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DAIS:

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P R O C E E D I N G S.

MR. HUSAR: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Ihor W. Husar. I am the Chairman of the Regional Assistance Committee for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II, New York.

Before we begin, I would like to go over some administrative announcements to include some ground rules for the proceeding we are about to undertake. What we would like to do this evening in connection with this public meeting--and we have asked people as they were coming in to get a sheet of paper that allows every one of you sitting out there to state a question or comment you would like to make so that we can give everyone an opportunity to be heard, whether it is a question, comment or statement to make.

We have people available that will collect these sheets of paper with the information that we would ask you to put on that, individuals who are about the room with green arm bands. As we speak and if you have already filled the sheets out, please raise your hand and we will have people circulating that will collect these sheets of

paper. These sheets of paper will be passed forward and as we make the presentations, they will be collected and sorted and we will try to arrange these sheets of paper so they can be best responded to by the people in the best position to answer these questions.

The purpose of the meeting--before we begin that, I would like to introduce the people here on the dais sitting next to me. First of all, Mr. John Weismantle. He is the vice-president of resources and development. Seated next to him is Mr. Charles Daverio, manager, nuclear operations and support department. Sitting next to him is Mr. John Leonard, vice-president, nuclear operations. Sitting at the far end is Mr. Ron Bellamy from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This FEMA proceeding is being memorialized in the form of a transcript and therefore will be made part of the permanent record for the FEMA files on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant station. A transcript of this proceeding will be made available, as well as the exercise, post-exercise assessment report when published and will be available at the Shoreham-Wading River

Public Library on North Country Road.

FEMA will not have copies of either the transcript or the post-exercise assessment report available to the public at large but will make them available not only at that library but also, once this information is docketed with the NRC, made available through normal procedures for such information.

The purpose of this public meeting is four-fold. One, to acquaint the members of the public in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant at Shoreham of the contents of the off-site plan and what the conduct of the joint exercise which tested the plan is. Two, answer any questions about FEMA review of the plan and the exercise. Three, receive suggestions from the public concerning improvements or changes that might be necessary. Four, describe to the public the way in which the plan is expected to function in the event of a real emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant Station.

The policies and procedures for review and approval by the Federal Emergency Management Agency of off-site radiologic emergency response

plans and preparedness for coping with off-site effects of radiological emergencies which may occur at the commercial nuclear power facilities are established in FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350, entitled "Review and Approval of State and Local Radiologic Emergency Plans and Preparedness." The evaluation of the adequacy of the off-site emergency planning for nuclear power plants at the operating licensee review stage where state and/or local governments decline to participate in off-site emergency planning is spelled out in Nuclear Regulatory Commission Final Rule Change, same subject, dated November 3, 1987.

The guidance for review and approval of utility-only plans is contained in Interim Supplement 1 to Nuclear Regulatory Commission document 0654/FEMA Rep 1, Revision 1, dated November 1, 1987. That document is entitled "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of a Nuclear Power Plant. This is commonly referred to as the criteria for utility off-site planning and preparedness.

Factored into this evaluation in an

actual radiologic emergency, state and local officials that have declined to participate in emergency planning will--and there are three assumptions that are in this supplement to the NUREG.

Number one, that these non-participating organizations will exercise the best effort to protect the health and safety of the public. Number two, that they will cooperate with the utility and follow the utility off-site plan and, three, they have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility off-site plan where state and local response is necessary.

The FEMA regional director, Mr. Jack N. Sable, my boss, is responsible for directing the off-site plan review, evaluating the off-site organization's implementation of the plan at a joint exercise and providing a recommendation of off-site preparedness finding to FEMA headquarters. This recommended finding will in turn be passed along to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I have been in close touch with the regional director regarding the plan review and in touch daily during the conduct of the recent three-day exercise. Mr.

Sable will be ready to complete his evaluation and forward his recommended finding to FEMA headquarters when all three components of the FEMA rule process are complete.

There are three components to the regional director's recommendation of finding regarding off-site plans and preparedness regarding a site which has applied for an operating license with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A recommended finding regarding the off-site plan, a post-exercise assessment report evaluating a joint exercise, and a summary of concerns or recommendations identified during public meeting. That is what this particular meeting is all about.

Mr. Sable will forward that recommendation to FEMA headquarters after the publication of the final post-exercise assessment report. FEMA headquarters will review the recommendation and transmit their final determination to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

What we would like to do now is establish a format for the rest of the presentations. What we would like to do is to have a discussion of the plan and, after discussion of

the plan by the presenters here on the dais, we will have discussion, impressions of how the exercise went. In order of the presentations, we will have the discussion of the off-site plan, the local emergency response organization plan given by Mr. Charles Daverio. He will be followed by me, and I will give an evaluation of that plan as it was formally submitted through the NRC to FEMA for review.

After discussion of the plan, we will then have presentations regarding the exercise, first the on-site, by Mr. Bellamy, followed by a discussion of the on-site by Mr. John Leonard, and then a discussion of the off-site aspects of this exercise first by Mr. John Weismantle, followed by me, providing impressions of how we thought the exercise went from the FEMA perspective.

Having said that, what I would like to do now is turn the microphone over to Mr. Daverio.

MR. DAVERIO: Good evening. As mentioned, I am Charles Daverio, manager of nuclear department operations at Shoreham. One of my responsibilities is emergency planning. My function here tonight is to give an outline and

overview of the emergency plan titled "The Local Emergency Response Organization." This plan and its associated implementing procedures delineates all the response activities at a local level that are needed in reaction to an incident at the plant. The plan describes the ability to respond at a local level absent state and county participation in the planning effort. The procedures contain detailed information and are used in implementing that plan.

Just to give you a little bit of history, when Suffolk County and New York State refused to continue their planning effort for Shoreham, the LERO effort began and the plan was developed as an interim measure for licensing of the nuclear power plant. The LERO plan and its procedures call for immediate notification of Suffolk County and New York State of an emergency at Shoreham. Although not involved in the planning process, it is assumed, as Mr. Husar just explained, that Suffolk County and New York State would respond and exercise their best effort to protect the citizens of New York State and Suffolk County during a radiological emergency.

LERO is a volunteer organization similar to that of the Red Cross, will offer support, advice, assistance to those officials in making and implementing effective action recommendation. The plan indicates the role of the agencies involved and the roles of all other outside agencies to accomplish stated objectives. The plan also describes the coordination of the response within this organization structure.

Federal guidance for preparation of a radiological emergency plan is given in a document entitled "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of a Nuclear Power Plant. That is long for a short term, NUREG 0654 document FEMA Rep 1. This document has jointly been issued by NRC and FEMA and is used throughout the country.

Within the scope of the plan, there are two major emergency planning zones. One of these is the plume exposure pathway zone and the other is the ingestion pathway zone. The plume zone is an area surrounding the station which is approximately 10 miles in circumference. The principal exposure sources for the pathway are

whole-body exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and from deposited material and inhalation exposure from passing radioactive plume. The land surrounding--the land area of the Shoreham plume exposure pathway is totally in Suffolk County, covering an area approximately from Port Jefferson to Riverhead and on the south bounded by Sunrise Highway.

To facilitate planning this 10-mile area is further subdivided into distinct planning areas. There are 19 zones within this 10-mile planning area. The boundary of each of these zones was chosen based on easily identified roadways or political boundaries to which affected individuals, including transients, could relate their activities. Each zone is then given an alphabetic designation, A through S.

Within the 10-mile zone there is also two smaller rings, two and five miles, measured radially from the plant which have been maintained and designed to allow additional flexibility depending on meteorological conditions and radiological conditions at the plant.

The ingestion pathway, by contrast, is

that area encompassed by a radius of approximately 50 miles from the station. This is an area, in general, bounded by the Queens/Nassau border, to Montauk Point and north to Hartford in Connecticut. The principal exposure from this pathway would be the ingestion of contaminated water or food such as milk, fresh vegetables or aquatic foodstuffs.

Turning to the organization itself, the Local Emergency Response Organization is an organization of more than 3,000 LILCO employees, consultants and support organizations trained to respond to a radiological emergency at the Shoreham site. The purpose of this organization is to help protect the health and safety of the public during any incident.

In addition to LERO members, other organizations have been trained to help support this response. Private ambulances and ambulettes will help move people who require special transportation. LERO ambulance and health facilities and home coordinators at the emergency operation center will coordinate these activities. Local bus companies have been contracted with to provide vehicles to assist in the evacuation of the

general public and school children within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. These services will be coordinated through LFRO's evacuation coordinator, the transportation support coordinator and bus coordinator again at the local emergency operations center.

During a radiologic emergency, the Federal Aviation Administration would help by restricting aircraft activities in the vicinity of the Shoreham site. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard will be providing notification of the water portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

The Department of Energy, with their facilities at the Brookhaven National Lab, will provide independent radiological assessment and dose assessment services--radiological accident and dose assessment services. If necessary, DOE facilities at other government laboratories--Bedes, Argon, Oak Ridge--will provide supplemental assistance.

American Red Cross will open, manage and operate congregate care centers for evacuees who need shelters. Evacuees will be directed to the centers from the LERO evacuee reception

centers.

Turning for a second to how the plan works, LERO has developed a set of plans and procedures for handling these--entitled "Local Off-Site Emergency Response Plan and Its Implementing Procedures." The procedures give guidelines to emergency workers on how to handle and develop and implement appropriate protective actions for the general public in coordination with state and county officials.

Turning first to emergency declaration, in NUREG 0654, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA have established a uniform classification system which is used at a hundred nuclear power stations throughout this country. This system directs the plan operators to declare one of four emergency levels automatically if specific readings on plant gauges and system indicators are reached. From the least to the most severe, these four emergency levels are Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area and General. While all four levels require immediate notification of government officials, only the general emergency represents a situation that might require

recommendations of protective actions to the general public.

The director and manager and--the director, manager of local response and five other senior LERO coordinators are notified of any emergency declaration, even Unusual Events occurring at Shoreham. Director of local response will also contact state and county officials to notify them of emergency and offer LERO's assistance as a volunteer organization. Other LERO members are notified and mobilized at either an Alert or Site Area, depending on the level and need for their assistance.

Once we have started the activation, an accident assessment is conducted to determine if protective actions should be recommended for residents within the 10-mile emergency planning zone around Shoreham. The first step of this assessment is to evaluate the Shoreham plant and weather conditions for initial reactions to the accident. LILCO and Department of Energy personnel stationed at the Brookhaven National Lab will send out monitoring teams to measure radiation levels if required. Their findings would be evaluated by

LERO and additional DOE people at the Brookhaven National Lab and will, along with other information, pass down from the plant at the local emergency operations center in Brentwood.

This evaluation would include calculations to predict the effects of radiation releases to the public within the 10 miles as well as predicting any ingestion pathway problems. The predictions are based on recommendations from the Environmental Protection Agency protective action guidelines which are used throughout the nation. Once the effects are compared to these protective action guidelines, a decision will be made on what protective action might be taken. The results of that assessment, though, are presented to the director and other government officials, who will then determine the appropriate protective actions for residents. These may include sheltering or evacuations, and protective actions in the ingestion pathway may include recommendations regarding food, milk and livestock feed control.

Whenever a protective action recommendation is made, the 89 sirens mounted throughout the 10-mile emergency planning zone will

be sounded and an Emergency Broadcast System message will be aired to tell the residents what action they should take.

Residents living within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would have received a public emergency procedures brochure telling them when they hear the siren for about three minutes they should turn to an emergency broadcast station.

If a siren did fail to operate, vehicles with public address units would drive through the zone and provide alerting through that message.

Organizations where a large number of people are located, such as hospitals, schools, nursing homes and major employers, have been given tone-activated radios which automatically turn on when an EBS broadcast is sent out. LILCO--LERO also notifies the U.S. Coast Guard to insure that offshore areas are notified as necessary.

Helping people evacuate, we would have 160 traffic guides stationed at 130 predetermined traffic control points to assist and monitor the flow of traffic out of the 10-mile emergency planning zone during an evacuation. We station 19

LERO road crews at points within the zone to help remove impediments to evacuation and to provide gasoline to those who need it; 333 LERO bus drivers who drive routes within the zones to be evacuated to transport residents who do not have their own means of transportation. LERO will also send out 34 buses and over 160 ambulances and ambulettes as needed to assist in evacuating health care and other special facilities within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. LERO has compiled a list of handicapped, aged and other residents who need special assistance in evacuating. The LERO plan provides for the appropriate transportation assistance for these residents also.

