

JAMES W. TAYLOR
General Manager

May 18, 1988

In reply, please
refer to LAC-12559

DOCKET NO. 50-409

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Dairyland Power Cooperative
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR)
Provisional License No. DPR-45
Emergency Plan Revision - SAFSTOR Condition

- REFERENCES: (1) DPC Letter, J. Taylor to Document Control Desk, LAC-12377,
dated September 29, 1987.
- (2) NRC Letter, L. Rubenstein to J. Taylor,
dated February 19, 1988.
- (3) DPC Letter, J. Taylor to Document Control Desk, LAC-12544,
dated April 15, 1988.
- (4) Telephone Discussion between R. Meck/P. Erickson (NRC) and
R. Christians/P. Shafer (DFC) of May 11, 1988.

In our letter of April 15, 1988 (Reference 3) we responded to various questions, which you had posed (Reference 2) in regard to your evaluation of revisions to the LACBWR Emergency Plan submitted previously (Reference 1). One comment which had been raised by you (Reference 2) was a request for us to provide a technical basis which demonstrates that there is no necessity for a Site Area or a General Emergency classification during LACBWR SAFSTOR conditions. We submitted a technical report as part of our response submittal (Reference 3), which provided bases for a conclusion that, "there would be no need to evacuate the site after a fuel damage accident, personnel dose limits should not be exceeded, and the (neighboring) Genoa 3 steam plant could continue operations. Therefore, a Site Area or General Emergency is not necessary."

The Technical Report (LAC-TR-134) indicated, in a very conservatively analyzed worst case accident scenario, the resultant whole body and skin dose

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equivalent limits should not be exceeded by onsite personnel, if precautionary sheltering.....out to 80 meters....is undertaken (for a ground release). This scenario included a ground level release of Kr-85 from damaged spent fuel assemblies with containment not being isolated. Sheltering should be done at the ALERT declaration, if significant fuel damage with potential for a ground level release, is the initiating condition.


In our telephone conversation (Reference 4), you requested that we include a statement regarding precautionary sheltering and Control Room ventilation isolation in the Emergency Plan revision. We have made a change to the Emergency Plan, Section 3.8.1 "Radiological Protection of Onsite Personnel" (page D-12) which describes the conditions for precautionary onsite sheltering and Control Room ventilation isolation. This change is enclosed with this letter for your review.

Please replace the old page D-12 in the copies of the Emergency Plan revision which were sent to you (Reference 3) with this new page D-12.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact us.

Sincerely,

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE



James W. Taylor
General Manager

JWT:REC:PWS:sks

cc: Mr. A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator
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Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Mr. Peter B. Erickson, LACBWR Project Manager
Division of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Mr. Ken Ridgway, NRC Resident Inspector