

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

March 3, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - SPECIAL REPORT 86-01

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire door
breached greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance
with the special report requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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SPECIAL REPORT 86-01
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT 1

Event Description and Probable Cause:

On January 27, 1986, at 1400 CST, fire door C46A was discovered to be inoperable during performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-701, "Visual Inspection of Fire Doors." Door C46A is the rollup fire door outside the shift engineer's office in the Control Building on elevation 732. Upon discovery, a breaching permit was issued to establish a fire watch per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12. The breaching permit also provides administrative control to return the door to functional status within seven days as required by TS. The breaching permit was not closed and the door was not returned to service until February 11, 1986, at 1452 CST, thus requiring this special report within 30 days.

A work request (WR) was written immediately after the door was found to be inoperable, and the WR was sent through its administrative cycle. The WR was available for work on January 31, 1986, but the foreman was not aware that a breaching permit was in effect and scheduled the work for February 4, 1986. The allowed seven days were in effect until February 3, 1986. Work was started and completed on February 4, 1986, but the craftsman was unable to close the breaching permit because door C46A was listed as C46 in SI-216, "Visual Inspection of Fire Doors," which is used to determine door operability after work is complete. SI-261 was then revised to include door C46A. The door was inspected and determined to be operable on February 11, 1986.

Corrective Action:

Increased management attention is being focused on making sure that breaching permits are closed on time. Effective February 10, 1986, a dedicated crew was established to ensure that door repairs are completed expeditiously and that breaching permits are closed within the allowed seven days.

During the period the fire door was breached, the fire detectors were operable and an hourly fire watch was performed. Both units were in mode 5 at 0 percent power during this event.

This report is required per the special report requirements of TS 3.7.12. There were no events in the area which would have required the operability of door C46A; therefore, there was no effect on public health or safety.