NRC Form (9-83)												U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/88				
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2							it 2						0 4 1 1 1 2	1	OF 0 12	
TITLE (4)	Re	actor	Trip Du	to Reactor	Coolar	nt Pump	Trip C	laused	By A Loss Of 4	CV B	us 2	A Mot	or Loads			
EVENT DATE (6)				LER NUMBER (6)		REPOR	RT DATE	71	ОТНЕ	INVOL	DLVED (#)					
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POWER LEVEL (10)		010	20.402(b) 20.406(a)(1)(i) 20.406(a)(1)(iii) 20.406(a)(1)(iii) 20.406(a)(1)(iii) 20.406(a)(1)(iv)			20.405(c) 50.38(c)(1) 50.38(c)(2) 50.73(e)(2)(i) 60.73(e)(2)(ii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)				73.71(b) 73.71(c) OTHER (Specify in Appropriate of the original form)			
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				COMPLETE ONE	LINE FOR	EACH COMP	PONENT F	AILURE	DESCRIBED IN THIS REPO	ORT (12	3)					

TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED :14

reactor power, a surveillance test of the 4KV and 480VAC Normal Bus Undervoltage (UV) Protection was initiated. This testing involves using a blocking relay in the UV circuitry while testing the UV protection relays. During testing of the 2A 4KV Bus, actuation of the undervoltage relays occurred causing a loss of 2A 4KV Bus motor loads. This caused the "A" Reactor Coolant Pump to trip initiating a Reactor Trip, at 0847 hours, due to the breaker position of the coolant pump. The operators stabilized the plant in Hot Standby using the Emergency Operating Procedures. The cause for the UV protection relay actuations was determined to be a malfunctioning blocking relay. The contact spacing was found to be out of adjustment causing improper operation. This relay was adjusted and calibrated using a relay calibration procedure. The Undervoltage Protection surveillance test was performed satisfactorily and the relay was returned to service. There were no safety implications to the public as a result of this incident. The undervoltage protection is designed to shed the loads on the respective bus before any damage to the loads are received due to

discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.3.1.1.11.

the operation at a reduced voltage. This type of event is

On 4/4/88 at 0800 hours, with the Unit in POWER OPERATION at 100%

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MONTH

DAY

648

NRC Form 366

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT

681

YES IN VEL COMPLETE EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OME NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2

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On 4/4/88 at 0800 hours, with the Unit at 100% reactor power, Operations personnel were preparing to perform a surveillance test. This surveillance test, Operating Surveillance Test (OST) 2.36.18, involves testing of the 4KV and 480VAC Normal Bus Undervoltage Protection Circuits. The undervoltage (UV) relays are functionally tested by utilizing a blocking relay in the protection circuitry. This blocking relay prevents the output of the undervoltage relays from performing its intended function.

During the resetting of the 2A 4KV Bus UV relays after functionally testing these relays (27-VA200, 27-VA2100, and 27-VA2200), an actuation of the UV relays occurred, causing a loss of the following 2A 4KV Bus motor loads: the "A" motor for the 21A Main Feedwater Pump (2FWS-P21A1), the 21A Service Water Pump (2SWS-P21A), the 21A Heater Drain Pump (2HDH-P21A) and the 21A Reactor Coolant Pump (2RCS-P21A). The loss of the 21A Reactor Coolant Pump, initiated a reactor trip on Reactor Coolant Pump breaker position, at 0847 hours. The operators stabilized the plant in HOT STANDBY (Mode 3) utilizing the Emergency Operating Procedures.

The cause for the UV relay actuations and subsequent reactor trip was determined to be the result of a malfunctioning blocking relay, Relay 1-NNSADX, (Westinghouse 125VDC MG-6 Latching Relay). Investigation by the Relay Department identified that the contact spacing between the electromagnet pole face and raised section of the armature which strikes the pole face, was found to be 0.00 inches. This spacing should normally be between 0.005 and 0.015 inches for proper operation of the relay. This relay was adjusted to the proper spacing using Relay Calibration Procedure (2RCP-01). The Operating Surveillance Test was then performed in order to verify operability of the blocking relay after adjustment. OST 2.36.18 was completed satisfactorily and Relay 1-NNSADX was returned to service on 4/6/88. Additionally, all remaining Westinghouse MG-6 relays have been identified and will be calibrated at the earliest opportune moment as plant operating conditions allow for the clearance of the relays involved. These calibrations/adjustments are expected to be completed prior to the next normally scheduled relay calibrations during the First Refueling.

Criticality was achieved at 0518 hours on 4/5/88, and full

power operation was reached on 4/6/88.

TEXT If more space a required, use additional NRC Form 3864's/ (17)

There were no safety implications to the public as a result of this incident. The undervoltage protection is designed to shed the loads on the respective bus before any damage to the loads are received due to the operation at a reduced voltage. In the event that the 2AE 4KV Emergency Bus would have also been taken out due to an undervoltage relay actuation, the No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator was OPERABLE throughout the incident and would have supplied the 2AE 4KV Emergency Bus if required. This type of event is discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.3.1.1.11.





Nuclear Group P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077-0004

> May 4, 1988 ND3SPM:0217

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 LER 88-007-00

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 88-007-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.iv, "Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Caused By a Loss of 4KV Bus 2A Motor Loads."

Very truly yours,

T. P. Noonan Plant Manager

pcj

Attachment

IEZZ

May 4, 1988 ND3SPM:0217 Page two

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