

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3

DOCKET NUMBER (2): 423  
050000

PAGE 1 OF 2

TITLE (4): Violation of Pressure Boundaries without Proper Notification

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER (5)
01	25	86	86	0016		02	21	86			050000
											050000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20 402(b)	20 405(c)	80 731(a)(2)(iv)	73 71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10): 000	20 406(a)(1)(i)	80 38(a)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80 731(a)(2)(iv)	73 71(c)
	20 405(a)(1)(ii)	80 38(a)(2)	80 731(a)(2)(v)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)
	20 406(a)(1)(iii)	80 731(a)(2)(i)	80 731(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20 405(a)(1)(iv)	80 731(a)(2)(ii)	80 731(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20 406(a)(1)(iv)	80 731(a)(2)(iii)	80 731(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):

NAME: Lawrence Loomis, Associate Engineer  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 203 447-1791

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
X	NA		S420						
X	NF		S420						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):

YES  (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE: ) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15):

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces - i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16):

During low power physics testing on 1/25/86, at 1630 hours, while operating in the startup mode it was discovered that the integrity of the Control Room pressure envelope had been violated without notification of the Shift Supervisor. In a similar incident on 1/27/86, at 1616 hours, with the same conditions of operation, the Control Room was notified that the Supplementary Leak Collection System boundary was suspected of being compromised. The immediate operator action, in both instances, was to notify plant management, enter into the appropriate limiting condition for operation, and secure the penetration as expeditiously as possible.

Investigation into the cause of these incidents revealed a deficiency in the identification of penetrations on authorized work orders. The required corrective action is the addition of a form to work order packages, which specifically address penetrations. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (v).

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0   5   0   0   0   4   2   3	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8   6	-   0   0   6	-   0   0	0   2	OF   0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

During low power physics testing on 1/25/86, at 1630 hours, while operating in the startup mode (with reactor coolant temperature at 557° Fahrenheit and pressure of 2250 psia) it was discovered that the integrity of the Control Room pressure envelope had been violated without notification of the Shift Supervisor. In a similar incident on 1/27/86, at 1616 hours, with the same conditions of operation, the Control Room was notified that the Supplementary Leak Collection Removal System (SLCRS) boundary was suspected of being compromised. The immediate action taken by Operations personnel, upon discovery of these conditions, was to notify plant management, enter into the appropriate limiting conditions for operation, and secure the penetration as expeditiously as possible.

Initial investigation identified that in both instances approved work orders had inadvertently authorized the removal of pressure envelope electrical penetration wall seals. The root cause of the incidents was determined to be a deficiency in the extent in which electrical penetrations are required to be identified. The standard method of identifying penetrations was by number and construction map (which was not routinely used by Operations). This provided opportunities for misinterpretations of the physical locations of subject penetrations.

As corrective action, to ensure that boundaries (pressure and fire) are properly identified, a form was generated to be included in future work order packages. This form clearly identifies boundary openings and directs the identification by building, elevation, and room for each opening. This will provide protection against recurrence.

The safety implication was the possible inability to maintain either the Control Room at the design positive pressure or the SLCRS area at the design slight vacuum in the event of an accident.

This report is being submitted as required by 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (v).

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY  
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY  
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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February 21, 1986  
MP-8734

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-49  
Docket No. 50-423  
Licensee Event Report 50-423/86-006-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 86-006-00 required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (v), any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Wayne D. Romberg'.

Wayne D. Romberg  
Station Superintendent  
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

WDR/TC:se

Attachment: LER 86-006-00

cc: Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I

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