Docket No. 50-423 B12985

Attachment 1

Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Containment Isolation Valves

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## DEFINITIONS

### CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

- 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:
  - All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
    - Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves may be opened under administrative control.
    - Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions.
  - b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,
  - c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,
  - d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and
  - e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

#### CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

#### CORE ALTERATIONS

1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel nead removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

#### DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microCurie/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I."

# E - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.11 E shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the sample) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV/d) for the radionuclides in the sample.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:
  - a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations\* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves are opened under administrative control,\*\* and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions.
  - b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and
  - c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing. except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at a pressure not less than P<sub>2</sub>, 54.1 psia (39.4 psig), and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than 0.60 L<sub>2</sub>.

\* Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

\*\* The following manual valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. 3FPW-V661, 3FPW-666, 3SSP-V13, 3SSP-V14, 3HCS-V2, 3HCS-V3, 3HCS-V9, 3HCS-V10, 3HCS-V6, 3HCS-V13, 3SAS-V875, 3SAS-V50, 3CHS-V371, 3CCP-V886, 3CCP-V887, 3CVS-V13.

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# CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

# 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

## LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to the required isolation times.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

## ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

- Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
- \*b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
- \*c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

# SURVEILLANCE

4.6.3.1 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position,
- b. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, and
- c. Verifying that on a Containment High Radiation test signal, each purge supply and exhaust isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

The provisions of Specification 3.04 are not applicable.

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# CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### BASES

## 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for these isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. FSAR Table 6.2-65 lists all containment isolation valves shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and approved by the Plant Operation Review Committee.

### 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit or the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps are capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These Hydrogen Control Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

## 3/4.6.5 SUBATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM

#### 3/4.6.5.1 STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR

The closure of the isolation valves in the suction of the steam jet air ejector ensures that: (1) the containment internal pressure may be maintained within its operation limits by the mechanical vacuum pumps, and (2) the containment atmosphere is isolated from the outside environment in the event of a LOCA. These valves are required to be closed for containment isolation.