

ATTACHMENT B

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST

LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 2

PROPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be equal to or greater than:

- a. 0.38% delta k/k with the highest worth rod analytically determined, or
- b. 0.28% delta k/k with the highest worth rod determined by test.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#], 2[#], 3[#], 4[#], and 5[#].

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than specified:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, reestablish the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, immediately verify all insertable control rods to be inserted and suspend all activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours.
- c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS* and other activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour. Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be equal to or greater than specified at any time during the fuel cycle:

- a. By measurement, prior to or during the first startup after each refueling.
- b. By measurement, within 500 MWD/T prior to the core average exposure at which the predicted SHUTDOWN MARGIN, including uncertainties and calculation biases, is equal to the specified limit.
- c. Within 12 hours after detection of a withdrawn control rod that is immovable, as a result of excessive motion or mechanical interference, or is untrippable, except that the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod.

*Except movement of IRMs, SRMs or special movable detectors.

[#]See Special Test Exception 3.10.9

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS

CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All control rods shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#], and 2[#].

ACTION:

- a. With one control rod inoperable due to being immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference, or known to be untrippable:
 1. Within 1 hour:
 - a) Verify that the inoperable control rod, if withdrawn, is separated from all other inoperable control rods by at least two control cells in all directions.
 - b) Disarm the associated directional control valves* either:
 - 1) Electrically, or
 - 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
 - c) Comply with Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.c.
 2. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
 3. Restore the inoperable control rod to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With one or more control rods trippable but inoperable for causes other than addressed in ACTION a, above:
 1. If the inoperable control rod(s) is withdrawn:
 - a) Immediately verify:
 - 1) That the inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) is separated from all other inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) by at least two control cells in all directions, and
 - 2) The insertion capability of the inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) by inserting the control rod(s) at least one notch by drive water pressure within the normal operating range**.
 - b) Otherwise, insert the inoperable withdrawn control rod(s) and disarm the associated directional control valves* either:
 - 1) Electrically, or
 - 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves

*May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

**The inoperable control rod may then be withdrawn to a position no further withdrawn than its position when found to be inoperable.

[#]See Special Test Exception 3.10.10

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD MAXIMUM SCRAM INSERTION TIMES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of each control rod from the fully withdrawn position to notch position 05, based on de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed 7 seconds.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#] and 2[#].

ACTION:

- a. With the maximum scram insertion time of one or more control rods exceeding 7 seconds:
 1. Declare the control rod(s) with the slow insertion time inoperable, and
 2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2c. at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with three or more control rods with maximum scram insertion times in excess of 7 seconds.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of the control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement with reactor coolant pressure greater than or equal to 950 psig and, during single control rod scram time tests, the control rod drive pumps isolated from the accumulators:

- a. For all control rods prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER following CORE ALTERATIONS* or after a reactor shutdown that is greater than 120 days,
- b. For specifically affected individual control rods following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or control rod drive system which could affect the scram insertion time of those specific control rods, and
- c. For at least 10% of the control rods, on a rotating basis, at least once per 120 days of operation.

*Except movement of SRM, IRM or special movable detectors or normal control rod movement.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.10

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD AVERAGE SCRAM INSERTION TIMES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.1.3.3 The average scram insertion time of all OPERABLE control rods from the fully withdrawn position, based on de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

<u>Position Inserted From Fully Withdrawn</u>	<u>Average Scram Insertion Time (Seconds)</u>
45	0.43
39	0.86
25	1.93
05	3.49

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#] and 2.

ACTION:

With the average scram insertion time exceeding any of the above limits, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.3.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.

[#]See Special Test Exception 3.10.10

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
FOUR CONTROL ROD GROUP SCRAM INSERTION TIMES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.4 The average scram insertion time, from the fully withdrawn position, for the three fastest control rods in each group of four control rods arranged in a two-by-two array, based on deenergization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

<u>Position Inserted From Fully Withdrawn</u>	<u>Average Scram Insertion Time (Seconds)</u>
45	0.45
39	0.92
25	2.05
05	3.70

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#] and 2[#].

ACTION:

- a. With the average scram insertion times of control rods exceeding the above limits:
 1. Declare the control rods with the slower than average scram insertion times inoperable until an analysis is performed to determine that required scram reactivity remains for the slow four control rod group, and
 2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2c. at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with an average scram insertion time(s) in excess of the average scram insertion time limit.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.4 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.

#See Special Test Exception. 3.10.10

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.5 All control rod scram accumulators shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#], 2[#], and 5^{*#}.

