

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 7 5	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 4
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TITLE (4)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOT PERFORMED

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	0 1	8 6	8 6	0 0 2	0 0	0 3	0 3	8 6	DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2		0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3
									0 5 0 0 0		

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 4 5	20.405(a)(1)(i)	80.36(e)(1)	80.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	80.36(e)(2)	80.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 80.73(a)(2)(i)	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME WILLIAM J. KELLY, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER	TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 1 0 1 5 5 1 9 5 1 - 1 7 1 3 1 5 1
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1000 PST, February 1, 1986, while Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 45 percent power, the time limit of Technical Specification 4.3.1.1, Table 4.3-1 was exceeded when plant licensed operators failed to perform Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) R-2B, "Operator Heat Balance." This was discovered by plant engineers during a review of routine shift checks on February 4, 1986. A satisfactory surveillance test was completed at 0430 PST on February 2, 1986.

A subsequent routine Quality Assurance review of plant records showed that the surveillance was not performed for Unit 2 on November 24, 1985.

The cause for both events was personnel error (cognitive) in that licensed operators did not perform the STP within the required time limitations.

To prevent recurrence, applicable procedures will be revised to bring potentially missed frequent surveillances to the attention of plant operations personnel.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500027586-002-00	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		86	002	00	02	04

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Initial Conditions

Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation), at approximately 45 percent power.
Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation), at approximately 50 percent power.

II. Description of Event

A. Event:

Unit 1:

On February 1, 1986, at 1000 PST, the time limit of Technical Specification 4.3.1.1, Table 4.3-1 was exceeded when plant licensed operators failed to perform Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) R-2B, "Operator Heat Balance."

STP R-2B is normally performed on the 0000 to 0800 PST shift of each day. A prerequisite to performing this surveillance is to have the unit in a stable operating condition to achieve the most accurate results. Throughout the 0000 to 0800 PST shift of February 1, 1986, Unit 1 control operators were changing unit power level resulting from heavy seas causing floating kelp to be washed over the intake cove breakwater, and did not perform the surveillance. The 0000 to 0800 PST shift foreman (SFM) did indicate to the relieving SFM that STP R-2B had not yet been performed. The relieving SFM understood this. However, his shift continued to be involved in the circulating water system problem and restoring the unit to full power; with his attention focused on this, the surveillance was missed. A satisfactory surveillance test was completed at 0430 PST on February 2, 1986.

Unit 2:

Subsequent to this event, a routine Quality Assurance review revealed one instance, on November 24, 1985, at 0100 PST, that the time limit of Technical Specification 4.3.1.1, Table 4.3-1 was exceeded when licensed operators failed to perform STP R-2B for Unit 2. A satisfactory surveillance test was completed at 0100 PST on November 25, 1985.

On November 23, 1985, at approximately 1900 PST, STP R-2B was performed by the 1600 to 2400 PST shift crew. On the following 0000 to 0800 PST shift of November 24, 1985, the Unit 2 SFM acknowledged this, and did not schedule the performance of STP R-2B for the 0000 to 0800 PST shift as he normally does. The fact that this Unit 2 surveillance had not been performed by the 0000 to 0800 PST shift was not formally communicated to the relieving SFM of November 24, 1985. Consequently, the STP was not performed on Unit 2 until approximately 0100 PST, November 25, 1985. The STP is required to be performed daily when the unit is above 15% of rated power.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

B. Inoperable structures, components, or system that contributed to the event:

None

C. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

1. November 24, 1985: STP R-2B not performed on Unit 2
2. November 25, 1985: STP R-2B satisfactorily completed on Unit 2
3. February 1, 1986: STP R-2B not performed on Unit 1
4. February 2, 1986: STP R-2B satisfactorily completed on Unit 1
5. February 4, 1986: discovery date, Unit 1
6. February 18, 1986: discovery date, Unit 2

D. Other systems or secondary functions affected:

None

E. Method of discovery:

Plant engineers discovered the Unit 1 missed surveillance during a routine review of STP I-1A, "Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses."

Plant quality assurance inspectors discovered the Unit 2 missed surveillance during a routine review of Unit 2 surveillance test records.

F. Operator actions:

None required

G. Safety systems responses:

Not applicable

III. Cause of Event

A. Immediate cause:

Personnel error (cognitive) in that licensed operators did not perform the STP within the required time limitations.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

B. Root cause:

1. In both cases, there was a breakdown of communication at shift turnover. The lack of effective tracking for this surveillance test was a contributing factor.

IV. Analysis of Event

The purpose of STP R-2B is to verify the calibration of the power range channels on a daily basis. Surveillances performed on the day before and the day after each event indicate the power range channels were within the desired accuracy of ± 2 percent on those days, providing reasonable assurance that the accuracy of the power range channels remained unchanged throughout the event periods. Thus, no adverse safety consequences or implications resulted from this event.

V. Corrective Actions

For better tracking, applicable surveillance test procedures will be revised to establish a specific time band for the performance of frequent surveillances, such as STP R-2B. If the surveillance is not performed during this specific time band, the missed surveillance will be visibly flagged to operators to ensure it is not overlooked. In addition, this event will be reviewed with all operations personnel to improve communications.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed components:

None

B. Previous LERs on similar events:

None

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

March 3, 1986

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-86-054

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2
Licensee Event Report 1-86-002-00
Surveillance Required by Technical Specification Not Performed


Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning a condition not permitted by the Technical Specifications.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,


for J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: L. J. Chandler
R. T. Dodds
J. B. Martin
B. Norton
H. E. Schierling
CPUC
Diablo Distribution
INPO

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