



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-369

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 82  
License No. NPF-9

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated March 14, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 82, are hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original signed by:

David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate 11-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-1/11

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: May 10, 1988

LA:PDII-3  
MRood:pw  
3/28/88

<sup>DH</sup>  
PM:PD11-3  
DHood  
3/28/88

<sup>SRXB</sup>  
SRXB  
WHodges  
3/28/88

<sup>OGC-WF</sup>  
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3/30/88  
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<sup>PDII-3</sup>  
PDII-3  
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4/1/88

<sup>ADR2:NRR</sup>  
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4/1/88



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-370

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 63  
License No. NPF-17

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated March 14, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 63, are hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original signed by:  
David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-1/II

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: May 10, 1988

LA:PDII-3  
MRood:pw  
3/28/88

<sup>DIF</sup>  
PM:PDII-3  
DHood  
3/28/88

SRXB <sup>my</sup>  
WHodges  
3/28/88

OGC-WF  
<sup>my</sup>  
3/30/88

PDII-3  
Acting PD  
4/1/88

ADR:NRP  
Glatnas  
4/1/88

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SECY*

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 82

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-9

DOCKET NO. 50-369

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 63

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-17

DOCKET NO. 50-370

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

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### 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

##### COLD LEG INJECTION

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The isolation valve open,
- b. A contained borated water volume of between 6870 and 7342 gallons,
- c. A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2100 ppm,
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 585 and 639 psig, and
- e. A water level and pressure channel OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3\*.

ACTION:

- a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron concentration less than 1900 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.
- c. With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration less than 1900 ppm and:
  - 1) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators 1900 ppm or greater, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 24 hours of the low boron determination or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.
  - 2) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators less than 1900 ppm but greater than 1500 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status or return the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators to greater than 1900 ppm and enter ACTION c.1 within 6 hours of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

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\*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

Pages 3/4 5-1 and 3/4 5-2b intentionally deleted.



Pages 3/4 5-3, 3/4 5-3a, and 3/4 5-3b intentionally deleted.

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## 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Leg Accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The allowed down time for the accumulators are variable based upon boron concentration to ensure that the reactor is shutdown following a LOCA and that any problems are corrected in a timely manner. Subcriticality is assured when boron concentration is above 1500 ppm, so additional down time is allowed when concentration is above 1500 ppm. A concentration of less than 1900 ppm in any single accumulator or as a volume weighted average may be indicative of a problem, such as valve leakage, but since reactor shutdown is assured, additional time is allowed to restore boron concentration in the accumulators.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

The original licensing bases of McGuire assumes both the UHI system and the Cold Leg Accumulators function to mitigate postulated accidents. Subsequent analyses, documented in "McGuire Nuclear Station, Safety Analysis for UHI Elimination" dated September 1985, and docketed by Duke letter dated October 2, 1985, support the determination that UHI is no longer required provided the Cold Leg Accumulator volume is adjusted to be consistent with that assumed in the Safety Analysis.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one Safety Injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and Safety Injection pumps except the required OPERABLE charging pump to be inoperable below 300°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

#### 3/4.5.4

[Deleted]

#### 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued)

for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.