All schools or school districts are kept up to date on conditions at Shoreham. In the event of an accident, they are advised to begin emergency procedures at the earliest possible stage. At an Alert level emergency, the second lowest of the four classifications, schools would most likely be advised to enact early dismissal programs. This is a precautionary measure taken to reunite families in case an evacuation is later recommended.

If sheltering is the recommended protective action, children will be brought inside and sheltered in the school buildings. If evacuation is recommended, children would be taken to relocation centers outside the 10-mile emergency planning zone. LILCO has more than 550 bus drivers ready to provide transportation to schools in the event that school evacuation is required. These bus drivers are available to supplement the regular school bus drivers who normally service the schools.

Information about school protective actions, again, would be broadcast over the Emergency Broadcast System. Public evacuee and reception centers have been established at LILCO operation facilities in Hicksville, Roslyn and Bellmore, with over 200 monitoring personnel there to assist. If radiological monitoring is necessary, the public will be instructed to go to one of these centers via the Emergency Broadcast System again. Evacuees will be monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated at these facilities. Monitoring and decontamination of special facilities populations is also carried out at other

LILCO facilities.

Evacuees who need shelter--evacuees who need a place to stay should go to one of these three evacuation reception centers where they will be monitored and given directions to a Red Cross congregate care center. At that center evacuees will be provided with food, shelter and other services as required.

That gives you a broad overview and quick overview of the plan. Turning to its status, we have provided to the NRC and, through them, to FEMA, Revision 9 of the LERO plan, which has been reviewed by their Regional Assistance Committee, as I understand it. They had comments. We have provided a Revision 10 to the NRC and to FEMA for their review which addressed some of their comments on Rev 9. That's essentially where the LERO plan review stands at this point.

Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: What I would like to do at this time is to give a chronology and the steps that were taken for the plan review and also the evaluation of the plan review.

As Mr. Daverio mentioned, there is a

Revision 9 to the plan that was generated and was reviewed. On February 16, 1988, our regional office in New York received a request from our national headquarters to conduct a review of Revision 9 to the Local Emergency Response Organization plan. A preliminary review dated March 17th of Revision 9 was conducted by FEMA Region II regarding our process and a preliminary review was distributed to the Regional Assistance Committee.

Now, I might pause here and describe a little bit what the Regional Assistance Committee is. The Regional Assistance Committee is an association of experts in a number of federal agencies that provide expert and technical assistance in the preview process for plans as well as for the evaluation of exercises. It includes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a member, Department of Transportation, Department of Agriculture, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy. It includes also the Food and Drug Administration.

These agencies have a representative that sits on this Regional Assistance Committee,

chaired by me. I, as the RAC chairman, coordinate the plan review effort, technical assistance effort and also plan implementation, which we observe during exercises and we provide a report on the implementation of that organization's plan.

FEMA Region II, therefore, had met with LILCO representatives on April 8, 1988, and received the utility's proposed actions to resolve the items that we found in a preliminary review of the plan that needed correction. Detailed review comments on Revision 9 of the plan were received from the Regional Assistance Committee members and were consolidated into an updated review document dated April 21, 1988. Then the Regional Assistance Committee, chaired by FEMA Region II, was held in our office to finalize the plan review comments of Revision 9 and a record of that meeting was transcribed.

In a memo, a memorandum dated May 6th, sent from the FEMA Region II regional director, Jack M. Sable, to FEMA headquarters, he transmitted the recommended finding of the inadequacies and also the areas that require attention to FEMA headquarters. This memorandum contained the

identification of planning inadequacies that had to be corrected. So, the FEMA evaluation included 17 planning inadequacies out of the 136 planning elements evaluated in NUREG 0654, FEMA Rep 1, which is the plan criteria guidance.

FEMA Region II recommended a negative finding on Revision 9 of the LERO plan in Mr. Sable's memorandum dated May 6, 1988 to Grant Peterson of FEMA headquarters. He is the director of state and local program support.

In this memorandum Mr. Sable stated that the plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiologic emergency at Shoreham. Planning for the exercise can go forward for two reasons, however, as the memorandum states. First, LILCO has provided the Federal Assistance Committee with proposed plan changes to address these inadequacies that were incorporated into Revision 10 prior to the exercise. Eleven plan inadequacies require relatively minor changes of these 17. Six inadequate elements require substantive revisions, and five inadequacies--that is, provisions for communication with New York

State, public information program for residents, transients and the agricultural community, written agreements for first-call commitments with bus companies providing supplementary buses for one-wave evacuation of the schools will not be exercised.

The remaining inadequacy was resolved by corrections made to the REPRO procedures as submitted as part of Revision 10 prior to the exercise and was demonstrated during the exercise without any significant problem.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission made a formal request for FEMA to review Revision 10 on May 28, 1988. Since it would not be possible for a full Regional Assistance Committee review to take place in the time available prior to the exercise, FEMA Region II staff performed a cursory review. Based on the review, FEMA determined the remaining inadequacy as corrected--was corrected--excuse me--to a sufficient degree to permit a successful demonstration in the exercise.

At this time, what I would like to do is to have a discussion of that exercise, starting with the on-site portion, Mr. Bellamy.

MR. BELLAMY: Good evening. My name is Dr. Ronald R. Bellamy. I am the branch chief of the facility's radiological safety and safeguards branch for Region I of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In that capacity I have the responsibility for the management of the NRC's inspection of emergency preparedness programs for licensed facilities in the northeast part of the United States.

There are very specific regulations and laws that govern the licensing of fission nuclear power plants in the United States. In the area of emergency preparedness, these laws require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to make a finding of reasonableness. That is, a finding that, and I quote, "there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiologic emergency.".

This finding is based on a number of factors and input. First, it is based on the NRC review and evaluation of the on-site portion of the licensee's emergency plans and their participation in exercises and drills. Second, it is based on

input from the Federal Emergency Management Agency with respect to the plans for the off-site emergency response, as Mr. Husar has discussed for you. Third, input from FEMA with respect to the performance of all off-site organizations during a full participation emergency preparedness exercise.

It is important to realize and emphasize that the regulations require the NRC to consider these inputs, but it is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that is legally responsible for making a finding of reasonableness, as I have already stated, prior to a license being issued for any nuclear power station to go above five percent power. No such finding is necessary for a licensee to operate its plant up to five percent power. Here at Shoreham, a five percent license was issued July 3, 1985.

During the past several years, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has performed numerous evaluations and inspections of emergency preparedness activities at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. The principal inspections were an emergency preparedness program appraisal conducted in September 1982. This was a seven-person

multi-disciplinary team that in effect praised the licensee's status. The effort was most concerned with an evaluation rather than an inspection and uncovered numerous areas for improvement and deficiencies. A follow-up inspection was conducted in December 1983 that closed out these deficiencies.

An inspection was conducted of the February 1986 exercise. Published reports by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency presented the status at that time. The NRC reported licensee performance is generally sound, whereas five off-site deficiencies were identified. First, a failure to respond in a timely manner to a traffic impediment. Second, insufficient copying capability at the emergency news center. Third, bus drivers were late in being dispatched. Fourth, wrong bus routes were followed. Fifth, untimely dispatching of traffic guides.

The NRC also observed an on-site exercise in November 1987. This routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of LILCO's annual emergency exercise, which was

performed on November 18, 1987, uncovered no violations of federal regulations and allowed the NRC to conclude that the licensee on-site emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. This report, which is in the local public document room, was issued over my signature on November 30, 1987.

In conjunction with the discharge of these licensing responsibilities that do reside with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC has conducted these numerous inspections at Shoreham and also observed the full participation exercise held here at Shoreham last week, June 7, 8 and 9, 1988. Both the NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency reviewed the licensee's proposed scenario prior to the exercise and insured the scenario would adequately test LILCO's response. By this I mean both the on-site LILCO staff and off-site LERO plan as we already had discussed this evening.

A team of eight NRC highly-trained and specialized emergency preparedness experts, including an NRC supervisor and the NRC senior

resident inspector, which is stationed full time at Shoreham, inspected the performance of LILCO. These individuals observed every significant activity of the LILCO emergency response personnel. Inspectors were stationed in the control room at the start of the exercise at 0430 in the morning. They also inspected the activation and operation of the on-site technical support center and operational support center and the off-site emergency operations facility and the emergency news center. We also accompanied off-site radiological monitoring teams into the field.

The areas observed by my inspectors included the ability to recognize and correctly classify emergency conditions, the ability to promptly notify cognizant authorities who may be involved in emergency response, the ability to notify the licensee's emergency response staff and then to activate the emergency response facilities in a timely manner, the ability to formulate and implement actions that could mitigate further damage to the plant, the ability to perform dose assessment and to make appropriate, timely protective action recommendations, the ability to

communicate effectively between various emergency response facilities and the ability to control the emergency response.

The NRC's detailed, in-depth technical review and inspection showed that no significant deficiencies were identified. There were minor weaknesses observed. These included, first, a hypothetical dose projection was not made in a timely manner due to a calculational error. Second, the technical spokesperson at the emergency news center did not fully explain technical issues raised for certain specific questions.

In addition to identification of these areas where licensee improvement is warranted, several strengths were observed. First, there was very good command and control of the various emergency response facilities. Second, licensee personnel were exceedingly knowledgeable, well organized and well trained. Third, the duties that these licensee personnel performed were all performed in an exceptionally professional and competent manner. Finally, protective action recommendations were prompt and conservative and utilized such factors as the appropriate evacuation

time estimates and sheltering versus evacuation doses and criteria.

An inspection report of these activities will be issued under my signature within approximately one week of today's date and a copy will again be located here in the local public document room. That report will specifically include our conclusion, which is that the NRC's conclusion for the licensee's on-site capabilities indicate that during the June 7th, 8th, and 9th emergency preparedness exercise at the Shoreham station, the licensee performed in a manner that demonstrated their ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

Thank you very much.

MR. HUSAR: Dr. Bellamy will be followed by John Leonard, vice-president, nuclear operations.

MR. LEONARD: Thank you. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

As a vice-president of nuclear operations, I was pleased to lead a capable and proficient group in the conduct of this graded

emergency preparedness exercise. This group consisted of personnel who manage the plant, the technical support center and the emergency operations facility as well as some people in the emergency news center. Some of the leaders are here--Jack Nataro from the technical support center; Ed Youngling, one of my key assistants; Dr. Stukakis, in the radiological assessment area.

Two of the three teams we have in this group performed in the exercise, one under the very capable direction of response manager, Bill Muesler, vice-president of electric operations; the other, under my direction.

The drill started at 4:29 in the morning with an Unusual Event that finally escalated into a General emergency wherein both the plant and the surrounding environments were exposed to a radiological release. When the general emergency was announced, protective action recommendations were made within a period of seven minutes. This is less than half the time allowed us by the regulatory requirements. These protective action recommendations were well thought out in advance, discussed with the emergency

director at the technical support center, formulated with key personnel in the emergency operation facility and were based on present conditions at the plant, expected conditions at the plant, present and future meteorological conditions.

In the culmination of the activities which resulted in these recommendations, I found all members on this team performed their duties in a rapid and proficient manner and gave me very good support.

As an example, at the plant during the period of this drill scenario, 46 separate repair teams were sent on major repair tasks in order to return the facility to a stable condition. When it was required that unnecessary personnel be evacuated from the site for their own protection, this was accomplished and personnel were accounted for in 28 minutes.

To the extent practical, none of the actions taken at the plant were simulated. As an example, when water connections were to be hooked up, the exact hoses and connecting appurtenances were used. When radiological decontamination on

the site required equipment such as bulldozers, these were procured and dirt was moved. In performing these actions the plant personnel demonstrated not only proficiency but a will to do the job right.

At the emergency operations facility, personnel remained in continuing support of the plant. External electric power sources were located and arrangements made to bring them to the staging area of the plant. Support for plant activities were continually discussed.

Priorities were assigned to tasks between the technical support center and emergency operations facility. Aid was requested from various resources by actual phone calls and messages. As a specific example, I was in personal contact with the vice-president in charge of the recovery effort at Three Mile Island. He stated that he would have a core physicist and two chemical engineers at Shoreham within six hours. They were experienced in managing a damaged reactor core and insuring its safety.

The emergency operations facility, technical support center and emergency news center

actively performed for a period of three days. It included shift changes of large numbers of people which were accomplished successfully. Coordination of radiological control aspects were carried out utilizing plant, emergency operation facility and other radiological personnel involved in the drill. Team 2, under Mr. Muesler, provided continuing support and backup in radiological analyses to our LERO organization during the days following the simulated accident.

