

HARMON & WEISS

2001 S STREET, N.W.

SUITE 430

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-1125

GAIL MCGREEVY HARMON
ELLYN R. WEISS
DIANE CURRAN
DEAN R. TOUSLEY
ANDREA C. FERSTER

TELEPHONE
(202) 328-3500

December 20, 1985

Mr. Joseph Felton
Director, Division of Rules & Records
Office of Administration
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT REQUEST

FOIA-85-844
Rec'd 12-24-85


Re: Freedom of Information Act Request

Dear Mr. Felton,

Pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act, I hereby request a copy of any and all answers provided by the GPU Nuclear Corporation to the attached questions, which were propounded by the NRC Staff as an attachment to Inspection Report No. 50-289/85-26.

Thank you for your prompt attention.

Very truly yours,



Ellyn R. Weiss

ERW/hmp

8603040111 851220
PDR FOIA
WEISS85-844 PDR

ATTACHMENT A

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
TMI-1 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS

1. Confirm that ducting, piping and other components that could potentially impact the backup instrument air bottles in the diesel generator room are either seismically supported or, if not, that their failure would not result in loss of function of the backup air bottles. For equipment that is seismically supported, provide the criteria used to establish seismic qualification (e.g. Regulatory Guide 1.29).
2. Provide a discussion which justifies the proposal to change the failure mode for the new emergency feedwater flow control valves (EF-V30s) to closed rather than open on loss of air. This discussion should address the importance of assuring reliable emergency feedwater flow against other considerations such as overcooling/overfilling.
3. Describe those features (indications) and actions relied on to alert the operators of flooding in the tendon access gallery in the intermediate building, for example, as a result of a main feedwater line break. Specify the design basis for these features. This discussion should also address the actions taken in the event of inadvertent indication of flooding and an assurance that these actions will not cause unnecessary challenges to safety systems.
4. What are the additional hazards and/or effects on safety-related systems in the intermediate building (especially the emergency feedwater system) with the storage of hydrogen and oxygen calibration gas bottles in the vicinity of safety-related equipment?