
TABLE 4.2.1 (Continued)

Automatic Depressurization System

Trip Function	Functional Test ⁽⁸⁾	Calibration(8)	Instrument Check
Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	(Note 1)	Once/Operating Cycle	Once Each Day
High Drywell Pressure	(Note 1)	Once/Operating Cycle	Once Each Day
Bus Power Monitor	(Note 1)	None	Once Each Day
Trip System Logic (Except Solenoids of Valves)	Once/Operating Cycle (Notes 2 and 11)	Once/Operating Cycle (Note 3)	



4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION

The Protective Instrumentation Systems covered by this Specification are listed in Table 4.2. Most of these protective systems are composed of two or more independent and redundant subsystems which are combined in a dual-channel arrangement. Each of these subsystems contains an arrangement of electrical relays which operate to initiate the required system protective action.

The relays in a subsystem are actuated by a number of means, including manually-operated switches, process-operated switches (sensors), bistable devices operated by analog sensor signals, timers, limit switches, and other relays. In most cases, final subsystem relay actuation is obtained by satisfying the logic conditions established by a number of these relay contacts in a logic array. When a subsystem is actuated, the final subsystem relay(c) can operate protective equipment, such as valves and pumps, and can perform other protective actions, such as tripping the main turbine generator unit.

With the dual-channel arrangement of these subsystems, the single failure of a ready circuit can be tolerated because the redundant subsystem or system (in the case of high pressure coolant injection) will then initiate the necessary protective action. If a failure in one of these circuits occurs in such a way that an action is taken, the operator is immediately alerted to the failure. If the failure occurs and causes no action, it could then remain undetected, causing a loss of the redundancy in the dual-channel arrangement. Losses in redundancy of this nature are found by periodically testing the relay circuits and contacts in the subsystems to assure that they are operating properly.

It has been the practice in boiling water reactor plants to functionally test protective instrumentation sensors and sensor relays on-line on a monthly frequency. Since logic circuit tests result in the actuation of plant equipment, testing of this nature was done while the plant was shut down for refueling. In this way, the testing of equipment would not jeopardize plant operation.

This Specification is a periodic testing program which is based upon the overall testing of protective instrumentation systems, including logic circuits as well as sensor circuits. Table 4.2 outlines the test, calibration, and logic system functional test schedule for the protective instrumentation systems. The testing of a subsystem includes a functional test of each relay wherever practicable. The testing of each relay includes all circuitry necessary to make the relay operate, and also the proper functioning of the relay contacts. Testing of the automatic initiation inhibit switches verifies the proper operability of the switches and relay contacts. Functional testing of the inaccessible temperature switches associated with the isolation systems is accomplished remotely by application of a heat source to individual switches.

All subsystems are functionally tested, calibrated, and operated in their entirety.

Amendment No. 22, 96, 98, 108, 106