ACTION:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2:
 1. With one control rod scram accumulator inoperable:
 - a) Within 8 hours, either:
 - 1) Restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status, or
 - 2) Declare the control rod associated with the inoperable accumulator inoperable.
 - b) Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
 2. With more than one control rod scram accumulator inoperable, declare the associated control rod inoperable and:
 - a) If the control rod associated with any inoperable scram accumulator is withdrawn, immediately verify that at least one CRD pump is operating by inserting at least one withdrawn control rod at least one notch by drive water pressure within the normal operating range or place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
 - b) Insert the inoperable control rods and disarm the associated directional control valves either:
 - 1) Electrically, or
 - 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 with:
 1. One withdrawn control rod with its associated scram accumulator inoperable, insert the affected control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves within 1 hour, either:
 - a) Electrically, or
 - b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
 2. More than one withdrawn control rod with the associated scram accumulator inoperable or with no control rod drive pump operating, immediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

*At least the accumulator associated with each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.10

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTROL ROD DRIVE COUPLING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#], 2[#], and 5*[#].

ACTION:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism:

1. Within 2 hours, either:

a) If permitted by the RWM and RSCS, insert the control rod drive mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:

- 1) Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and
- 2) Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position.

b) If recoupling is not accomplished on the first attempt or, if not permitted by the RWM or RSCS then until permitted by the RWM and RSCS, declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:

- 1) Electrically, or
- 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

2. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours, either:

1. Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or

2. If recoupling is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:

- a) Electrically, or
- b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

*At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

**May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.10

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.7 The control rod position indication system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#], 2[#] and 5*[#].

ACTION:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one or more control rod position indicators inoperable within one hour:
 1. Determine the position of the control rod by:
 - (a) Moving the control rod, by single notch movement, to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator,
 - (b) Returning the control rod, by single notch movement, to its original position, and
 - (c) Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours, or
 2. Move the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, or
 3. When THERMAL POWER is:
 - (a) Within the low power setpoint of the RSCS:
 - (1) Declare the control rod inoperable,
 - (2) Verify the position and bypassing of control rod with inoperable "Full in" and/or "Full out" position indicators by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.
 - b) Greater than the low power setpoint of the RSCS, declare the control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:
 - (1) Electrically, or
 - (2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
 4. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

*At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

**May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.10.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS

ROD WORTH MINIMIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.4.1 The rod worth minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1[#] and 2^{*#}, when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power setpoint.

ACTION:

- a. With the RWM inoperable, verify control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed control rod pattern by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff who is present at the reactor control console. Otherwise, control rod movement may be only by actuating the manual scram or placing the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.4.1 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, and in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 prior to RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.
- c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within 1 hour after RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.
- d. By verifying the control rod patterns and sequence input to the RWM computer is correctly loaded following any loading of the program into the computer.

*Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

See Special Test Exception 3.10.8

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM
ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.4.2 The rod sequence control system (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2^{#**}, when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power setpoint.

ACTION:

- a. With the RSCS inoperable:
 1. Control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin.
 2. Control rod movement shall not be permitted, except by a scram.
- b. With an inoperable control rod(s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod(s) in the RSCS provided that:
 1. The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, and
 2. There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in any RSCS group.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.4.2 The RSCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performance of a self-test prior to:
 1. Each reactor startup, and
 2. Rod inhibit mode automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER.
- b. Attempting to select and move an inhibited control rod:
 1. After withdrawal of the first insequence control rod for each reactor startup, and
 2. Within one hour after rod inhibit mode automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

#Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

**See Special Test Exception 3.10.8

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 The reactor mode switch shall be OPERABLE and locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position. When the reactor mode switch is locked in the Refuel position:

- a. A control rod other than 02-43 shall not be withdrawn unless the Refuel position one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE; and during the second fuel cycle, control rod 02-43 is disarmed and fully inserted.
- b. CORE ALTERATIONS shall not be performed using equipment associated with a Refuel position interlock unless at least the following Refuel position interlocks are OPERABLE for such equipment.
 1. All rods in.
 2. Refuel platform position.
 3. Refuel platform hoists fuel-loaded.
 4. Service platform hoist fuel-loaded.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5*[#].

ACTION:

- a. With the reactor mode switch not locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position as specified, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position.
- b. With the one-rod-out interlock inoperable, lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c. With any of the above required Refuel position equipment interlocks inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS with equipment associated with the inoperable Refuel position equipment interlock.

* See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.3. ^{##}

[#]The reactor shall be maintained in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

^{##}The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Run or Startup/Hot Standby position to test the switch interlock functions provided that all control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.8 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.8 The provisions of Specifications 3.1.4.1 and 3.1.4.2 may be suspended for control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle to allow the demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at this control rod location. The FMCRD 02-43 will be bypassed in the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) and programmed out of the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM).

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

Movement of control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle is permitted provided that:

- a. Thermal power is greater than 25% Rated Thermal Power, and
- b. A rod pattern has been established.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.8 Prior to movement of control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle, a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff who is present at the reactor control console will verify that:

- a. Thermal power is greater than 25% Rated Thermal Power, and
- b. A rod pattern has been established.