Careful and considered measures were utilized by this team in declassifying the event and allowing recovery to begin in the plant and in the supporting departments in the office of nuclear operations.

I was personally very proud to work with this group and as a former commanding officer of two nuclear submarines, having served as the engineering and training officer of a submarine flotilla in charge of training up 20 submarines, I can honestly say I would be proud to have this group of both men and women serve with me under equally arduous conditions in the service.

Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: For impressions of how the LERO organization performed, I would like to have at this time Mr. John Weismantle, vice-president of resource and development, present his remarks for you.

MR. WEISMANTLE: Thank you. As was mentioned before, this is the second federally graded exercise of the LERO organization. The first one was run in February of 1986. I mention that because I will do a brief comparison of the scope of this exercise versus the one conducted a little over two years ago. Besides talking about the scope of this exercise, I want to discuss some things we have done since that exercise in the LERO organization to improve its performance. While we feel our performance in the February '86 exercise was good, we think it is even better in this exercise, and I will tell you how that was accomplished. Finally, I will conclude with some remarks on our performance last week.

Two years ago, the exercise we had was a one-day exercise. It involved the testing of a single shift in LERO. This time around we believe our exercise was larger than any other exercise

ever run in this country in terms of actual participation of local resources. From 4:30 a.m. on June 7th until about 4:00 p.m. on June 9th, when the exercise was terminated, we had over 2,300 LERO personnel participate. As with on-site, there was very little that was simulated. Most activities were actually performed short of mandatory public participation. Two-and-a-half years ago, as a comparison, there were about 1,100 participants in the exercise.

In addition, we were faced with a number of unique challenges. This is the first exercise ever run in this country to supplement one. That is, it is the first exercise where a utility had to demonstrate its ability to interface with governments who were non-participants in the planning process. That was a big challenge. In addition, we had over 11 facilities participate for all three days. And on the second day, when a special school evacuation demonstration was conducted, another 23 facilities participated.

FEMA had about 66 evaluators here this time over the three-day period as compared to about 38 two-and-a-half years ago. We had more

objectives to meet. 36 out of the 37 generic objectives were objectives for this exercise.

So, we were faced with a very big challenge. Now, since the last exercise, we did make a number of changes in the LERO plan and the LERO organization that addressed some areas that were identified previously by FEMA. Among these were the following: First, we spent a little more time concentrating in field worker training, in training of the bus drivers, traffic guides, rad monitors, route alert drivers, evacuation route spotters and so forth. That group comprises over half our organization. In addition, we revised some procedures to assure that we could implement the mobilization of our field workers more swiftly than in the past. We revised procedures, we revised some physical arrangements at our staging areas who process and dispatch these field workers.

Further, we concentrated on communications, improving and emphasizing lateral communications and vertical communications of all sorts, focusing on the unusual and the unexpected, such as impediments and other so-called free play eventualities that FEMA tests us with and which it

is important that we perform well in a real emergency.

Finally, we also focused in on the operations at the emergency news center. Mention was made of copier failures. They were flawless this time around. But more than that, we beefed up the staff there and provided a more diverse group of talented people, and that paid off as well.

As far as the exercise itself goes and our performance is concerned, I have to qualify my remarks by saying they are very preliminary. It was a very complicated exercise, as you can appreciate. It is going to take FEMA a while to complete their evaluation and, internally, it will take us some time. However, we can reach some tentative conclusions and I will present those to you today. I will do it mainly by reviewing operations at the major facilities and then talking a little bit about field operations.

First, at the EOC we were faced with several challenges that were more severe than usually tested. Instead of having two traffic impediments to deal with, as we had last time, we had four impediments, diverse in nature, at diverse

geographical points that were responded to. We believe we responded to them in an excellent manner, very promptly. We utilized the resources at our disposal in the EOC, including a traffic engineer, to analyze what needed to be done, promptly communicated that to the field where field traffic guides were relocated for rerouting. We believe we handled all four of them in a very good manner.

In addition, the communications of those impediments within the EOC to the ENC and so forth was done very well.

Command and control, we feel, throughout the three days was excellent. We had crisp briefings. It was clear who was in charge at the facilities, and overall team effort was shown. Protective action recommendations, we believe, were done in a timely manner, even though we were faced with the challenge of communicating our recommendations to state and county simulators in a command cell and persuading them that our recommendations were sound. They didn't just passively sit by. They challenged us, and the burden was on us.

Those protective action recommendations were done independently, with input from the on-site organization but with an independent analysis in each case. And I believe we demonstrated our ability to integrate the necessary resources to come up with sound protective action recommendations.

Finally, the overall equipment and facilities, we believe, was excellent at the EOC. We have included some additional equipment and materials there to facilitate the emergency response, and we believe we demonstrated their use.

At the ENC, whose function it is to interface with the media, we believe we demonstrated accurate and timely flow of information to the public on the major facets of our emergency response and even some of the more minor details. We had technical experts available who participated in press briefings and in developing and issuing press releases.

At the staging areas, we demonstrated the ability to promptly brief, equip and dispatch field workers. This time around, with the changes in procedures and the stream-lining of some

operations there, we were able to mobilize all traffic guides in the field, in place, within about a 20-minute period after the recommendation for an evacuation was made to the general public. That gives us a margin of about 40 minutes from the time needed to do that in order to assure a controlled evacuation--that is, an evacuation--an optimum evacuation with all traffic guides in place, stream-lining traffic line.

At the reception centers we monitored and demonstrated monitoring and processing of evacuees. We feel we did that in a very good manner. The monitoring was done professionally and the processing of people was done expeditiously. We also demonstrated the ability to communicate from the reception centers to the EOC and command and control remaining at the EOC.

In the school evacuation demonstration, which took place on Wednesday the 8th, we mobilized about 500 bus drivers, plus other personnel. Those personnel went to about 23 other locations, most of them bus companies, picked up equipment--or in the case of those that didn't pick up the equipment, used their own vehicles--and

drove a multitude of routes to schools, simulating the evacuation of school children to the Nassau Coliseum or Nassau Community College, and then we dispatched some of those buses back to the Hicksville reception center to show how we could take potentially contaminated school children for monitoring and decon as a precautionary measure. The overall school evacuation drill went very well and involved not only our personnel but personnel from a bus company that services one of the school districts.

Finally, as far as field operations is concerned, we mobilized a total of about 900 people who reported to staging areas and were dispatched into the field. These are traffic guides, bus drivers and field monitoring people. We believe they demonstrated--and they were closely scrutinized by FEMA. They demonstrated superior knowledge of their job functions. They demonstrated a dedication to their job and good knowledge.

I would just like to conclude by saying, as John Leonard said for the on-site people, I am proud to serve for LERO. LILCO's

management is proud of LERO's performance. We believe all LERO personnel demonstrated an extreme dedication under difficult circumstances, were enthusiastic about their job and demonstrated their knowledge of their jobs across the board up and down the line.

Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: What I would like to do is, at this time, to present first impressions on behalf of FEMA of this three-day exercise that occurred last week.

Before I begin, I would like to kind of lay the framework of how we came to the exercise from the time we first started the preparation.

Based on a request from FEMA headquarters, Mr. Sable, my regional director, authorized me to proceed with the conduct of the recent three-day joint exercise held June 7th, 8th and 9th. The scenario approved by FEMA and the NRC was designed to test 33 of the 36 FEMA standard objectives. Three of the objectives that were not evaluated, based on preplanned agreement, included the following: General public distribution administration of potassium iodide. That was

objective 17. Off-hours, unannounced exercise, objective 36. And the observation of congregate care facilities, which is objective 22.

Objective 37, which is capsulized as the demonstration of the capability of the utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with the non-participating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance, was added to this exercise and that was evaluated.

This latter objective was accomplished through a FEMA control cell representing non-participating governments. The role of the FEMA control cell was to take all calls from the LERO players, record their requests or notifications, ask for clarification of their calls if warranted and provide authority to implement each recommended protective action on a case-by-case basis.

The role of the control cell was not to second guess what non-participating governments might or might not do in each case for assistance for approval.

As was mentioned earlier, this was a

three-day exercise. As was mentioned earlier, it tested on the first day the plume exposure pathway concerns, on the second day, ingestion pathway concerns, on the third day, recovering re-entry concerns.

. The first day of the exercise focused on a simulated population at risk in a 10-mile emergency planning zone. The second day focused on protective actions decision-making and demonstrating--protective action decision-making and demonstrations regarding ingestion pathway. The third day focused on recovery and re-entry activities. FEMA Region II fielded 66 federal evaluators for this exercise. A number of demonstrations were conducted out of sequence based on prior agreement with LERO exercise controllers. Out-of-sequence demonstrations were due to FEMA resource constraints.

In order to adequately oversee the exercise, I, as chairman of the Regional Assistance Committee, used a mobile telephone to keep in touch with FEMA evaluators at key locations. Evaluators used two-way vehicle radios to communicate with exercise controllers regarding the progress of the

exercise. As preplanned, one exercise objective was not evaluated during the three-day period. This FEMA objective, objective 31, involves performing many calculations to come up with total population exposure. Results of these calculations, along with supporting documentation, will be provided to FEMA for review and evaluation by LERO. The evaluation of that submission will be published as a supplement to the post-exercise assessment report.

The following facilities and functions were evaluated over the three-day period. The LERO emergency operation center, the warning point, emergency news center room or control, Emergency Broadcast System, emergency operation facility, acts and assessment at the emergency operations center, Brookhaven office field monitoring capability, 36 general population bus routes, 40 school population bus routes, all three staging areas, Port Jefferson, Patchogue and Riverhead; all 11 transfer points, 18 mobility impaired vehicle routes, also including the homebound and curbside pickups; the school relocation center, all three radiologic reception centers which are located at

Bellmore, Roslyn and Hicksville, respectively; 3 traffic impediments, 30 traffic control points, 3 alert routes, 16 hearing-impaired route notifications, two hospitals--that is Brunswick Hospital and Mid Island Hospital; the emergency worker decontamination facility and a decontamination trailer operations. The decontamination trailer operations were one of the ones run out of sequence on day two.

Simulated Coast Guard boating alert and the use of Teledyne, Inc., which is the primary radiological lab for the LERO organization.

I will now provide some first impressions regarding how the exercise went. As stated by Mr. Weismantle regarding his evaluation of the exercise, FEMA's evaluation of the exercise is still ongoing. It will take a while for us to sort through all evaluations by the 66 evaluators so these are just first impressions. There is no closure on any of the areas I am about to mention but these are impressions nonetheless.

Emergency operations center: We observed that it was a well-controlled facility for security. The facility was appropriately situated

with status boards, maps, key event logs, dose assessment boards, et cetera. The facility was capable of sustained operat ns in a 24-hour environment for a continuous period of time.

Briefings were conducted on a regular basis. LERO did an excellent job in demonstrating the ability to maintain staff on a continuous 24-hour basis. The overall management of LERO was very good. All information received from the emergency operations facility was promptly shared. The LERO director clearly was in command and coordinated decision-making throughout the three-day exercise.

Overall public information coordination staff demonstrated the ability to provide necessary information to the public at risk in a timely manner. The FEMA prompt notification standard was met in the required 15 minute time period. The Emergency Broadcast System criteria were met by the radio station WPLR. Transportation and traffic coordination in emergency operations center worked well.

At the emergency news center, it was an excellent facility with the appropriate

logistics to perform that function. There was an adequate demonstration of the procedures by the players in the emergency news center. Mobilization and reporting was timely. Frequent briefings by the spokesperson in charge was effected. Coordination of ingestion pathway and recovery re-entry issues in the news center with the emergency operations center was well handled.

There were some concerns. Labeling and updating of status boards. The LERO EBS procedures need to be improved. Length and format of EBS messages, the posting of internal and distribution was not particularly timely. Procedures need to be updated for updating and posting visuals that were used throughout the exercise to keep the emergency news center staff informed.

There were insufficient phone lines and instruments for the federal and state organizations that are to be represented in emergency news center.

Rumor control: Rumor control was well demonstrated. The system, including district office and call boards, operated efficiently. The

bus evacuation, which included also general mobility impaired comments are as follows: Management, direction and control of bus operations from the emergency operation center at Brentwood was excellent and in accordance with the plan. Buses allocated to all transfer points was timely. Radio communication between transfer points and the emergency operations center were flawless. A total of 97 buses ran routes and arrived at the Hicksville reception center. Mobility impaired curbside pickups at Patchogue went well. In general, the bus operation ran extremely well. The transfer points were run professionally and in accordance with the plan requirements.

