



A Centeror Energy Company

DONALD C. SHELTON  
Vice President - Nuclear  
(419) 249-2300

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Serial No. 1583

September 1, 1988

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: License Amendment Application Change Pages Regarding Referencing of  
the Control Rod Position Switches for Remote Shutdown Instrumentation  
(TAC No. 66735)

Gentlemen:

By letter dated August 5, 1988 (Serial No. 1492), Toledo Edison submitted an application for an amendment to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 Operating License, Appendix A, Technical Specifications involving Section 3/4.3.3.5, Instrumentation, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation, Tables 3.3-9 and 4.3-6. That submittal inadvertently omitted the marked-up Technical Specification pages depicting the requested changes. Enclosed are those marked-up pages which complete the License Amendment Application as previously transmitted by the aforementioned letter.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. R. W. Schrauder, Nuclear Licensing Manager, at (419) 249-2366.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R. W. Schrauder'.

RMC/tlt

Attachment

cc: DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector  
A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator (2 copies)  
State of Ohio  
A. W. DeAgazio, NRR Davis-Besse Project Manager

8809160051 880901  
PDR ADOCK 05000346  
P PDC

Accol  
1/1

**THIS PAGE PROVIDED  
FOR INFORMATION ONLY**

INSTRUMENTATION

REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-9 shall be OPERABLE with readouts displayed external to the control room.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-9, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.5 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6.

TABLE 3.3-9

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>READOUT LOCATION</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT RANGE</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
1. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication	(a) 480v F&DC CH. 2 Switchgear Room	OPEN-CLOSE	(a) 1 (Trip Breaker A)
	(b) 480v E&DC CH. 1 Switchgear Room		(b) 1 (Trip Breaker B)
	(c) 480v F&DC CH. 2 Switchgear Room		(c) 1 (Trip Breaker C)
	(d) CRDC Cabinet Room		(d) 1 (Trip Breaker D)
2. Reactor Coolant Temperature - Hot Leg	Aux. Shutdown Panel	520-620 °F	1
3. Reactor Coolant System Pressure	Aux. Shutdown Panel	0-3000 psig	1
4. Pressurizer Level	Aux. Shutdown Panel	0-320 inches	1
5. Steam Generator Outlet Steam Pressure	Aux. Shutdown Panel	0-1200 psig	1/steam generator
6. Steam Generator Level Startup Range	Aux. Shutdown Panel	0-250 inches	1/steam generator
7. Control Rod Position <del>Level</del> Switches	Control Rod Drive Control Cabinets, System Logic Cabinet #4	0, 25, 50, 75 and 100%	1/rod

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

3/4 3-44

AMENDMENT NO. 110

TABLE 4.3-6

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication	H	N.A.
2. Reactor Coolant Temperature-Hot Legs	H	R
3. Reactor Coolant System Pressure	H	R
4. Pressurizer Level	H	R
5. Steam Generator Outlet Steam Pressure	H	R
6. Steam Generator Startup Range Level	H	R
7. Control Rod Position <u>Limit</u> Switches	H	X N.A.

~~10-month surveillance test due May 17, 1983, may be delayed until 2400 hours September 17, 1983.~~

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1

3/4 3-45

Amendment No. 59

**THIS PAGE PROVIDED  
FOR INFORMATION ONLY**

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

---

---

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.

3/4.3.3.2 INCORE DETECTORS

The OPERABILITY of the incore detectors ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. See Bases Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for examples of acceptable minimum incore detector arrangements.

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event so that the response of those features important to safety may be evaluated. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility. This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes," April 1974.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public. This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23 "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of

**THIS PAGE PROVIDED  
FOR INFORMATION ONLY**

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

---

REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost.

3/4.3.3.6 POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the post-accident instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

3/4.3.3.7 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the chlorine detection systems ensures that an accidental chlorine release will be detected promptly and the control room emergency ventilation system will automatically isolate the control room and initiate its operation in the recirculation mode to provide the required protection. The chlorine detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operations Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.