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Region V, Division of Compliance

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY - DIABLO CANYON UNIT NO. 1  
DOCKET NO. 50-275

The attached report contains the details of my recent inspection of construction activities at the site of the subject facility. No items of nonconformance were identified. The announced inspection was conducted on December 1, 2 and 3, 1970 pursuant to PI 3800/2 and in accordance with the master inspection schedule for the project.

The PG&E QA investigation concerning our previous observation of possible inadequate technique in performing liquid penetrant testing of a root pass of a weld in a liquid holdup tank appeared to be timely and comprehensive. The results of the investigation failed to show a general deficiency in the PDM QC program. Based on my review of the investigation effort, I considered PG&E's followup action concerning the issue to be adequate.

PG&E's UT test findings concerning the wall thickness of the spools of primary piping in storage indicates possibly that the Westinghouse and Vendor QC inspection efforts may not be sufficiently comprehensive in scope. I concur with PG&E in that more extensive examinations of the piping need be performed before valid conclusions can be reached. I intend to pursue the subject and will report fully on PG&E's additional test efforts and conclusions after the next scheduled inspection (March 1971).

Generally, I found adequate documentation concerning construction discrepancies and QA audits. In particular the documentation of the occurrences involving the steam generators and the reactor vessel showed the complete history of relevant facts, circumstances, evaluations and actions.

You will note the removal of the sea water from the generators was effective and that an article quoted in the report indicates that the exposure to sea water under such conditions does not create chloride stress corrosion problems. The inspection of the reactor vessel penetration tubes after being struck by the wooden panel was considered comprehensive and should have detected any damage. I also included in the report the data obtained from PG&E's independent tests to demonstrate the detrimental effect of arc burns on reinforcing steel since it may be of interest to other inspectors.

The events associated with the discrepant anchor bolts appeared to have accentuated the need for the implementation of a formal procedure clearly delegating specific responsibilities to appropriate personnel to confirm that the information shown on certifications is consistent with what the certification implies. The PG&E on-site QC personnel began this practice after our June inspection.

*G. D. Johnson*  
for A. D. Johnson  
Reactor Inspector