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radios) will be required to be returned to a single location. Pers need to use a radio in the power block will be required to sign a f are familiar with the SQO36 program before a radio will be issued. will review available documentation to determine if SQO36 adequatel electronic equipment that has been installed during the extended ou investigate the feasibility of reducing the maximum power level of currently in use.	e main control room ator level. The nnunciator alarmed lt of these signals ions personnel upport valve n system circuits s. The root cause o prohibit the use regarding the posting additional ence of this event, ents of SQ036, sed by plant ermanently maintain sonnel that have a form stating they In addition, TVA ly addresses new utage and will

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## DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On April 11, 1988, at approximately 0150 EDT and 0153 EDT, while unit 1 was in mode 5 (0 percent power, 5 psig, 127 degrees F), reactor trip signals were generated by the reactor protection system (EIIS Code JC) when it received a low steam generator number 3 (EIIS Code SB) level signal concurrent with a steam flow/feed flow mismatch signal. Reactor trips did not occur from these signals because unit 1 reactor trip breakers were already open.

At the time the reactor trip signals occurred, plant Modifications personnel were attempting to establish radio communication between the number 4 accumulator room and the main control room to support a functional test of flow control valve 1-FCV-90-109B. Radio communications could not be established and Modifications personnel resorted to the use of telephones to establish communications. 1-FCV-90-109B is an air sample valve for a lower containment radiation monitor (EIIS Code IL). The functional test was being performed as part of a 10 CFR 50.49 cable splice replacement effort in accordance with Workplan (WP) 12581.

At 0150 EDT, the unit 1 reactor operator (RO) observed a first out reactor trip annunciator (EIIS Code IB) alarm for number 3 steam generator low level steam flow/feed flow mismatch reactor trip. The alarm condition immediately cleared and was reset by the RO. At 0153 EDT, the RO witnessed a similar reactor trip signal as well as several bistable indicating lights which flashed on and off. The RO again acknowledged and reset the annunciator. Following the completion of testing, Modifications personnel went to the control room to obtain operator signatures in the workplan for the successful completion of the functional test. At that time, the RO and maintenance personnel were discussing the occurrence of the reactor trip alarms and the locations and time Modifications personnel were attempting to establish radio communications. The time of the reactor trip alarms coincided with the attempted use of the radios.

## CAUSE OF EVENT

The immediate cause of this event has been attributed to the use of a portable radio in the number 4 accumulator room. The radio transmission created interference in the reactor protection system (RPS) circuits from the number 3 steam generator level and steam flow transmitters. The circuits from these transmitters run through the number 4 accumulator room. The radio transmission interference simulated a low steam generator level concurrent with a high steam flow in steam generator number 3. Since low feedwater flow already existed (i.e., the steam generators were in wet layup), the reactor trip logic was satisfied and a trip signal was generated.

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The root cause of this event has been attributed to incomplete posting of signs prohibiting the use of portable radios in the accumulator rooms. Radio use is controlled at the Seguoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) by Standard Practice SQO36, "Control and Use of Portable Radio Equipment." SQO36 controls the use of radios by limiting the operating frequency and output power level, and by specifying the minimum distance from open instrument and control cabinets and electronic instruments that must be adhered to by SQN personnel. Further, SQO36 requires posting of signs to prohibit radio use around the subject equipment and in specified rooms. The accumulator room was posted in accordance with this procedure but personnel operating the radios could not see the signs from where they were located. Modifications personnel also did not believe that radio transmissions could create an interference problem because the unit was in cold shutdown and previous use of radios in this area had not resulted in any known interference problems.

## ANALYSIS OF EVENT

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This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.iv, as a condition that resulted in the actuation of the reactor protection system.

