SEP 15 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Stolz, Project Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Project - I/II

FROM: M. W. Hodges, Chief
Reactor Systems Branch
Division of Engineering & Systems Technology

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON BEAVER VALLEY 2 SPENT FUEL POOL ENRICHMENT INCREASE

The Reactor Systems Branch requests the enclosed additional information in order to continue our review of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 request for an enrichment increase to 4.85 weight percent U-235.

original signed by
Marvin Hodges

M. W. Hodges, Chief
Reactor Systems Branch
Division of Engineering & Systems Technology

cc: P. Tam

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Contact: L. Kopp, SRXB
Ext. 20879

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 SPENT FUEL POOL ENRICHMENT INCREASE

1. Describe the fabrication process for the Boraflex assemblies. Indicate whether a single sheet or multiple sheets of Boraflex were used in each poison assembly. Also, indicate whether or not the Boraflex sheets are fastened to or permanently glued onto any surface or structure.

2. Describe the measuring techniques for detecting degraded Boraflex specimens in the inservice surveillance program.

3. Describe the corrective actions to be taken if degraded Boraflex specimens or absorber is found in the spent fuel pool.

4. Describe how the sub-region of Region 1 which can presently store fuel up to 3.6 weight percent U-235 with no physical restrictions will be distinguished and separated from the sub-region of Region 1 which will store fuel with enrichments higher than 3.6 weight percent in a 3 out of 4 configuration.

5. In order to prevent fuel loading errors in spent fuel pools with storage configuration restrictions, the staff has previously requested physical blockage of storage locations which are prohibited from containing any fuel. Please discuss the acceptability of physically blocking the 4th cell in each 3 out of 4 cell array in Region 1 rather than relying solely on administrative procedures to prevent misloadings.

6. What is the reactivity effect of neglecting the axial and radial distributions of burnup in the Region 2 fuel assemblies?

7. Discuss any procedures or physical restraints which require the movement of fuel to non-burnup dependent locations before movement to burnup dependent racks.

8. Should revised Tech Spec 5.6.1 refer to the UFSAR rather than the FSAR?