NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Trojan Nuclear Plant	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 4	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Containment Ventilation Isolation on High Containment Radioactivity Signal

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	2 1	8 8	8 8	— 0 1 0	— 0 0	0 5	2 0	8 8	NA	0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	6	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Larry Hinson, Plant Review Board Engineer	5 0 3 5 5 6 - 3 7 1 3

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
NA											

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 21, 1988, the Plant was in Mode 6 with reactor vessel water level just above the top of the loops and the reactor head vent path open. The Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Systems were in operation. While raising reactor vessel water level, a Containment ventilation isolation was initiated by a high Containment radioactivity signal from the Containment Low Level Noble Gas Monitor (PRM-1C). The Containment Purge System isolation valves closed as required.

The increase in Containment gaseous activity was caused by gases being forced out of the reactor vessel and into Containment when reactor vessel water level was increased.

Immediate corrective action was to stop raising reactor vessel water level. A temporary procedure was implemented that provided for educting gases from the reactor vessel and directing them to the Refueling Cavity Exhaust System. The method for establishing the PRM-1C setpoint was revised to incorporate a more representative background determination when a release is planned.

This event had no effect on public health and safety.

IE22
1/1

Description of Event

On April 21, 1988, the Plant was in Mode 6 (refueling) with Reactor Coolant System temperature at 108°F. The reactor vessel water level was at 62 feet (just above the top of the loops) for maintenance, and the reactor head vent path was open. The Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Systems were in operation. While raising reactor vessel water level to 62.5 feet to prepare for reactor vessel flood-up, a Containment ventilation isolation was initiated at 0345 by a high Containment radioactivity signal from the Containment Low Level Noble Gas Monitor (PRM-1C). The Containment Purge System isolation valves closed as required. Upon receipt of the Containment ventilation isolation signal, the operators stopped increasing reactor vessel water level. Gaseous activity in Containment returned to normal soon after the level increase was stopped. Increasing reactor vessel water level forced gases out of the reactor vessel and into Containment, thus, increasing Containment gaseous activity levels sufficiently to initiate the isolation signal. It is estimated that 0.3 curies of Xenon-133 were released.

Cause of Occurrence

The increase in Containment gaseous activity was caused by gases being forced out of the reactor vessel and into Containment when reactor vessel water level was increased. The PRM-1C setpoint of </= 2 times background required by Trojan Technical Specifications was based on the activity level in the Containment atmosphere.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to stop raising reactor vessel water level to stop the increase in Containment gaseous activity. A temporary procedure was implemented that provided for educting gases from the reactor vessel via the head vent and directing them to the Refueling Cavity Exhaust System. This allowed the gases to be directed to a monitored exhaust path and minimized the increase in general Containment activity levels. The method for establishing the PRM-1C setpoint was revised to incorporate a more representative determination of background activity level when a release is planned. Calculation of the initial setpoint is now based on the methods prescribed in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual as allowed by Trojan Technical Specifications. No further problems with high Containment gaseous activity levels were experienced while raising reactor vessel water level.

Significance of Occurrence

This event had no effect on public health and safety. The Containment Ventilation Isolation System functioned as designed.

Portland General Electric Company
Trojan Nuclear Plant
71760 Columbia River Hwy
Rainier, Oregon 97048
(503) 556-3713

May 20, 1988
CAO-217-88

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Licensee Event Report No. 88-10 is attached. This report discusses an event in which Containment ventilation isolation was initiated by a high Containment gaseous activity signal.

Sincerely,

C. A. Olmstead

C. A. Olmstead
General Manager
Trojan Nuclear Plant

c: Mr. John B. Martin
Regional Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mr. William Dixon
State of Oregon
Department of Energy

Mr. R. C. Barr
USNRC Resident Inspector
Trojan Nuclear Plant

IE22
1/1