

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 1 OF 0 3

PAGE (3)
1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY CAUSES UNPLANNED ISOLATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
12	06	85	85	044	01	02	24	86			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	20.402(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.402(c)	50.38(e)(1)	50.38(e)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)	
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 10 10																							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
Raymond D. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Hatch

TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE: 4 0 4 5 2 6 4 7 0 1 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1205 CST on 12/06/85 with the Unit shutdown for refueling, and with the Residual Heat Removal system operating in the shutdown cooling mode, an unplanned isolation of the shutdown cooling suction outboard containment isolation valve (1E11-F008) occurred. This tripped the shutdown cooling pump which was in service at the time (1E11-C001A).

Plant personnel removed the isolation signal, opened the valve, and restarted the shutdown cooling pump, thus restoring shutdown cooling at approximately 1213 CST.

An investigation has determined that this event was the result of a procedural deficiency in that special purpose procedure 42SP-DCI-009-1S which was in use at the time did not specify the actions necessary to prevent the isolation of 1E11-F008.

The valve (1E11-F008) closed on the isolation signal as designed. Additionally, a review of the shutdown cooling heat exchanger temperature recorder roll chart showed that the reactor coolant temperature did not rise noticeably during this event. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	065000321	85-044-01	02	OF	03

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (closure of primary containment isolation valve 1E11-F008) occurred.

At approximately 1205 CST on 12/06/85, the Unit was in shutdown for refueling with approximately 400 fuel bundles remaining in the reactor vessel core. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system was operating in the shutdown cooling mode with the reactor coolant temperature at 82 degrees Fahrenheit. At that time, an unexpected isolation of the shutdown cooling suction line inboard isolation valve (1E11-F008) occurred on a Drywell High Pressure signal. This tripped the shutdown cooling pump which was in service at the time (1E11-C001A).

At approximately 1213 CST, after verifying that no high pressure condition existed in the drywell, operating personnel restored shutdown cooling by removing the isolation signal, reopening valve 1E11-F008 using its control switch, and restarting pump 1E11-C001A.

An investigation has determined that at the time of occurrence of the subject isolation, contract personnel were performing the "TERMINATIONS OF ECCS LOOP G (TO 37) PER DCR 81-138" special purpose procedure (42SP-DCI-009-1S) as part of the process of installing new relays in the logic for RHR. However, the contract personnel who prepared special purpose procedure 42SP-DCI-009-1S failed to include a step to prevent the isolation of suction isolation valve 1E11-F008. Thus, when the isolation signal was generated as a result of the work, the valve closed.

This event is the result of a procedural deficiency. The procedure (42SP-DCI-009-1S) was corrected by initiating a temporary modification sheet per the "TEMPORARY BYPASS, JUMPER, AND LIFTED LEAD CONTROL" procedure (30AC-OPS-005-0S) prior to continuing its use. Additionally, as a result of this event, the "TERMINATIONS OF ECCS LOOP F (TO 36) PER DCR 81-138" special purpose procedure (42SP-DCI-008-1S) was found to contain a similar error where inboard shutdown cooling suction isolation valve 1E11-F009 and inboard reactor vessel head spray isolation valve 1E11-F022 would have isolated if the procedure had been used as originally written. Therefore that procedure (42SP-DCI-008-1S) was also corrected by initiation of temporary modification sheets per procedure 30AC-OPS-005-0S. The severity of this event has been discussed with the writers and reviewers of procedures 42SP-DCI-008-1S and 42SP-DCI-009-1S.

There have been no past similar events where a shutdown cooling isolation valve was unintentionally closed because a special purpose procedure did not adequately prevent such an event while the system was being modified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR 8 5	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 0 4 4	REVISION NUMBER - 0 1			

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

This event was reviewed on 12/09/85 by the Plant Review Board (PRB) and determined to be non-reportable per 10CFR 50.73. However, it was rereviewed by the PRB on 01/09/86 at which time it was determined to be reportable per the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv). Consequently, this LER does not meet the 30 day reporting time requirement.

The valve (1E11-F008) closed on the subject Drywell High Pressure signal as designed. Additionally, a review of the shutdown cooling heat exchanger temperature recorder (1E41-R605) roll chart showed that the reactor coolant temperature did not rise above 82 degrees Fahrenheit during this event. Therefore neither the safety of the plant nor the health and safety of the public were adversely affected by this event.

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L. T. Gucwa
Manager Nuclear Engineering
and Chief Nuclear Engineer



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February 24, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-321/1985-044, Rev. 1. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

L. T. Gucwa

CBS/1c

Attachment

c: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.
NRC-Region II
GO-NORMS

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