The steam generator steam flow/feed flow mismatch signal is processed with a low steam generator level signal by the RPS to generate a reactor trip. This trip is provided as an anticipatory trip to a low-low steam generator level trip (at 18 percent steam generator level) to protect the reactor from the potential loss of heat removal capabilities by a steam generator. The RPS compares steam generator steam flow signals to steam generator feedwater flow signals to determine if water inventory in the steam generators is decreasing. If the steam flow/feed flow mismatch exceeds a programmed setpoint, a signal will be provided to the reactor trip logic circuits. If the steam generator water inventory is actually decreasing from such a mismatch, the steam generator water level will decrease accordingly. Steam generator level is sensed by the RPS via steam generator level transmitters. If the steam generator level decreases to 25 percent, the low steam generator level bistables will also provide a signal to the reactor trip logic circuits. When a steam flow/feed flow mismatch signal is coincident with a low steam generator level signal from any one steam generator, the RPS will generate a reactor trip signal.

During this event, a steam generator steam flow/feed flow mismatch coincident with a low stam generator level did not actually occur since the unit was in mode 5 with the steam generators in wet layup. A reactor trip did not occur during this event because the reactor trip breakers were open before the receipt of the reactor trip signal. The RPS logic did provide a trip signal based on the artificial conditions caused by the radio transmission interference in the circuits; however, this signal is indicative of proper RPS operation. If this event had occurred during power operation, the RPS would have generated a trip signal and a normal reactor trip would be expected. Thus, this event did not result in an adverse condition on the health and safety of the public.

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

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## CORRECTIVE ACTION

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As immediate corrective action by the RO in response to the condition described herein, the alarms were acknowledged and reset. No further operator actions were required, as plant conditions did not warrant a reactor trip, and the reactor trip breakers were already open.

The SQ036 program addresses the required action that must be taken when radio transmissions are found to cause interference with electronic equipment that had not previously been identified as susceptible to radio transmission interference. That is, Attachment A to SQ036 is required to be revised to include the identified areas/equipment that are susceptible to interference. The SQ036 program also requires the identified areas be posted with signs prohibiting radio use. Since the instrumentation panels associated with the subject equipment are already included in SQ036, no procedure revision is necessary. However, to ensure personnel will be better informed regarding the prohibiting the use of portable radios will be placed in the vicinity of the accumulator rooms by July 1, 1988.

To ensure SQN personnel are aware of the requirements associated with portable radio use, TVA will issue a bulletin by May 31, 1988, stating that all SQN radio users must comply with the SQO36 program. In addition to the bulletin, further restrictions with regard to the use of portable radios in the SQN power block will be promulgated by SQN management. That is, portable radios that are currently being used in the power block by SQN personnel (other than those personnel in departments required to permanently maintain radios, e.g., Operations and Nuclear Security) will be required to be returned to the materials and procurement (M&P) section. SQN personnel that have a need to use portable radios in the power block will be required to check them out from M&P and sign a form stating that they are familiar with the SQO36 program. Those personnel in departments that are specifically required to maintain radios inside the power block will be briefed on the requirements of SQO36. These additional restrictions will become effective on July 1, 1988.

To ensure that SQO36 adequately addresses equipment that may have been installed during the extended SQN outage, TVA will review the documentation associated with engineering change notices (ECNs) that resulted in the installation of new electronic equipment. Equipment that is identified as being susceptible to radio transmission interference will be included in the next revision of SQC36, and signs prohibiting the use of radios will be posted in the immediate vicinity of this equipment. This review will be complete by November 30, 1988, and if necessary, a revision to SQO36 will be complete by December 29, 1988.

To reduce the potential for radio frequency interference, TVA is investigating the feasibility of reducing the maximum power level of the SQN radios currently in use. SQ036 presently limits the power level of portable radios to less than six watts. TVA will complete this feasibility study by July 31, 1988.

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Muclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

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May 10, 1988

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 5C-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT SQR0-50-327/88018

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning a reactor trip signal that was generated from radio transmission interference in reactor protection system circuits. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.iv.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

S. J. Smith Plant Manager

Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

> J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NSC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant