

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5N 157B Lookout Place

February 20, 1986

BLRD-50-438/86-05
BLRD-50-439/86-04

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

05 FEB 24 P 1:29

Dear Dr. Grace:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CABLES INSIDE VERTICAL CONDUIT RUNS
ARE UNSUPPORTED - BLRD-50-433/86-05, BLRD-50-439/86-04 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
Art Johnson on January 21, 1986 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as SCR BLN
4657. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next
report on or about one year before fuel load of unit 1.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


R. L. Gridley
Manager of Licensing

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. James Taylor, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
CABLES INSIDE VERTICAL CONDUIT
RUNS ARE UNSUPPORTED
BLRD-50-438/86-05 AND BLRD-50-439/86-04
SCR BLN 4657
10 CFR 50.55(e)

FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Some safety-related electrical cables routed inside vertical conduit runs are not supported at the top of the vertical drop in accordance with TVA's General Specification G-38 Revision 5 (G-38 R5), "Installing Insulated Cables Rated Up To 15,000 Volts." The condition was identified as a result of a generic investigation of Watts Bar nonconformance W-262-P.

The apparent causes of this condition are (1) the failure to include vertical cable support criteria in G-38 for approximately four years and (2) the failure to adhere to the criteria during installation for a period of time after G-38 revision 5 was issued.

Safety Implications

Cables subject to the identified deficiency could experience conductor degradation and/or insulation failure at cable or conduit bends due to the weight of unsupported cables and contact with the metal edges of cable trays or conduits. In addition, cable terminations could fail due to the same applied forces. This could degrade or interrupt safety-related power supplies thus potentially adversely affecting the safety of operations of the plant.

Interim Progress

TVA is reviewing the installation requirements provided in G-38 R5 to determine the required and appropriate corrective actions. TVA will provide a final report upon determination of the corrective actions but no later than one year before fuel load of unit 1.