	- × - 4					LICENS	SEE EVENT	REPORT	(LER)					
Facility Name (1) Docket Nu									lumber (2) Pa		(3)			
									01 01 41	5 5 1	of 0			
Title	(4) FEED	WATER	ISOLATI	ON ACTUATIO	N ON HI	GH-2 STEAM	GENERAT	DR LEVE	L DUE	TO PERSONNEL	ERROR			
Event Date (5)		1	LER Numbe	WILL WILLIAM	Repo	Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)					
Month Day		Year	Year	/// Sequen		Revision		Day	Year			Docket Number(s)		
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								Expected Month Day Year Submission						
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ABSTRA	CT (LI	mit to	1400 st	paces, i.e.	approx	mately fi	fteen sin	gle-sp	ace ty	pewritten lin	les) (16)			

On August 29, 1987, at 0156, Byron Unit 2 was in Mode 4 at zero percent power. Instrument and control technicians (non-licensed) were calibrating one of the 2D Steam Generator level transmitters. The technician in containment isolated the wrong level transmitter. This action satisfied a 2 of 4 coincidence causing a feedwater isolation on Steam Generator High-2 level, P-14. The feedwater isolation actuated as designed. The level transmitter was unisolated and the Feedwater Isolation Signal was reset.

The cause of the actuation was a cognitive personnel error on the part of the instrument and control technician. The technician was disciplined.

There have been no previous occurrences of this nature.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER I	Page (3)						
		Year	Year /// Sequential Number			Revision Number			
Byron, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 5	8 1 7	-	0 1 5	-	0 1	01 2	OF	0 12

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Event Date/Time 8/29/87 / 0156 hrs.

Unit 2 MODE 4 - Hot Shutdown Rx Power 0 RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure 330°F/340 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On 8/29/87 Byron Unit 2 was in Mode 4 at zero percent power. At 0156 hours instrument and control technicians (non-licensed) were calibrating the 2D Steam Generator (FW)[JB] level transmitter 2LT-559, which had its bi-stables tripped and in the test mode. The instrument and control technicians in containment isolated the wrong transmitter, 2LT-549. This satisfied a 2 out of 4 coincidence required to cause a Feedwater Isolation on Steam Generator High-2 level, P-14. All the safety actuations associated with the P-14 permissive operated properly. The 2LT-549 transmitter was unisolated and the Feedwater Isolation signal was reset.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The Feedwater Isolation was due to a cognitive personnel error by the instrument technician. The Feedwater Isolation Signal was received due to the isolation of one level transmitter on the 2D Steam Generator while another level transmitter was in test. A P-14 actuation was received after a 2 out of 4 coincidence was satisfied on Steam Generator 2D level.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The plant or public safety was not affected by the Feedwater Isolation actuation. In Mode 4, most Feedwater Isolation valves were already closed. Plant conditions did not require a Feedwater Isolation. The safety systems operated properly. If this event had occurred at power, the Reactor Protection System would have actuated per design for a loss of feedwater event.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The incident was discussed with the instrument and control technician and a letter was placed in his personnel file and he was placed on a one year probation. The incident was also discussed in a general meeting with all the technicians and foremen.

The Trip Prevention Committee has investigated the use of additional identification on different instruments in an attempt to prevent technician errors. The conclusion was that, in this case, the event was an isolated technician error, that the equipment is readily identifiable, and that no additional identification is needed.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

LER NUMBER NONE

TITLE

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

MANUFACTURER Not Applicable

NOMENCLATURE

MCDEL NUMBER

MFG PART NUMBER

b) RESULTS OF NPRDS SEARCH:

Not Applicable

September 13, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Byron Generating Station is being transmitted as a supplemental report.

This report is number 87-015; Docket No. 50-455.

Sincerely,

R. Pleniewicz

Station Manager

Byron Nuclear Power Station

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 87-015-01

cci

A. Bert Davis, NRC Region III Administrator P. Brochman, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

INPO Record Center CECo Distribution List

Ltr:

BYRON 88-0904 (1921M/0206M)