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.9 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.9 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN is equal to or greater than:

- a. 0.38% delta k/k with the highest worth rod analytically determined, or
- b. 0.28% delta k/k with the highest worth rod determined by test.
(With an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of FMCRD 02-43.)

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than specified:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, reestablish the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, immediately verify all insertable control rods to be inserted and suspend all activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WITHIN 8 hours.
- c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS[#] and other activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour. Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.9 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the fine motion control rod 02-43 to be equal to or greater than specified at any time during the second fuel cycle:

- a. By measurement, prior to or during the first startup after each refueling.
- b. By measurement, within 500 MWD/T prior to the core average exposure at which the predicted SHUTDOWN MARGIN, including uncertainties and calculation biases, is equal to the specified limit.
- c. Within 12 hours after detection of a withdrawn control rod that is immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference, or is untrippable, except that the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod.

[#]Except movement of IRMs, SRMs or special moveable detectors.

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.10 CONTROL RODS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.10 The provisions of Specifications 3.1.3.1 thru 3.1.3.7 may be suspended for control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle to allow the demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at this control rod location, provided conditions of 3.10.9 are satisfied.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5.

ACTION:

With the requirements of 3.10.9 not satisfied, immediately insert control rod 02-43 and disarm the drive motor electrically.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.10 The provisions of Specification 4.1.3.1 thru 4.1.3.7 may be suspended for control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle to allow the demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at this location.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

BASES

3/4.10.8 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS

With the in-plant demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD) installed at the peripheral location 02-43 during the second fuel cycle, position 02-43 will be bypassed in the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) and programmed out of the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM). This will free the FMCRD rod from the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) and notch movement restrictions. By requiring that thermal power be greater than 25% rated thermal power and a rod pattern be established (after the withdrawal/insert sequences of its Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence Group are complete) before movement of control rod 02-43, one ensures that this rod will be moved only under conditions when the RSCS and RWM are not required to be operable. After one cycle of demonstration with this control rod, position 02-43 will be returned to the RSCS and RWM in conjunction with the reinstallation of the original locking piston control rod.

3/4.10.9 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

With the in-plant demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at 02-43 during the second fuel cycle, the shutdown margin shall be demonstrated assuming this control rod is at the fully withdrawn position. In other words, during the second fuel cycle, the shutdown margin shall be equal to or greater than the values specified in Specification 3.1.1 with the most reactive control rod and the fine motion control rod fully withdrawn.

3/4.10.10 CONTROL ROD

A fine motion control rod drive will be installed at LaSalle County Station Unit-2 during the second fuel cycle. To minimize the safety impact, a peripheral location 02-43 is selected. Due to the temporary test nature of this control rod drive, safety evaluation has been performed to justify continued safe operation of the reactor assuming this control rod drive is inoperable. However, this rod is not considered inoperable in the context of specifications 3.1.3.1 through 3.1.3.7 and any scram time will not be included in τ_{ave} in specification 3/4.2.3. Thus during the second fuel cycle operation the LCO and surveillance requirements applicable to regular control rods are exempted for this control rod. After one cycle of demonstration, this control rod drive will be removed and the original locking piston control rod drive will be reinstalled at this location.

ATTACHMENT C

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST

LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 AND 2

EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

- 1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the Fine Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD) will be removed and a locking piston control rod drive (CRD) of the original design will be reinstalled. This will restore the CRD system to the configuration of its original design. The Technical Specifications will likewise be returned to their original state.
- 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because this proposed amendment and actions that are scheduled for removing the FMCRD and reinstalling a locking piston CRD will restore the CRD system to the configuration of its original design. All the original accident evaluations will again be valid for the CRD System.
- 3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because the CRD system will be returned to its original design and therefore all of the original safety evaluation will apply. The margin of safety will likewise return to its original level.

Guidance has been provided in 51 FR 7744 for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards considerations. This document provides examples of amendments which are and are not likely considered to involve significant hazards considerations. This amendment request is similar to example (ix) of

the examples that are not likely to involve significant hazards consideration. Example (ix) is a change which involves a repair or replacement of a major component or system important to safety, if the following conditions are met:

- (1) The repair or replacement process involves practices which have been successfully implemented at least once on similar components or systems elsewhere in the nuclear industry or in other industries, and does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; and
- (b) The repaired or replacement component or system does not result in a significant change in its safety function or a significant reduction in any safety limit (or limiting condition of operation) associated with the component or system.

This change falls within this example in that the Locking Piston CRD originally installed is being reinstalled. Therefore by replacement of the CRD mechanism, the CRD system will be restored to that originally reviewed and approved by the issuance of the LaSalle Unit 2 license.

This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establish safety limits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings or a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(e), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.