NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMI: NO. 3150-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGETS 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 1 OF 0 13 Seabrook Station TITLE (4) ESF Actuation - Diesel Generator Start EVENT DATE (6) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) DAY MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH 0 15 10 10 10 8 8 8 0 0 0 9 0 8 1 0 0 0 4 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR \$: (Check one or more of the following) (11) OPERATING 73.71(b) 20.402(h) 20.408(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20 405(4)(1)(0) 50.36(e)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) OTHER (Sracify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20 405(4)(1)(4) 50 73(4)(2)(40) 01010 50 38(4)(2) 20.408(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(4)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.405(a)(1)((v) 80 73(+1(2)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.406(a)(1)(v) 50.73(\*)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) AME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Timothy G. Pucko (extension 4428) Senior Engineer 61013 417141-19151714 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) TO NPROS MANUFAC EPORTABLE TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE COMPONENT SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YEAR MONTH DAY EXPECTED

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately lifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

YES (IT yes, samplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

On August 10, 1988 at 3:31pm EDT, Vital Buses E5 and E6 tripped on a loss of offsite power, which resulted in the starting and loading of Diesel Generator 1A onto Bus E5. Diesel Generator 1B was out of service at the time. The cause of the event is attributed to the premature opening of 345KV feeder breaker GCB163.

NO

The event occurred as a result of activities initiated to correct an indication of partial arc discharge on one insulator. The Seabrook Station Unit Shift Supervisor and the offsite System Dispatcher determined that GCB163 would have to be opened. Offsite power to Vital Buses E5 and E6 was to be transferred from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT's) to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RAT's). Upon completion of the transfer, communications would be re-established and a switching order requested.

As a result of miscommunications between the two facilities, premature opening of GCB163 by the System Dispatcher caused a loss of offsite power and the resultant start of the 1A Diesel Generator. Prompt operator action was taken to restore offsite power. All available safety systems operated as designed.

The root cause of the premature opening of GCB163 has been contributed to personnel error. To preclude recurrence, additional training will be established.

This is the first event of this type at Seabrook Station.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 36EA's) (17)

On August 10, 1988 at 3:31pm EDT, while Seabrook Cation was in MODE 5 (Cold Shutdown), Vital Buses E5 and E6 (EDE-SWG-E5 and EDE-SWG-E6 [SWGR] respectively) tripped on a loss of offsite power [JE], which resulted in the starting and loading of Diesel Generator [EK] 1A onto Bus E5. At the time of the event, Diesel Generator 1B was out of service. The cause of the event is the premature opening of a 345KV feeder breaker [BKR] GCB163.

The Seabrook Station switching station consists of a metal enclosed, pressurized sulphur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>) gas-insulated bus structure [FK]. The event occurred during isolation of Gas Zone 4 in the switching station due to indication of partial arc discharge on one insulator. To facilitate the isolation of Gas Zone 4, the Seabrook Station Unit Shift Supervisor and the offsite Senior System Dispatcher determined that 345KV feeder breaker, GCB163, would have to be opened and agreed on the following steps to accomplish this: prior to the opening of GCB163, offsite power to Vital Buses E5 and E6 was to be transferred from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT's) [XFMR] to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RAT's); upon completion of the UAT to the RAT transfer, the Seabrook Station Control Room would re-establish communications with the offsite System Dispatcher and request a switching order to open the 345KV breaker.

Prior to the completion of the UAT to RAT transfer, communications were re-established between the Control Room and the System Dispatcher's office. Conversation between the Control Room Operator and the System Dispatcher resulted in the System Dispatcher misinterpreting the call to mean that it was time to open GCB163.

As a result of this miscommunication between the two facilities, the premature opening of GCB163 by the System Dispatcher caused a loss of offsite power and the resultant loading of the 1A Diesel Generator onto Vital Bus E5. Prompt operator action was taken to restore Vital Bus E6 to offsite power and to parallel and restore offsite power to Vital Bus E5. Diesel Generator 1A was returned to standby status.

During this event the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] was at a temperature of 112 degrees Fahrenheit and vented to atmosphere. All available safety systems operated as designed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/86					
ACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	T	LE	R NUMBER (6)			,	AGE	3)	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The root cause of the premature opening of GCB163 has been contributed to personnel error. Contributing factors to the personnel error include:

- An incomplete understanding of job functions between the Control Room Operators and the System Dispatchers.
- The event occurred during a shift change while the shift briefing was being conducted.
- Lack of proper transfer of the preswitching agreements from the primary personnel (Unit Shift Supervisor and System Dispatcher) to the secondary personnel (Control Room Operator and System Dispatcher).

To preclude recurrence of this type of event, additional operator training will be established to familiarize the operators with the offsite System Dispatchers facility and the proper steps to take to confirm a Switching Order before it is initiated. In addition, increased training with the System Dispatchers will be established, and a review of this event will be presented in future System Dispatcher training sessions.

This is the first event of this type at Seabrook Station.



## Public Service of New Hampshire

New Hampshire Yankee Division

NYN-88122

September 9, 1988

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-56, Dock+ & No. 50-443

Subject: Licensec Event Report (LER) No. 88-004-00: ESF Actuation - Diesel Generator Start

Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 88-004-00 for Seabrook Station. This submittal documents an event which occurred on August 10, 1988, and is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. T. G. Pucko at (603) 474-9574, extension 4428.

Very truly yours.

George 5. Inom

Enclosures: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator USNRC Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19405

> Mr. David G. Ruscitto NRC Senior Resident Inspector (Acting) Seabrook Station Seabrook, NH 03874

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