Staging areas: The staging areas were set up quickly and effectively. Staging area coordination was established promptly after the person in charge arrived. Communications worked smoothly. Dosimetry briefings went well. Special attention was given to female staff.

Field dispatch of buses with drivers went well. Route alerting for notification of hearing impaired went well. Traffic control point guides demonstrated a high level of training and

knowledge of their duties. Radio communications contributed to effective traffic control and management of the evacuation.

The Brookhaven office field monitoring: The Brookhaven operations, accident assessment and field monitoring teams coordinated functions well and demonstrated their skills effectively.

Teledyne, the primary radiological lab, displayed excellent radiation protection, contamination control and records keeping. Teledyne is a full-scale radioanalytic laboratory with capability of measuring all types of samples with high precision with known geometries.

Reception centers: We are talking about Roslyn, Hicksville and Bellmore. The mobilization and activation was well coordinated. Setup of the reception centers went smoothly. Some reception center members need more training on decontamination procedures.

Emergency worker decontamination facility: Approximately 600 LERO school bus drivers and their vehicles were directed to the Hicksville reception center for decon processing.

This activity was part of the out-of-sequence demonstration on day two of the exercise. The facility was adequate. Monitoring and decontamination personnel demonstrated adequate techniques. The monitoring activity dealt with monitoring, 40 emergency workers by 15 individuals at a rate of about 90 seconds for a sustained period of time.

Medical drill: Two medical drills were evaluated, one on the first day and one on the second day. In summary, with the two hospitals, the two hospitals were evaluated, one June 7th and the other June 8th. The evaluation was to ascertain emergency room staff and their skills to treat a contaminated and injured person or persons. It was to ascertain the skills of the ambulance personnel in treatment of a contaminated injured patient.

There were some problem areas identified at the hospital by the staff, the hospital staff: Inappropriate handling of contaminated injured individuals. There is a need for additional training at both hospitals. Demonstrated skills on the part of ambulance

drivers were good.

The emergency operations facility: The facility was adequate. The space and supplies were certainly adequate. Visuals were designed well and displays were maintained promptly. Access control was noteworthy. Mobilization and activation of the LERO staff was timely. Regular briefings were effective and timely. Communications was excellent and plume dose projections were conducted in accordance with the LERO plan.

This now concludes the FEMA impressions regarding how the exercise went.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: How about the 32 sirens that--

MR. HUSAR: Full report will not be available for 60 to 90 days. Once the report is published, we will in the report identify all areas observed and our evaluation of the areas and also our recommendations for corrective action.

What I would like to do now is restate what was mentioned by me earlier regarding the procedure we would like to follow for giving everyone an opportunity who would like to either

ask a question or make a comment.

What we would like to do is to have the sheets that were available at the door, if you haven't done so already, to be given to the people with green arm bands to collect them and bring them forward. What we will do is to acknowledge each individual and give an opportunity for that person to come to the mike, to ask a question, make a comment. We would like to allocate no more than five minutes per individual so everybody in the room can have an opportunity to ask a question or make a comment.

I would ask at this time that the sheets be passed forward and give us a moment or two to compile these and we will get to every individual who has a question.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Would you like us to ask a question--

MR. HUSAR:: Characterize the kind of question you have so we know who the best person is up here to answer.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Who it is directed to?

MR. HUSAR: Yes. In characterizing

the kind of question, not necessarily the specific question. We would then know who would be in the best position to answer the question.

As we are waiting for the sheets to be brought forward, I would like to make reference to an earlier remark I made regarding the composition of the Regional Assistance Committee. I think I may have left out one or two members so I would like to enter that into the proceeding at this time and give you a listing of all the federal agencies represented on the Regional Assistance Committee, so that I don't hear any bad remarks that I have not given due recognition.

The National Weather Service, Department of Interior, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration and also U.S. Department of Agriculture. All our members that sit on the Regional Assistance Committee, whose role it is to provide technical assistance in the development of plans and development of capabilities as well as evaluate the response organization's ability to implement their plans during exercises and drills.

First I would like to acknowledge Mr. Robert Hux. Sir, where are you? If you would come up to one of the mikes available, we would all like to hear your question and hopefully we can answer your question completely.

MR. HUX: My question is, considering the collapse that is going on in the bridges, the railway systems and general transportation grid going on in New York State, what is required to transmit the number of people that would be involved in an actual evacuation of everyone within the evacuation route on Long Island? And what upgrade in the transportation system would be needed for that and what industrial capability and associated electrical power generation would be required for that to actually function?

MR. HUSAR: The way I understand your question, sir, it relates to capacity and condition of the road network to handle an evacuation. I don't think I am in a position to give an evaluation of the condition of the road network, but certainly the road network that would be used is in the plan.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: What about

the sirens?

MR. HUSAR: And that the condition of that road network is something that local government would be in the best position to assess.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: They already said it wasn't adequate. Wait a minute.

MR. HUSAR: Sir, we certainly would like to give you an opportunity to speak. So--

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Wait your turn.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Why don't you save some seals?

MR. HUSAR: The condition of the road network is certainly something that needs to be evaluated if there are problem areas. FEMA is not aware that there are conditions in the road network that are in the plan that may require changes in the plan to redesign or reconfigure the network for evacuation if that should be necessary.

Sir, I don't know if I have answered your question directly but we have a member on the Regional Assistance Committee from the U.S. Department of Transportation. Any matters, certainly, regarding transportation and evacuation

would be concerns that he would deal with if those matters are brought to our attention. We would, in turn, coordinate this with the U.S. Highway Administration. Certainly, if there is a need, based on the assessment and recommendation to re-examine the evacuation routes, we would then provide that information to LERO so they could take that appropriate action.

MR. HUX: My point in asking the question is to emphasize that in an actual evacuation, as is being discussed, the idea of actually shutting down and not generating power from this facility gets you in a position with what do you actually do when the transportation grid of the areas involved break down? In order to rebuild those you need electrical power generating capability that you don't have if such a facility were to be actually shut down, okay, in order to actually support your industrial capability to rebuild the infrastructure.

MR. HUSAR: Are you stating that if there was an emergency at the plant, that power would not be available for residents in the community? Is that what you are basing your

statement on?

MR. HUX: No. I am saying, if you have to rebuild large amounts of infrastructuring in the event of bridge collapses and stuff like that, that means you need a certain amount of electrical power generating capability in order just to support the industry in the area. The people saying shut down the plant are sort of putting them in an untenable situation from the standpoint of the evacuation procedure itself.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you.

Eena-Mai Franz?

MS. FRANZ: I also wanted to make a comment. Since the plant was constructed according to federal regulations, has been inspected, tested and declared ready for operation and looks like now that the emergency plan was successful or the drill was successful, is there anything else that has to be addressed before the license can be issued?

MR HUSAR: I can only speak from the FEMA perspective. Based on our rule--I mentioned earlier in my remarks that we will take the plan review evaluation and the post-exercise assessment report comments, along with concerns and statements

that are made here and memorialized in the transcript. Our regional director will evaluate that and provide his recommendation to FEMA headquarters, which in turn will provide a final finding to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Once it is in the hands of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Commission will then decide--will take that into account and examine the finding and make a decision with respect to the licensing.

MS. FRANZ: The drill was really the last step in the licensing process?

MR. HUSAR: Well, I can only speak to our rule. This information will be provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and they will make a final determination. I can't speak for any other aspects of the preparedness that might need to be addressed outside of the scope of FEMA's involvement.

MR. WEISMANTLE: I could perhaps add, there is ongoing litigation on certain plan items. There is also certain other tests of the prompt notification system that will have to be run, the prompt notification system consisting of the

issuance of a public information brochure and the sounding of the sirens and a message broadcast to the public. There may be some other details, too, but those are the major ones.

MS. FRANZ: I just wanted to make a comment that I feel, as do many hundreds of thousands of Long Islanders here, that the plant should be licensed as quickly as possible and that the decision, which should be based on technical judgments, should not be influenced by political gains.

MR. HUSAR: Miss Kimberly Heilig?

MS. HEILIG: I have a number of questions. I don't know which you are referring to at the moment. If you want to give it to me, I can read it.

Apparently there were a number of sirens that did not operate properly or did not operate at all as the drill began. I would like to know how can LILCO even hope to evacuate persons in a real--that is, an unplanned emergency--if they are not able to sound warning alarms when they have had more than ample time to plan for a pseudo emergency?

MR. WEISMANTLE: Regarding the sirens, I will address that. In fact, I was going to address it in my remarks and was diverted at that point.

You are right. There was a sounding of the sirens once on the morning of June 7th and about two-thirds of them failed to sound. A couple of things on that. Number one, one of the objectives was not to actually test the sirens, per se. It was to coordinate the setting of the sirens with an EBS message.

Number two, we had and we demonstrated route alert drivers going out into the field. And they are in our plan to notify the public where sirens fail. As a matter of fact, we actually got some messages back from traffic guides, although this wasn't a formal part of our plan, that pretty rapidly let us know we had a problem.

At that point, we would have resounded them again, but since it wasn't an exercise objective and since we had to follow the instructions of the controllers in terms of which sirens failed and to dispatch drivers to that, we didn't go forward with that.

However, starting that afternoon, we did conduct an investigation of what had happened, since two weeks previously, when we sounded them, we got 87 out of 89, which is a better-than-average result. What turned up was two things: One, a slightly slow activation of the system itself. There are a number of processes that are followed to get a message out to each of the sirens via radio. That was a little slower than we would have liked. Number two, some timers on the sirens themselves, once we did field inspections, had drifted from their set points.

So, in the space of two days we inspected the 89 sirens, we adjusted the set points of the timers, and then on Friday morning, at about 10:30, we went through the whole procedure again and got 86 of the 89 sirens working properly.

MS. HEILIG: How many days later?

MR. WEISMANTLE: Two days later. As I said, if this was a real emergency, we would have attempted to resound the sirens very carefully and they would have worked. It wasn't part of this objective or wasn't a--

MS. HEILIG: Wouldn't one think that

was one of the most fundamental--

MR. WEISMANTLE: Oh, yes. It is fundamental. And that is why we conducted the investigation.

MS. HEILIG: And this drill was planned for a very long time. It seems if something like that can go wrong when it is a planned emergency and it takes two days to get them going, it seems to--three days--it seems to me--that is very serious. We cannot know what kind of malfunction we will have.

MR. WEISMANTLE: We are concerned, too, which is why we proceeded to do a thorough investigation rather than not, then. We are going to look at the whole siren system again in more detail now that the dust has settled from the exercise.

MR. HUSAR: If I could explain FEMA's role in the prompt notification system? Mr. Weismantle is correct that FEMA's interest was not to determine the operability of the sirens during the exercise. FEMA is going to make an evaluation of the operability in the near future. This was not a requirement for the exercise.

MS. HEILIG: It was not a requirement for this exercise?

MR. HUSAR: No. What we had required in the exercise is to test the system to see that from the time a protective action decision was made, that that decision could be communicated to the public via the Emergency Broadcast System. Because this plant is not licensed and because we have not submitted a final finding to the NRC regarding the capability of the off-site preparedness and to make a determination with respect to adequate reasonable assurance, this acoustical evaluation will be performed in the near future. Once that evaluation is completed, that will become part of the FEMA report.

Subsequent to that, although not required for this process, there will also be a survey conducted by FEMA to test the public education with respect to the public information brochure. The public information brochure is currently under review by FEMA. Once it is returned to LILCO for corrective action, it will then be distributed and then a survey will be conducted to ascertain knowledge of the public

regarding the procedures for prompt notification.

MS. HEILIG: So the sirens will be retested after LILCO has a chance to correct the problem?

MR. HUSAR: That is correct.

MS. HEILIG: So a spot check, though, is like not a good test?

The other thing I wanted to ask you, we are all aware that last year the NRC approved a rule change in order that LILCO not be required to have local and state cooperation. We are also aware that Frank Petrone resigned from FEMA after the last drill because he would not certify that the emergency plan was--that he could assure the health and safety of the people of Long Island.

It seems to me that the federal government has a stake in terms of getting this plant licensed. Could you please comment on that, why it seems like FEMA is bending over backwards to approve this plant, when the most fundamental things go wrong with the plan and people are still saying, "It was a wonderful drill, it was a wonderful drill"? We start to wonder.

