

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): RIVER BEND STATION
DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8
PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4): Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation Due To Surveillance Test Procedure Steps Not Perform In Proper Sequence

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	DIVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER (S)									
0	8	15	8	8	0	1	6	0	0	0	9	1	2	8	8	0	5	0	0	0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):

OPERATING MODE (9): 1	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	90.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10): 1, 0, 3	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	90.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	90.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(2)(iv)	90.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	90.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(3)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	90.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(4)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	90.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	90.73(a)(2)(viii)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	90.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):

NAME: L. A. England - Director-Nuclear Licensing
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 5 0 4 3 8 1 - 4 1 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE): NO:

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH: , DAY: , YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1600 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0500 hours on 8/15/88, with the unit at 100 percent power, an automatic isolation of the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) occurred during the performance of a surveillance test procedure (STP). Also, division II main steam line drain valves isolated as well as the division II isolation valve to the reactor sample panel.

The actuations occurred due to technicians not following steps in the proper sequence as required by the STP.

The personnel involved were counseled on this event. All instrument and controls (I&C) technicians received training on the requirement of following steps in sequence as prescribed in procedures.

The system performed as designed when it was inadvertently actuated. No other challenges to ESF systems occurred, and the system was returned to its normal configuration after the event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER																
	0	5	0	0	0	4	5	8	8	8	-	0	1	6	-	0	0	0	2	OF	0

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 288A or 117)

Reported Condition

At 0500 hours on 8/15/88, with the unit at 100 percent power, an automatic isolation of the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) (*CE*) occurred during the performance of a surveillance test procedure (STP). Also, division II main steam line drain (*DRN*) valves (*V*) isolated as well as the division II isolation valve (*ISV*) to the reactor sample panel. This condition is being reported as an inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Investigation

This actuation occurred due to instrumentation and controls (I&C) technicians incorrectly following the sequence of steps prescribed in STP-058-4501, "Containment and Drywell Manual Isolation Actuation Monthly Channel Functional Test". During the surveillance, the technicians were nearing completion of the test section for the "B" channel of the manual nuclear steam supply shutoff system (NSSSS) isolation pushbutton. Before completing this section, the technicians proceeded to make initial preparations to test the "C" logic channel. These preparations consisted of unscrewing covers to relay (*RLY*) boxes used to maintain electrical separation between redundant channels.

Contrary to the requirements of the procedure, the technicians did not stop at this point and instead continued with the testing of the "C" logic channel. Neglecting steps not yet completed for the "B" channel, the technicians requested the at-the-controls operator to arm and depress the manual NSSSS isolation pushbutton to the "C" logic channel. The system performed as designed with the subsequent system isolation occurring.

A review of previously reported LERs from River Bend Station revealed instances of ESF actuations due to a failure to follow procedures. LERs 85-031, 85-045, 85-051, and 86-051 reported RWCU isolations during surveillance testing when personnel failed to place the RWCU isolation bypass switch in the bypass position causing the system isolation.

In LER 85-045 a technician omitted a procedural step in an STP causing and Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) injection, and in LER 87-012 electrical maintenance personnel caused a loss of electrical power to feedwater regulating valves via a power interruption due to not following their job plan and maintenance procedure for troubleshooting a battery inverter. In each of these events, the involved personnel were counseled or procedures revised to improve clarity and enhance procedure performance.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 288A's (17))

Corrective Action

The technicians involved have been counseled on this event. In addition, training was conducted to caution all technicians on the requirements for following steps in the sequence prescribed in procedures. All I&C foreman have been counseled on the need to more actively monitor technicians performing sensitive testing.

Safety Assessment

The system performed as designed when it was inadvertently actuated. No other challenges to plant ESF systems occurred as a result of this event. The systems were returned to their normal standby configurations shortly after the occurrence.

Note: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the test as (*XX*).



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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AREA CODE 804 635 6094 346 8661

September 12, 1988
RBG-28782
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 88-016 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

L. A. England

for J. E. Booker
Manager-River Bend Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

mt ASB RLS
JEB/TFP/PDG/ERS/ch
LR

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