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February 28, 1986

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. D. Muller, Project Director BWR Project Directorate No. 2 Division of Boiling Water Reactor Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC DOCKET 50-321
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
PRESERVICE INSPECTION DISCREPANCIES

Gentlemen:

As previously discussed with the NRC, during the course of Hatch Unit 1 inservice inspection and IGSCC mitigation activities, plant personnel discovered an additional 28" diameter circumferential shop weld in the "A" Recirculation (Recirc) system loop. The subject shop weld is located between welds 1B31-1RC-28A-5 and 1B31-1RC-28A-6 (Refer to Figure 1, attached) and has been designated as weld 1B31-1RC-28A-5A (weld 5A).

A detailed investigation conducted by Georgia Power Company (GPC) personnel, including the Company's chief mechanical engineer, revealed that weld 5A was shown only on the drawings of the piping fabricator, Associated Piping and Engineering Company (AP&E). The subject shop weld was not shown on either the drawings of the NSSS vendor and Recirc piping supplier, General Electric, or the field erection drawings of the piping installer, M. W. Kellogg. The original examination agency, Southwest Research Institute (SwRI), did not include weld 5A and its adjacent longitudinal seam piping welds 1B31-1RC-28A-5A-LU (weld 5A-LU) and 1B31-1RC-28A-5A-LD (weld 5A-LD) in the preservice inspection plan and the subsequent inservice inspection plan which SwRI developed. Welds 5A, 5A-LU, and 5A-LD were not examined by SwRI during the preservice inspection of the Recirc piping in December, 1973. Review of the AP&E documentation indicated that nondestructive examinations were performed on weld 5A, including surface and volumetric examinations, which meet or exceed the requirements of the code (i.e., 1971 Edition of ASME Section XI with Addenda through Summer 1972) to which the preservice inspection was conducted.

Welds 5A, 5A-LU, and 5A-LD were not inspected in service until the current outage. Ultrasonic examination of the subject welds revealed that the welds were free of any rejectable indications. Subsequent to the ultrasonic examinations, weld 5A was treated using induction heating stress



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improvement (IHSI). The weld was examined again post-IHSI and was found to fully meet appropriate acceptance criteria, with no rejectable indications. It should be noted that insulation removal from this section of piping for normal or augmented inservice inspection had not been required since the existence of the subject circumferential weld was unknown. The insulation was removed during the current outage to facilitate mounting of equipment to perform IHSI on weld 1B31-1RC-28A-5.

Subsequent to the recent discovery, the ASME Code Class 1 stainless steel piping in the Recirc, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Systems for those sizes of piping required to be examined pursuant to ASME Section XI Code requirements was walked down to assure there were no additional welds. Two independent walkdowns indicated no additional welds exist in the aforementioned systems' piping.

As a result of the discovery of weld 5A, statements made by GPC relative to the performance of stainless steel piping weld examinations conducted during the 1984 maintenance/refueling outage require correction. Various GPC letters submitted to NRC relative to the 1984 outage and inspection plans for the 1985 outage have indicated that one hundred percent of the piping welds (circumferential and branch connection welds) for those sizes of Class 1 Recirc, RHR, and RWCU stainless steel piping required to be examined pursuant to ASME Section XI were examined during the 1984 outage. As a result of the discovery of weld 5A such statements were not accurate; approximately ninty nine percent of the accessible welds in the subject stainless steel piping were examined.

Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office.

Sincerely yours,

IT Amara

L. T. Gucwa


JAE/mb Attachment

xc: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.

Mr. H. C. Nix. Jr.

Dr. J. N. Grace (NRC-Region II)

Senior Resident Inspector



GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NO. I

B31 - RECIRC - 28-A-MAIN RECIRCULATION LOOP "A"

FIGURE 1