MR. HUSAR: My response to your

question is as follows: Congress provides certain authorities to the executive branch. The executive branch of government, of which FEMA is a part, has got a rule that it follows, its regulation. In accordance with the Rule 44 CFR 350, we have a responsibility for off-site radiologic emergency preparedness.

MS. HEILIG: But you change the rules whenever--

MR. HUSAR: No. Our rule is not changed.

MS. HEILIG: The NRC changed the rule in terms of local and state participation so your rules don't really mean anything, because I know if LILCO doesn't pass the rule, the rules change so they are able to pass it.

Can you comment on what I addressed?

MR. HUSAR: I am trying to.

Under our rule, we provide a determination of reasonable assurance to Nuclear Regulatory Commission upon request or part of our process when the governor of a state submits the plans for initial review. In this instance, under the memorandum of understanding between FEMA and

Nuclear Regulatory Commission we were asked to review a plan. We did. We were asked to evaluate an exercise and we did. So we are just following our regulation.

Next question, please?

Thank you very much. I would ask that we limit your time to about five minutes per individual, so unless you have one other question we would like to give the other people who have submitted their sheets for questions to give them time to speak and to ask questions. Okay?

MS. HEILIG: Okay. I don't feel my questions were answered adequately but I will yield the floor.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you.

Mr. Paul Lozowsky.

MR. LOZOWSKY: My name is Paul Lozowsky and I am representing an organization called November Coalition, composed of approximately 10,000 business owners and also a handful of basically residential rate payers. What we are saying basically applies to whether you own a business or you basically own a home or rent a home, for that matter.

First, I would like to thank the LILCO employees because they took a lot of garbage from the public when it should have been directed towards the management. They did a good job during Hurricane Gloria with the equipment they had available, but it wasn't the fault of the employees.' It was the fault of the management that put all their money into Shoreham. It is 80 percent of LILCO's assets. Any business that has 80 percent of an asset tied into a nuclear plant is obviously severely mismanaged and certainly doesn't deserve to operate on Long Island. That is one point I certainly wanted to mention.

Another point--

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: How about a question?

MR. LOZOWSKY: I am doing what I am told, giving hell to people who deserve it. That certainly must be the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

To make it less than five minutes, what is demanded from whether it be the Governor of the State of New York, or for that matter the NRC, is that the rate payers on Long Island have a

right, just as all business people have a right to provide a safe environment for employees and customers plus a decent price. It is our belief that you don't have to be a traffic engineer to know that on Long Island you simply cannot evacuate Long Island in a timely fashion, especially five hours. The roads are closed. There is constantly overturned trucks on the Long Island Expressway, constantly overturned trucks on Sunrise Highway. The roads are bad. You can't evacuate, period. I wish you would get into your mind--maybe you should travel the roads of Long Island to get the point. The point is, you cannot evacuate Long Island in five hours, period.

However, Three Mile Island taught us that it takes more than 10 miles to move the people--people will evacuate further out, okay, there will be a backlog of traffic and the people in Southampton area, especially east, will be trapped with no place to go and they will be stuck. Studies have proven if you can't evacuate in five hours and there is a serious accident at Shoreham--and I think LILCO has the capability of doing it--as much as 35,000 lives could be lost,

short-term deaths and other lives could be lost, long-term deaths.

You definitely have to question yourself about the sirens. They should have worked and didn't work, and you have to examine your conscience and you should also think about being held responsible if any deaths do happen if, God forbid, LILCO gets a license for Shoreham and has an accident.

Just another couple of points. We ask the NRC to immediately stop licensing. We ask FEMA to immediately withdraw all attempted tries to--for this evacuation. We certainly ask Cuomo--we thank him for his support, but the idea is whether we have LILCO or whether we have LIPA, public power system, we cannot be responsible for 80 percent of LILCO assets called the Shoreham mistake. We believe public power is not a bad way to go. If LIPA has to eat the Shoreham Plant, Long Island will be bankrupt. We ask and remind Cuomo that he did say LILCO should eat Shoreham and rate payers should not. It is time for Cuomo to let Peter Bradford know that all funding for Shoreham must stop.

We are paying 30 percent of our monthly bills for Shoreham and we demand an end to the funding and a decent price and reasonable rate. Also, we ask Mr. Bekneer(ph) to stop this attempted farce or basically step down and find somebody who can do the job.

I appreciate your time.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much.

Ginny Levin?

MR. LOZOWSKY: Please don't let Long Island down.

MS. LEVIN: What is the lead radio station?

MR. HUSAR: There are two radio stations in the plan, WPLR, New Haven, Connecticut and WCBS, New York City.

MS. LEVIN: Which is the lead station?

MR. WEISMANTLE: Essentially, WPLR has indicated they would be withdrawing once we get a full power license. WCBS is in the plan. That is lead--

MS. LEVIN: Which is the lead station right now?

MP. WEISMANTLE: Let me try to answer the question. The--

MS. LEVIN: The question is, which is the lead station right now?

MR. WEISMANTLE: Right now I would have to say PLR is. WCBS, as the plan indicates--

MS. LEVIN: I thought they indicated--

MR. WEISMANTLE: I would like to finish.

MS. LEVIN: WXXX in the scenario?

MR. WEISMANTLE: --is the lead station for the southeast regional New York EBS network.

MS. LEVIN: I have another question.

MR. WEISMANTLE: That is a network that includes about 30 stations on Long Island and the Suffolk County Executive and the Governor both have the ability to initiate that network with CBS /AM as the lead.

MS. LEVIN: Is FEMA going to continue aiding and abetting the Atomic Safety Licensing Board going on, talking about the hearings? If so, why? Isn't FEMA supposed to be doing evaluating of its own instead of sitting there encouraging that nonsense?

MR. HUSAR: Federal Emergency Management Agency is following its rule--

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Excuse me. Can you stand up?

MR. HUSAR: The Federal Emergency Management Agency is following the rule that has been given to it by Congress the function of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with respect to off-site radiological emergency preparedness is provide an evaluation of the adequacy of state and local governments surrounding nuclear power plants to deal with a nuclear power plant accident. We provide that evaluation determination to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and we are performing that function.

MS. LEVIN: Did I understand you to say you are evaluating the state and local governments? Are you not evaluating LILCO's part?

MR. HUSAR: There has been a recent rule change to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule--

MS. LEVIN: Oh. You are good at those, aren't you?

MR. HUSAR: And we are following our

charge. And in connection with the memorandum of understanding, to provide an evaluation of the plan, provide an evaluation of the implementation of that plan by the off-site emergency response organization.

MS. LEVIN: Does the recent rule change have a name or number?

MR. HUSAR: Yes. It does have a name and number.

MR. BELLAMY: I believe the rule change you are referring to is a change to Appendix C to 10 CFR, Part 50 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations. That is a Congressional document--

MS. LEVIN: (Inaudible) Was there an acronym in there or more of the usual bombast?

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Mind your manners.

MS. LEVIN: The likes of you is teaching me manners?

MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much for your time.

MS. LEVIN: I'm sorry. I would also like to know who is sponsoring the meeting? Is

LILCO paying or are the taxpayers paying?

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: We paid for the ice water.

MR. HUSAR: This public heating is being conducted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in accordance with its Rule 44 CFR 350.

MS. LEVIN: And for the hearings to continue? That is really outrageous.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you.

Miss Jane Alcorn?

MS. ALCORN: Hello. I am Jane Alcorn. I have certain comments and a few questions. I understand, first of all, that today LILCO signed an agreement with the State that would sell Shoreham to LIPA for one dollar. I have a dollar in my bag. I am willing to pay for it and see the damn thing shut. I think all of you are involved in an exercise in futility because your services are not really needed. You can all go home.

In addition, I have some comments and some questions about your evacuation plan.

I have spent quite a bit of time in the local document room reading through your plan. I am particularly interested in the portions that

pertain to the evacuation of children. I live about two miles from the plant. As far as your EBS system is concerned, CBS does not reach my house in Wading River. We don't get it. As far as a lead station, it is impossible for people east of the plant to consider that. We don't--we can't get it. It is not powerful enough.

In addition, as regards these children, my children attend schools in Shoreham-Wading River. I see some of the people here, either former school board members or current school board members, and I consider them all Judases who are willing to sell our children for a few bucks.

Out of the 11 school districts within the 10-mile EPZ, one school district participated in the plan and that was Shoreham-Wading River and they are concerned about their tax dollars. The other 10 have refused to participate. There is no safety for the children.

I would like to say that in reading through your plan there is something very, very crucial that has been missing and I haven't found it yet. I have spoken to people involved in this

area, and that is camps. You have not addressed the camps within the 10-mile EPZ. There are two within five miles and there are several within ten miles and on weekends sometimes there are 1,000 children at some of those camps. Some of them come from as far away as Nassau County. You have no provisions in your plans to evacuate thousands of children whose parents are miles and miles away. It is a glaring flaw.

In addition, you have not tested perhaps the most crucial of all parts of this plan and that is the trust that the people of Long Island have in LILCO. People on Long Island, except for the LERO workers and the people who work for the LILCO company, do not trust that company and will not follow directions of LERO workers. You will see more gridlock than you ever saw in your lives. It is there now and it will get worse. I live in a community right near the plant and nobody except the people who work for LILCO, who work at that plant, want to see it open. Nobody.

I also would like to know what kind of grade you gave to the kinds--the traffic guides at 2:30 on the day of your drill who stood at the

southwest corner of 25A and William Floyd Parkway drinking their beer as they sat on their cars? What kind of grade did they get? That is one thing I would like to know. Could you answer that, please?

MR. HUSAR: As I mentioned at the top of this meeting, FEMA evaluation is not yet complete. What I provided you were first impressions. The particulars of each vantage point that was evaluated will be in the report when it is published.

MS. ALCORN: One of the vantage points I had was when driving home from teaching in the Shoreham-Wading River schools that day. I saw two cars parked there. I know they were LERO workers. They had badges hanging from the belts and antennaes on their cars. They were leaning there, smoking their cigarettes and drinking their beer. That is my vantage point. Also, we sat in the teachers' room at lunchtime the first day we were testing your sirens and we didn't hear a thing.

In addition, I know that in schools you are expecting teachers and bus drivers to

participate and it has been my experience and through conversations with most of the teachers that I deal with that they will not participate in your plan. There is no safety for the children. You are dealing in supposition and what the people on Long Island call surrealism.

I also would like to read this to you. This was in Sunday's Newsday. "Judging by these tests, LILCO, the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency regard conjecture as the soul of readiness. In their approach to the evacuation challenge, the two drills demonstrate that 10 working assumptions are more highly regarded by the NRC than one working system. There is a reason for this. The premise that evacuation is possible is hopelessly flawed because of the region's geography and its infarction-prone road system. So any evacuation plan has to be firmly based on speculation, couched in terms of assumption and tested by surmise. In literature, this would be called fiction. But in this case it is a particularly engaging form of fiction, a dramatic one called farce. It is a form that demands impeccable aplomb. When it is well

done, it is always approached with the sort of idiot panache that Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy brought to the challenges they faced. LILCO and its federal co-conspirators do it as well as Stan and Ollie ever did."

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Who wrote it?

MS. ALCORN: Bob Lehman from Newsday.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much for your comments.

I would like to respond to one of the questions you had because I think there is a misperception about how the Emergency Broadcast System works. The Emergency Broadcast System is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. It is a volunteer system, and in this volunteer system the stations that participate sign on to be able to either broadcast live when they receive the dual tone attention signal or to rebroadcast messages.

The comment earlier that radio station WCBS cannot be heard as far east as Wading River does not mean that the broadcast message, should EBS activate the system, that it would not be heard by your radio regardless of what radio station you

are tuned to. The Emergency Broadcast System works on the premises that you have a whole host of radio stations that have signed on the system that will broadcast live or rebroadcast messages based on the entry radio station. The common program control station for the operational area to include Nassau and Suffolk County is WCBS radio station.

The next person, Mr. Robert Meyers?

MS. ALCORN: Can you answer my question about camps? What are you doing about those thousands of children?

MR. HUSAR: We appreciate your comment. Let me explain what is going to happen with this transcript once it is published. Comments that are made here, questions that are raised here regarding the plan are all part of the need and all part of the purpose of this public meeting, to address concerns. If there are matters in the plan that have not been adequately addressed, certainly we will ask LERO to investigate that situation and give us an evaluation of what that means and to provide us with a schedule of what is going to be done to address those concerns if they are not currently in

the plan.

So, this comment that you have regarding a planning issue will be memorialized in this transcript and we will ask that we get feedback regarding this particular matter.

