

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Commonwealth Edison Company
LaSalle, Units 1 and 2

Docket No. 50-373
Docket No. 50-374

As a result of the inspection conducted on June 27 through July 22, 1988, and in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C - General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (1987), the following violations were identified:

1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as described and implemented in the Commonwealth Edison Topical Report CE-1-A, Section 16, and the Quality Assurance Manual, requires that significant conditions adverse to quality shall be (1) promptly identified and corrected, (2) the cause of the condition shall be determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition and (3) the cause and the actions taken shall be reported to appropriate levels of management.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to promptly correct a known problem associated with the closing circuits of the station emergency diesel generators. On June 1, 1984, Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) issued a letter to the LaSalle Station stating that the INPO notice (OPEX83-29) received earlier had been investigated and determined that the subject Potter-Brumfield relay failures could occur at LaSalle on each of the Divisions 1 and 2 diesel generator breaker closing circuits. Not until three relay failures were experienced at LaSalle during surveillance testing in 1987 did the station take action. The licensee failed to clearly identify the common mode significant condition adverse to quality that was known for nearly four years in the Division 1 and 2 generators of both units. Moreover, the quality assurance program allowed this condition to remain uncorrected.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

2. Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2 requires that the emergency diesel generators be demonstrated operable in accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8.1.1.2-1. Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 requires that whenever the number of failures per nuclear unit in the last 100 valid tests equals two, the test frequency be at least once per 14 days. For three failures in 100 valid tests, the tests frequency must be increased to at least once per seven days.

Contrary to the above, the Unit 1 diesel generators experienced two failures within 74 valid starts (between August 10, 1986 and September 17, 1987). However, the test frequency remained at once per 31 days. On December 18, 1987, the Unit 1 diesel generators experienced their third failure within the last 85 valid test and the test frequency was only increased to once per 14 days.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation: (1) corrective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.

9/9/88

Dated _____



Hubert J. Miller, Director
Division of Reactor Safety