provides no RPS safety function considered in the PNPS safety analysis. In addition, these deletions can improve the clarity of the TS by deleting misleading statements and can reduce the potential for spurious trips by deleting the functional test to a half-scram condition on a weekly basis. Therefore we find the proposed deletions acceptable.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

This amendment involves a change in requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: G. Requa

Dated: May 23, 1988