MR. WEISMANTLE: I will just add, we have contacted camps. We have interfaced with them and offered to plan with them. I can't tell you exactly where in the plan reference is made to that, but I can assure you we have taken into account the camps and the children in those camps and would provide transportation and whatever other resources they would need.

MR. HUSAR: Robert Meyers?

MR. MEYERS: I would like to make two comments. I am an engineer. I work at Shoreham. Many of my colleagues are here. I participated in the drill. This is not a plant. I simply want to make a simple, non-rhetorical observation. I think the proceedings that are taking place here tonight have been conducted in a tremendously professional manner and I want to congratulate the people who are up there on the dais and I want to thank you very much for that.

The second comment I would like to make is perhaps not quite as non-rhetorical as the first, in that I have a sign here. If there is anybody here taking pictures I would like you to read the sign. The sign is very simple. It is a pamphlet about 42 pages long that was prepared by the Brookhaven National Laboratory scientists. It is called "The Shoreham Safety Report." It is a factual, well-researched document, and for those people who have the signs at the back of the room I would like to use this sign in refutation to whatever it is that they are saying. I have not had a chance to read them--

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: The signs--

MR. MEYERS: The fact remains that this can be procured from P.O. Box 344, Huntington, New York, 11743, and also, I believe, it is probably available from Hicksville, from LILCO.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to say these things.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you.

Mr. Mark Sperber?

MR. SPERBER: Mark Sperber from Nucleonics Week.

Given the preliminary assessment of this drill, would LILCO be at all interested now in withdrawing its appeals of the Licensing Board decisions on the February '86 drill, notably the one in December 1987 on scope and then the February decision on adequacy of that exercise as it stood? Will LILCO be interested now or would it contemplate withdrawing its appeals on that exercise?

MR. WEISMANTLE: no. We wouldn't withdraw our appeals on that.

MR. SPERBER: Why is that?

MR. WEISMANTLE: Because we think the facts support our position on it in terms of our performance and the scope of the exercise being adequate.

MR. SPERBER: My second question: In July, I believe, of 1987, you applied to NRC for permission to run Shoreham at 25 percent of rated capacity. Does a drill such as this give your application any added weight or do you feel you can demonstrate to NRC that a license such as this, one relatively unprecedented, is indeed tenable?

MR. LEONARD: We intend to continue

the licensing process for the 25 percent license and for the 100 percent license.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Why?

MR. LEONARD: You should be aware that the 25 percent license clearly shows that the emergency planning effort around the plant can be much, much smaller than is required by present regulations. So, the answer to your question was it does, timewise, for instance. The progression of an accident scenario at 25 percent takes much longer than it does at 100 percent.

MR. SPERBER: You feel this supports--

MR. LEONARD: Absolutely.

MR. SPERBER: My third question: Has LILCO come up with a total dollar figure for the cost of the drill in terms of salaries, equipment, expenses, et cetera?

MR. LEONARD: No. No.

MR. SPERBER: I see. When might you have one and, if so, will that be released?

MR. LEONARD: I am not sure we would have it because the way we work this, we assign a certain budget to the emergency preparedness division for the year. Part of that, you know, is

used to constantly prepare, to handle this type of thing.

MR. SPERBER: Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: Mr. Ferraro, Mr. or Mrs., I am not sure, Ferraro?

Anton Rogall?

MR. ROGALL: My name is Anton Rogall. I have worked with nuclear energy research in Hicksville many, many years ago; in the early fifties. And I say nuclear energy is the safest, cleanest and cheapest energy available. And Shoreham should be put into operation immediately to prevent brownouts and blackouts. Also, I urge the NRC Commissioner, Mr. Sek(ph), he should not assign the Shoreham license over to Mr. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo, or New York State, as this is also necessary for the national security of our country.

Furthermore, one pound of uranium releases the heat equivalent of 1,300 tons of coal. Depending on what fuel oil you use, whether it is bunker 6, which has a different BTU value and a higher BTU value than any of the other fuel oils, like number two, same viscosity, everything included--we would save an awful lot of trade

deficit money by using uranium and not importing expensive oil.

Also, while I was working at the time, after we made the first successful element, nuclear--nuclear element, it was determined, when Long Island Lighting was charging 3.4 cents per kilowatt, this same electrical energy, one kilowatt of electricity could have been manufactured with nuclear energy for the cost of .4 cents per kilowatt hour. So, no matter how you slice it, you hear a lot of things and read lot of things where getting rid of Shoreham, your energy was going to be cheaper. Now it is coming out that it is going to be more expensive than ever before.

Plus the fact, taking into account all the acid rain that this fossil fuel is going to produce, people will die. You won't have to evacuate the island. They will die just from the acid rain. Ask the fishermen that go fishing the amount of fish that are dying off each year. It is unbelievable.

So, therefore, I, as myself, who have worked with it and one of my peers over there that works for Brookhaven Labs, this is a very, very

important step. We are going forward, we are not going backwards. To destroy over $5 billion--people got to be sick, if not crazy.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you, sir.

Jeanne Kacprzak? Am I pronouncing it correctly?

MS. KACPRZAK: No, but not a lot of people do.

Most of my questions have been answered, but what comes to my mind in this whole thing is, in general, the evacuation procedures for any kind of accident on Long Island seem to be difficult. Under this condition that the state and local government has refused to participate, would that qualify the LERO organization to be more responsive in an emergency? And also, it is brought to my attention that not too far away from here, in Connecticut, there is an operating nuclear plant and I don't think there is any emergency procedures to evacuate Long Island in the case of a problem over there.

Can you answer those?

MR. WEISMANTLE: As a matter of fact, there is a part of Long Island within the 10-mile

zone of the Millstone Point plan, Fishers Island, and Suffolk County evidently has emergency procedures to evacuate that island in the event of an accident at Millstone. In addition to that, as was mentioned earlier, we exercised ingestion pathway on Long Island and that is, by regulation, plans have to be in place for a 50-mile zone. When you look at the map of Long Island, virtually every--95 percent-plus location on Long Island is within a 50-mile zone of one or more nuclear plants--Indian Point, Millstone, Haddam Neck, Connecticut Yankee, I guess. Presumably, New York State has ingestion pathway plans to take care of the eventuality of an accident at those plants in terms of its impact on Long Island.

MS. KACPRZAK: Can you clarify the 50-mile radius plan? I don't understand.

MR. WEISMANTLE: Every nuclear plant is required to have a plan that goes out to 50 miles. The first 10 miles are what is conventionally known as an evacuation plan--that is, you have to have preplanned plans for evacuation of the general public and special facilities within 10 miles. In addition to that,

from 10 miles to 50-mile radius, you must have plans that could be implemented to protect the public via contamination of foodstuffs, water or milk or whatever. And those are required to be in place for the areas of up to 50 miles around operating nuclear plants and every plant trying to gain an operating license.

What most people don't realize is, Indian Point plant is actually closer to Nassau County than the Shoreham Plant is, to the closest point in Nassau County.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you.

Michelle Santuntonio?

MR. SANTUNTONIO: At the start of the hearing or whatever you want to call it, two of the people on the dais said they assumed the state and local governments would participate in attempting to follow the plan put forth by LILCO. I would like to know, on what do you base that assumption? It seems as though they already said under oath that they would not participate. So, either you are wrong or our elected officials are guilty of perjury. Can you address this issue?

MR. HUSAR: Yes, sir. I mentioned

earlier the fact that with the NRC rule change and, hopefully, my colleague from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will correct me if I am wrong--there were certain planning assumptions that were provided in this rule change. And I read off the three planning assumptions that would allow the review and evaluation of plans and, subsequently, the determination of the people, the emergency response people in implementing those plans, allow that process to take place.

So, it is in the rule-making that allows, that provides for these three planning assumptions. And these are planning assumptions in rule-making. These are not statements by individuals here on the dais. This is in the rule-making.

MR. SANTUNTONIO: In that case, all of your assumptions are erroneous because not only have the state and local officials already said that they would not participate in this evacuation plan, but the people who are supposed to drive the buses to evacuate the children and who in fact will have physical possession of those buses at the time of any accident have also said that they will not

participate and evacuate children from camps or schools or anywhere else. And the police officers, Suffolk County Police Officers, who would have the only legal authority to direct traffic here have also said that they will not participate. And they, incidentally, reported that there were 41 accidents, not 4. That is a factor of 10 difference.

Do you people take these things into account at all?

MR. WEISMANTLE: Yes, we do. As a matter of fact, besides the fact it is a regulation, what has been found in other emergencies is that governments perform their traditional role. There is a law that says governments must respond to emergencies. In New York State, I guess it is Article 2-B or some such citation. We found even at Shoreham, actually, governments have responded to bomb threats, for instance. There has been numerous bomb threats where Suffolk County police have actually responded and stayed in contact and actually sent people to the plant until it was clear that there was no bomb. As a matter of fact, the day of the exercise

at an unusual event, we believe that New York State actually responded to that to the extent of taking down the information through their normal channels, by the people who are normally assigned to do that.

MR. SANTUNTONIO: It was not an actual event, though. It was a planned drill.

MR. WEISMANTLE: Let me finish. We think it is just common sense and proven by actual responses to Shoreham and other emergencies that governments will respond. There is no question about that.

MR. SANTUNTONIO: I am not saying that the governments of the County of Suffolk and State of New York will be remiss and abandon their citizens at a time of radiological emergency at this plant. I am merely pointing out that your basic assumptions for this drill are erroneous by the testimony of our elected representatives.

MR. WEISMANTLE: I think that is just rhetoric.

MR. SANTUNTONIO: What about the other issues I have raised?

MR. HUSAR: Sir, if you can restate your question, I am not sure that it was phrased in

the--

MR. SANTUNTONIO: How do you reconcile--claim there were only four accidents in the evacuation area and the Suffolk County Police reported over 40?

MR. WEISMANTLE: I--

MR. SANTUNTONIO: Are you drawing these numbers out of a hat? How did you come about with that number or did you make it up just to be convenient? I am asking because I want to know where you got the number.

MR. WEISMANTLE: I can't address where FEMA got the number for the drill, but I can address what the record shows as far as accidents in the 10-mile zone--

MR. SANTUNTONIO: In the midst of a radiological emergency.

MR. WEISMANTLE: What the record shows is that in the midst of normal traffic conditions, the average number of accidents over a period of about five or six hours is four. 90 to 95 percent of those, statistically, would not affect the evacuation at all because they would be fender benders where people could pull over to the side of

the road.

When experts look at other evacuations, including Three Mile Island, including evacuations associated with propane, the danger of propane explosion, which we experienced on Long Island but was experienced in a much bigger way about eight or ten years ago in Canada, they find that actually the accident rate goes down when roadways are filled to their capacity. People are driving at low speeds, there is less chance of an accident. Most accidents happen at night and when people are driving at higher speeds. So, actually, we were--

MR. SANTUNTONIO: I disagree. I disagree with that assessment. And I think the statistics from the Suffolk County Police Department will bear me out on that. I have to say, I don't think you live around here or drive around here.

MR. WEISMANTLE: Oh, yes, I do.

MR. HUSAR: Sir, your five minutes are up. Thank you very much.

Mr. Robert O'Connor?

MR. O'CONNOR: I don't even know where

to start. I am a little discouraged. I came here tonight hoping to hear the evacuation procedures explained. I live close by to the plant. I am discouraged because I don't feel they have been explained at all and I feel I am part of some kind of charade and I don't want to be that. I don't want to be part of it.

I was thinking that we need the rumor control bureau that you talked about, that operated so well for LILCO, because 80 percent of Suffolk County, who is against the opening of this plant, are not, I don't think, equally represented here tonight. I think there is a rumor going around that the plant is not going to be opened. I really wish we had the resource of your efficient bureau.

The other thing is, it seems that I think that the rules do seem to change. You talk about the sirens. And I hear that, okay, over 66 percent of them don't work. Then what I hear you say is, you tell me why they don't work and that they are going to be reset. And they were reset and subsequently they did work. That doesn't seem to be what a test is all about. A test is either they worked or didn't. Not they didn't and this is

why so now we will do it again when no one is around. That seems absurd. Again, what is a test about?

The people have talked about the traffic conditions and things being maybe endemic to this area. First of all, I had trouble following--I was hoping for an explanation of what was going on and I had some trouble even following. To use your language--I got here late and I almost co n't get here to interface with you and hear about how well the briefings went because of traffic impediments. I almost could not get here. And that is your language.

I think that is an outrage. The other thing is, as I said, I don't want to participate in a charade and I came here hoping to hear a lucid explanation of what an evacuation plan is about, not about free play eventualities and traffic impediments. It doesn't make sense to me. I don't know what you mean and I question whether you know what you mean. Especially when we are talking about, in your scenario there were 4 accidents and Suffolk County Police say they are over 40. Something there is not coinciding. It is a

contradiction and I don't know what you are doing on paper. It doesn't seem to have been addressed.

I just tried to write notes. I don't feel too prepared to be able to do this.

I live really close to the plant and traffic is so bad on a normal--on a normal day that I have trouble crossing 25A within 10 to 15 minutes, just to cross from north to south, forgetting about getting on it and driving anyplace. I sit there because there is no traffic light. So I don't know what area you are examining. I really--I really don't.

My faith is really shaken. I am actually embarrassed. I had some faith in what you people were doing and it is totally gone. And you're looking as if, you know, you kind of don't believe, but I came here, I think, in good spirit. And that spirit has been lost for me as I have sat through these hearings.

I see rule--changes being made in the rules when they don't work. I heard, before the whole Shoreham thing, I heard, in the last several months, how Shoreham was essential to what I would call our national insecurity. Our people called it

our national security. Then I pick up The New York Times saying it is over, the plant is not closing. I hear from the nuclear industry quotes that it doesn't matter. It seems like, well, now that the people have spoken up, one of the few times in my lifetime I can remember that people in a local area have stood up and said "no" to the Federal Government, that now it is like, well, but that wasn't important anyway. That seems to me like another changing of the rules.

I just want to say, I think that it is very, very important what the people in this county have done, how hard they have worked to get their voices heard. And I hope you hear it and I hope you remember it.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much, sir. Dennis Ruppert?

MR. RUPPERT: Thank you very much for hearing us tonight and for this presentation going on here. I would just like to thank everybody for coming down, all those pro and those who are against. I think that those that are against have been misinformed for many years, whetner you believe it or not. You can sit back and realize

that. I have been a part of the Shoreham situation for a good portion of my life, even before I even worked there.

Excuse me, young lady. I was quiet while you talked. Please be quiet while I talk.

I hope you people all enjoy the coal plants and gas plants you have and I hope you enjoy the high rates you will have also if this place doesn't run. If it does run, I will be a strong back right against it to work and do what I can to work and make it a safety plant. I was part of the drill, I have been proud of the drills for the last four years or so and I will do anything I can until evacuation plans or the management changes that. I thank you very much--thank you very much for my time. Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: Mr. Frank Petrone?

MR. PETRONE: Thank you for your hospitality.

I was hoping that I would be here tonight and I would be able to speak to various types of audiences, including LILCO employees, because as in the past, and right now, too, I do give you credit--I have to give you credit for

going through with this.

There is something that I think we all hoped to accomplish over the last several days, and that was to see that an agreement would be signed. I would have hoped, as someone who took this work very seriously, who doesn't particularly call it a farce, that we would have had some sort of moratorium on the tactics that have been going on over the last several months.

I don't think LILCO appreciates them. I certainly know that, speaking for Suffolk County, we don't appreciate them. I think everyone wants to see a resolution to a major problem, resolution that has split a community in more than half, that has split a community amongst families, that has split a community within their school districts and that has split a community within even their own homes.

We had hoped that this would be resolved before this meeting would be attended. But I have to speak and I hope it is the last time I have to speak on Shoreham, because I believe that if this agreement is forged and that plant closes, that everyone, once again, can do the important

things that they are supposed to be doing, and that is working together in one community as a team. Yeah, there are brownouts, there are blackouts that are coming. No one is denying that. There certainly are hurricanes. There are all sorts of things we are going to face. It is not going to be solved through a LERO plan. It is certainly not going to be solved by a county government alone.

I have to speak, though, on some of the points that I spoke on two years ago, because it has been heard and in some cases it hasn't been heard. This LERO plan is not adequate to protect the public. At this point in time, you must realize that the basis for an emergency plan is not only the coordination of the various elements of that plan, which, number one, is tremendously lacking--it was alluded to that there was a siren breakdown, or two or three or four. That is the case. We don't have a notification system for this public and we don't know if the backup system truly works. And who cares if it is part of the scenario, because the scenario is only written to deal with things that take place that are planned.

That was a beautiful, free-play

experience and I certainly hope that FEMA is going to utilize it as a free-play experience to see whether or not there is an adequate notification system.

If we look at the plan, the public hasn't been informed. They don't know what an EPZ is. They have no idea. You may all know, but they certainly don't. The public information piece has never gone out. True, it is perhaps not part of the planning of today to have that done and I am sure that LILCO intends to have that to the public, and I wouldn't even take offense in terms of what type of brochure it would be. But it isn't here. The public is not ready. The public doesn't even know what is happening other than the controversy that exists.

Simulation is another issue. We always use simulation in exercises. We do it all the time in fire drills in schools. But we simulate the decision makers. We want to know who makes those decisions. This exercise could have been table-topped out of Washington, D.C., where the County Executive resides, because basically that is what happened. True, there wasn't the

participation. The governments refused, Connecticut has refused, Westchester has refused, the Red Cross has refused. Many entities refused to play. But what are we evaluating? How could someone else can make a decision for the people who are truly going to have to make the decision if there is truly an emergency?

This is pre-Three Mile Island. Even at Three Mile Island, governments attempted to make decisions. What we are facing ourselves with now is something that is exceptionally incomplete and assumptions that have been made, whether you call them through rule changes or not, the assumptions are still made that the government would follow the LILCO plan. And that is not true. The governments have said they would not.

My main message and what I would like to really conclude on, is the fact that any exercise that takes place--and I took this program very seriously and I worked my butt off at Indian Point to make sure it worked. I took it extremely seriously. But what we evaluated was preparedness. We never evaluated based on assumption. There was never an assumption made in any power plant that I

could recall. And if there wasn't participation, it was dealt with head on. And if it meant going back and if it meant not doing it, it wasn't done.

But the problem we face here today is that we are trying to create something that isn't. I am not even saying that we are going to point fingers at anyone. But there is not a level of preparedness in this county. If something happened at Shoreham and everyone's good intentions were there, God help us because there is no level of preparedness that, number one, you can measure, no less count on.

Thank you very much.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much. Maria Branco?

MS. BRANCO: Hi. Maria Branco. I work at the nuclear power station. I dedicated 13 years of my professional career to it. I married into a family which started in this town as a matter of fact, 200 years ago, James Rourke, shipwrecked off the shores of Fire Island and was brought to this town with his children by the cooperation of local residents who were prepared for these sorts of emergencies in those days. It

was a local activity, not Suffolk County, not the town. The people.

What people? And I am very proud of my colleagues. We are here, most of us are not LERO. Most of us are Shoreham employees. We are dedicated. It is not the salary. Believe me. We are doing it because we want to and we believe in this form of energy. I live downwind from the Northport power station. I am not criticizing LILCO, of course, but I would rather have Shoreham because I know Shoreham. And I don't know fossil-fueled plants all that well. I am afraid of them, it is true, and so are my fellow residents in the back. FEMA, NRC. We are working. We are working hard. We want this plant. My neighbors now want this plant because I have talked to them for all these years.

I have educated people and I believe I have done that in good faith. I have tried to educate many more. Some of them won't listen. There has been misinformation. One of my colleagues got up and spoke. There is misinformation. We want to stop that. I want to stop the fear also. I don't know how to do it. I

would like cooperation.

Mr. Petrone pointed to a very good point. Maybe he is right from the point of view of Suffolk-wide, the whole county. It is true we are not coordinated. Here we are, LERO, LILCO. Where is Suffolk County? Where is the Governor? We really have to give the incentive to the governments to play with us, to plan with us and eventually, if anything happens, to work with us. 200 years ago it worked for James Rourke. We are still here. My husband is around. Lots of children everywhere. I have two. It can work on this island again. It can work because of the people here and because this government will still believe in us when we operate.

Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: Mr. Hanns Streuli?

MR. STREULI: There is a tendency to discredit opponents of the Shoreham Plant. We are misinformed. Ten years ago I was 100 percent for Shoreham. I am 100 percent against it now and I hate being a Shoreham opponent. I hate having to come out here and speak up in this way. The only reason I do this is because I am convinced that

LILCO and FEMA are not doing their job in this respect.

There is not enough concern for the safety of people. There is not enough concern for a whole range of other things. I have a personal file at home which would allow me to, in a shortcut, give you a half hour presentation with all kinds of information from United Nations findings to anything else. And I do that because it seems to me that the stations, the authorities who should be in charge of that, are not doing this. We are not all an articulate group but some of us are very well read. It is not that we lack the information.

I joined when I heard that a 45-year-old woman was arrested, and I called her up when her address was in the newspaper and I asked her, "How could you do a stupid thing like this at your age?" And I spent about an hour with the lady and in the course of that I was given titles of several books and after I had read those, studied them, I all of a sudden realized that a lot of vital information is kept from the public. If you people would all know better you would probably be

opponents, too.

Tonight I am faced with a charade. What is going on here is other than I expected. I thought FEMA would be more open to the concerns of everybody. It reminds me of an eagle scout project. It is quite cute and everybody really feels they have to applaud what is going on but it has nothing whatsoever to do with reality.

I am teaching on Long Island--can you people imagine that in my school district, in my building, we would hold a fire drill during a light drill and because the principal decides because it is kind of a bit cool we are just deciding precisely how everything has to be done. You watch carefully and so on. But since people will catch pneumonia we are going to stay in our classrooms.

There has never been such a thing as long as I have been teaching. Every single kid, whether in the bathroom or at the nurse, is getting on the outside. We don't even care what the principal is doing and all kinds of administrators. It is the people, the kids who are going out there who we want to watch because if there is just one someone going in the wrong direction, everything

gets messed up and this thing is not safe. We check how long does it take until everybody is out, et cetera. If you don't do this with that drill, the drill is really worthless.

I am surprised that nobody brought up those failing sirens. It struck me as being very strange. I'm sorry. When the drill was described as being so successful--maybe I have a hearing loss but I didn't hear anything about the sirens. When somebody brought it up among the opponents, it was played down as if it was really unimportant and wasn't even necessary that they were part of it. In my opinion it is a crucial thing. It is just symptomatic of the failure of the drill that half of the sirens did not work, period, regardless of how you explain it away.

In my opinion, FEMA has the job to evaluate the drill properly. I say I have a hearing loss. When I came first, then I thought the moderator was a high official of LILCO because he described that drill and what happened as if it were his own personal project. I wish that this would change and that you people pay attention to what the concerns of all the people in Long Island

are because I don't see that here. I am very scared about the fact that this whole project is just going to be railroaded through. I hope that you people will give the opponents' version some thought and you evaluate that drill in a proper way so that we are not faced with the fact that we get impressions that FEMA is just an arm of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and trying to get that plant licensed as soon as possible.

Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much.

For those of you who may not have had an opportunity or chose not to fill out the sheet, what I thought we would do is to see if anybody who has not spoken as of this time has any comments or questions to make, statements to make or questions to ask, so that those thoughts, those comments, those questions could be memorialized in this transcript.

Yes, sir?

MR. McCOMB: I turned in a sheet. I am ready to talk. Arthur McComb.

MR. HUSAR: Yes, sir.

MR. McCOMB: Did you find it?

MR. HUSAR: Go right ahead, sir.

MR. McCOMB: Arthur McComb, Lake Ronkonkoma. And 10 years ago, more than 18 years ago, I started attending all of the hearings that allowed the public to speak and I spoke whenever I was allowed to. I started out by representing an organization in my community and an organization of clubs, a chairman in both cases.

Now, in view of the fact that LILCO has unanimously voted to sell Shoreham for a dollar, this is all moot. However, I want to read something to memorialize into the record, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.

A bumper sticker I saw, "If you don't like the way I drive, stay off the sidewalk," could have been said by LILCO and NRC as they usurped local government to license Shoreham's fission nuclear plant. Lest we forget, nothing has changed the horror of a fission nuclear accident. Just one meltdown, just one core coolant failure and we face gamma ray death, sudden and painful and the rest live on impregnated with radiation damage for future cancers forever, for structures and real estate to be excluded from loss benefits bring

dollar-wise insurance companies. Assets will face wipeout by the radiation plume.

Incidentally, I at this point, I put out a book which listed all my steps for 18 years, in the letters and so forth, and put it together in a book, "Plume is doom."

Bad weather adds to ugly consequences. Land, highways and structures are made indefinitely unusable. Devastation would reign. Chernobyl was our latest warning. We still have no safe disposal of dangerous radioactive waste matter.

NRC is promotional, not regulatory, and always has been, like its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission. Promotion was so blatant that by 1975 the name was changed. But that is all that changed. NRC and Feds and LILCO conspire to block local constitutional responsibility as to health, safety and general welfare from known fission N-plant flaws.

How much more nonsense and vicious attack can we the public take? How much more prime time TV can we watch overflowing with wonders of the golden parachute clique paid for by rate payers? How many presidential lies, as in Reagan

and Hodell campaign letters promising never to open Shoreham over local opposition, to elect Carny congressman from the Shoreham area can we stomach? Surely we were suckered to foot the bill.

LILCO, NRC, Feds-prompted, has cost us locally millions in legal defense which continues ad infinitum. When to stop it?

Government of people started at the Magna Carta. Must we corner King John again at Runnymede? 18 years of force feeding us, the public is overdue for regurgitation.

Have you looked at your useless home insurance policy lately? N-plant accident damage is excluded from coverage. Will Newsday ever turn 180 degrees in editorial policy and blast the golden parachutists? It is overdue.

The 12/7 1970 editorial headed "What's the hurry," says LILCO began construction before the end of the hearings, that AEC radiation standards are high enough to cause cancer, that they are more concerned with promotion than safety and that it is both promoter and licensor. Today much documentation still supports Newsday. Newsday's 6/6/88, page 3, says, "Half a million is

to go on an evacuation exercise and FEMA to spend an unknown amount and we know the public will pay. We always do."

Thank you for your time, gentlemen. At least we got a chance to air it.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you, sir.

Is there anyone at this time who would like to make a statement or comment?

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: I gave my paper to some LILCO employee who said he'd bring it up there and obviously he didn't.

I don't want to criticize LILCO employees because I think that they have done an excellent job in providing power for Long Island over the years. I do criticize and I think many people are directing their anger at the management of LILCO in pushing their business-with-blinders attitude and pushing Shoreham. I think a lot of people who are against Shoreham are not specifically against the LILCO employees, who are our neighbors.

Getting a little bit--get back to the evacuation planning system that we have here, I don't know if FEMA is aware of what is going on.

This came out of Long Island business about two years ago, comparing the road situation here on Long Island with other areas of New York State. A number of road miles per square mile, New York State, excluding Long Island, has 2.1. Long Island has about 6.7. In the vehicle registrations per square mile, New York State, excluding Long Island, has 148. Long Island has 1,215.

Vehicle registrations per road mile, New York State has 70. Long Island has 181.

We are talking about Westchester, talking about the Indian Point area. Westchester has a population of 1.9 million. Long Island has 2.6. But Westchester has 18 percent more road miles, 2,385 extra miles and more than 2.5 times the area of Long Island. Long Island has more than twice the road miles per square mile, 66 percent more vehicle registrations per mile of road and 267 percent more vehicle registrations per square mile.

You add these factors and you also add these two major truck accidents which have happened, one after the 1986 drill where a tire blew out on a mayonnaise truck and caused the backup of about 10 miles for five hours; also, one

this year where a driver had a sneezing fit, overturned and caused another 10-mile backup.

I think things like that is what FEMA should be looking at. The reality. This is realism.

Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much.

Is there anyone else here who would like to ask a question, make a comment, make a statement?

If not--yes, sir?

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: I'm sorry. My English is not too good. I came from Taiwan. I have been working for Atomic Power Company for 17 years, half of the 17 years in a nuclear power station. From the first year up to now, already 15 years.

I wanted to say I think first every private money--every company's money, a part of the country, we sort of think $5 billion is also the whole country's money, you know. We cannot waste $5 billion. We still need $1 billion to the Commissioner and it is too wasteful. Everybody knows today our United States country, the economy

is going down. If we are so wasteful, you know, one by--one of these planes got--the whole economy will be shaken down even more. Today our (unintelligible). We can't waste so much money.

Actually, nuclear power station is not so dangerous as you might think. Take French, for instance. Do you know how much power it is generated from nuclear power stations in French? More than 60 percent. In Japan, 32 percent. In Taiwan, 33 percent. I am from Taiwan.

We never experienced any accident. It is very safe.

I'm sorry. I have a lot to say but my English is not too good. It is making me nervous. Thank you for your encouragement.

I wanted to say, there are so many redundant water systems. First I talk to the Chernobyl accident. I mean--sorry.

The type of reactor involved in the Soviet Union Chernobyl accident is entirely different design from U.S. commercial reactor. In lots of important safety features built into U.S. plant. Additionally, society institutional and management approach it in the Soviet Union are

quite different than in the United States. Does anybody know what is the difference between our commercial nuclear power plant and the difference between these two? Anybody know? I want to tell you.

There are five major differences. First, they don't have containment. They don't have a primary containment. Our U.S. plant have a shield, primary containment. Second, reactor stability. U.S. plant chain reaction ceases when cooling water is lost. That mean we have a negative void of coefficiency. It is fail-safe, not like Chernobyl. It fails dangerously because the chain reaction speeded up when cooling water is lost.

The third reason, reactor control. Our control only takes two seconds to three seconds to get--but Russian Chernobyl takes 20 seconds to get(unintelligible)

Four, the automatic safety, U.S. operators cannot--our operators cannot disarm the automatic safety system which are shutting down the reactor. Soviet Union's reactor could disarm automatic safety system while the reactor still was

running.

Number five, you know the moderator, we use water. We use graphite as a primary moderator. Graphite is combustible. It can catch on fire but water cannot catch on fire, so you don't have to worry about this kind of accident like at Chernobyl.

You worry too much. There are so many redundant systems of water in the reactor.

The emergency response drill is just man-made. I mean, Congress made a procedure before we can get a license. It is not a necessary from my point of view. I have so many years experience. I am sure I know. There is no accident that could happen. You know, how many reasons can cause a reactor shutdown? 17 of them. Any kind of high pressure, high--

MR. HUSAR: Sir, I'm sorry. The allotted time is about up. Could you conclude your remarks? Certainly we would like to give opportunity to others who may have remarks to make them at this time.

SPEAKER: I think--I got to say something, you know, something more.

I want tell you--

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: I don't want to hear it.

13

SPLAKER: Because you don't know. How can you fight anything you don't know about it?

MR. HUSAR: Sir?

SPEAKER: When I said that you might--I get no radiation, no radiation--(unintelligible)

MR. HUSAR: Sir, I'm sorry. We are going to have to cut you off. You have exceeded your allotted time. Thank you very much, sir.

MR. JACOBY: I am Greg Jacoby. I do work for the LERO organization. I guess you back there are going to hear a few things. I heard people coming up here and talking to me about thousands of people instantaneously dying. I would like to have a reference on that. I would like to have reading material on that. I will read this material. Just as you said you have read this material. I also will read this material and make my own decision for myself that these thousands of people have died.

As far as Chernobyl is concerned, 31

people known record have died. You are also comparing reactors that have nothing to do with our reactor. You are comparing apples to oranges. At the very same point, at the very same point--hold on a second.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: You do your homework--

MR. JACOBY: I have. I have operated operators the past 12 years. I know about it. You never stepped near a building.

As most of the people here can see, some people that are against nuclear power do ask questions and are not willing to listen to the answers to their own questions, let alone finding out for real what the real story is, they make accusations that cannot even be based up by fact. They are not even listening to their own answers to their own questions.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: I am willing to listen.

MR. JACOBY: You were not even listening to me speaking now. You are interrupting.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: You are

berating me personally.

MR. JACOBY: I feel the same way. There are people in the room--I am also a Long Island citizen and I also pay taxes and my taxes are also going to this here drill and they are also going to other useless things, as far as you are concerned. But as far as I am concerned, this is not a useless thing.

This is--what we have here is we have people that are willing to prove that an emergency plan does work and in fact it does work. In fact, it does work. The material will be common knowledge. You will be able to educate yourself on the conjunction of the drill yourself on your own time, reading it in the library. This would be common knowledge. You should take this time to get an education and find out, without just making conjecture and talking about thousands of people died without any basis in fact, I would like you to educate yourself and then make a decision on whether you like it.

Thank you very much.

MR. HUSAR: Thank you, sir.

We have about five more minutes that

we have allotted for this particular public meeting. Anyone else that would like to ask a question or make a comment?

MR. HADDON: My name is Mark Haddon. I also work at the Shoreham Plant. I have a question for the NRC member. I haven't heard too much from you tonight.

What I would like to know is, sir, if you have that FEMA report in front of you right now and everything on it was positive and Mr. Leonard, if the NRC were to hand you a 25 percent or a full power license right now, first of all, how long would it take, with that favorable report in front of the NRC, to issue either license, 25 percent or 100 percent--just an estimate is all I am asking for. And Mr. Leonard, will Shoreham ever operate right now, if you do have license in front of you, in your opinion, sir?

MR. BELLAMY: Let me try first. It is unusually difficult to try to come up with an estimate of what you asked for. We are under no timetable whatsoever to issue a license to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. There will be no NRC decision made until we receive the FEMA report,

as Mr. Husar has indicated, until we digest all that information in the report, until we can make a reasonable assurance finding as I discussed earlier and then we make a recommendation to the five NRC commissioners in Washington, D.C. as to whether we think, we at the staff level, think a license should be issued to that plant, to this plant.

The decision as to whether Shoreham would get an operating license, whether that be 25 percent or 100 percent, will be made by those five commissioners in Washington, D.C. I cannot speak for when such a decision might be made.

MR. LEONARD: I will attempt to answer the second part of the question. Rather than give you my opinion, I would like to give you the facts and restate something the chairman of the board said. I assume you were at one of his meetings at Shoreham.

He has stated and he has been consistent throughout the last six months that this company is on three tracks. One is we are going to actively pursue the licensing of Shoreham. Two, we are going to negotiate with the State. Three, we are going to deal with the offers that the Long

Island Power Authority makes. He has done that, he has been consistent.

Now, we are right now actively engaged in licensing the plant. That is why we had the emergency preparedness exercise. That is why we are going forward with other things, the hearings. We are doing that because part of the negotiation agrees that we will continue to actively license the plant. I am not an attorney and I am giving it to you in layman's--the way I interpret things.

We have agreed that we will sell the State of New York the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station for one dollar and they can do anything they want with it. They can demolish it, they can mothball it, anything they want to do with it. Now, those negotiations, however, depend on a lot of things. After they are signed by LILCO and the State of New York, there are a lot of other signatures that have to occur. For instance, there are a lot of provisos that have to come to pass, such as the company must be granted an investment rating, investment grade rating. I am not a financier, either. But that means that such things as somehow, some settlement has to be arrived at in

the Suffolk County RICO suit because we don't think that with that big a cloud hanging over the company, that that can be granted the company.

The Governor apparently--and I say apparently because I am not privy to what the Governor says officially. I just read things in the newspaper as you do. He wants the State Legislature to fully ratify--the State Assembly and Senate to fully ratify this negotiated agreement. Whether that comes to pass, I honestly can't tell you.

So, we don't know how these things are going to turn out. We are going to do all these three things in good faith. If we got a license during the negotiations, we would not operate the plant because that would be bad faith. But if we get a license and the negotiations unravel, we will, of course, operate the plant.

MR. HUSAR: The time is now 10:00 p.m. We are reaching the end of the allotted time as noticed in the papers for this public meeting. We will entertain one more comment or question.

SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Hello. I do have a couple of concerns I would like addressed.

I do work at Shoreham. I do work for LILCO. I do live within the 10-mile zone. I have a wife and two children. My concern is not with LILCO or with Shoreham. My concern is with both Suffolk County and New York State. I would like them to address, A, how they intend to evacuate me and my family in the event of an accident in Millstone, which I am within the 50-mile zone. Two, I would like to know from both New York State, who--their absence on this board--and Suffolk County on this board is evident--how they will effectively answer how they participated by employing the National Guard to evacuate people at the Indian Point plant when they will not participate in evacuating LILCO's Shoreham facility?

Thank you.

MR. HUSAR: We have come to the end of this public meeting proceeding. Thank you very much for your participation.

(Time noted: 10:05 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, DEBRA STEVENS, a shorthand reporter and notary public within and for the State of New York, do hereby certify that I reported the proceedings of the FEMA Public Meeting on June 15, 1988, and that this is an accurate transcription of what transpired at that time and place.

Debra Stevens

Debra Stevens,

Shorthand Reporter