

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board

In the Matter of)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC) Docket Nos. 50-440
ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL.) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,)
Units 1 and 2))

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT A. STRATMAN

County of Lake)
 : ss:
State of Ohio)

Robert A. Stratman, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. I, Robert A. Stratman, am General Supervisor, Operations Section, Perry Plant Operations Department, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. My business address is 10 Center Road, Perry, Ohio 44081.

2. As General Supervisor, Operations Section, I am responsible for the supervision of the operation of Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. This responsibility includes supervision of all plant operators and all systems involved in the operation of the plant. As a part of the recovery organization established following the January 31, 1986 earthquake, I was responsible for determining the plant status and whether plant structures and components had suffered damage. A statement of

my professional qualifications is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "A".

3. The purpose of this Affidavit is to describe the results of the extensive plant walkdowns and inspections that were performed by Perry Plant personnel in response to the January 31, 1986 earthquake. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and believe the information set forth herein to be true and correct.

PLANT STATUS

4. Prior to the earthquake that occurred on January 31, 1986, numerous testing, calibration, and work completion activities were being conducted in preparation for fuel load of Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. One major activity was preparation for the Division II diesel generator response time testing. As part of this work, all of the safety related components powered from the Division II diesel were energized and in standby readiness. Table 1 is a list of these components. All of this equipment behaved normally through the event; that is, there were no spurious starts or alarms. Preparations were also underway to move the startup sources. This work had not yet begun when the seismic event occurred. The sources were never actually moved, and remained stored in the upper pools.

5. In support of the ongoing test and surveillance activities, a significant number of systems were in operation. In addition, numerous other systems were energized and in the standby mode. Lists of the specific safety and non-safety sys-

tems energized or operating prior to and during the earthquake are included as Tables 2 and 3. All of the operating safety-related systems continued to operate through the event. None of the safety-related systems in the standby mode experienced any spurious initiations.

6. As noted in Table 3, a large number of non-safety systems were operating or in the standby mode, and maintained their status throughout the event. Two non-safety items tripped on protective signals as intended by their design. These were the Unit 1 instrument air compressor, which tripped on high vibration, and the auxiliary steam boiler, which tripped due to actuation of one of its protective circuits. The instrument air compressor is a centrifugal machine that operates at greater than 40,000 rpm and as part of its protective devices has a very sensitive vibration switch. The auxiliary steam boiler has several protective circuits of which one tripped during the earthquake. The boiler was successfully restarted after the event.

7. The only other non-safety items of equipment that tripped during the earthquake were the Unit 1 main and auxiliary transformers, which tripped due to the closing of the generator protection relays. These relays although open at the time of the seismic event, were not connected to voltage. After the event, the transformers remained in a deenergized state consistent with the design of the generator's protection logic. The loads automatically transferred to the startup transformer per the design. Laboratory testing of these relays since the event

has confirmed that the presence of voltage on the relays significantly increases the force required to close these relays. Had the voltage been supplied to these relays, they would not have closed during the event. This is substantiated by the fact that other similar open relays with voltage applied did not close during the seismic event.

8. An 1-1/2 inch increase in suppression pool level at the time of the earthquake, indicated by the water level transmitters, has been investigated. A detailed investigation has concluded that the indicated increase was caused when air trapped in the two sensing lines serving the water level transmitters was discharged due to the earthquake. Air apparently became entrapped in the lines when the suppression pool was refilled in early January. The procedure for refilling the sensing lines will be revised to ensure proper filling of these lines any time they are drained. In addition, vents will be installed to facilitate proper filling and thus prevent air from being trapped in the future.

9. Immediately following the event, the plant operators performed initial surveys of the plant. Areas visually inspected included the Transformer Yard, lower elevations of the Turbine, Auxiliary, Intermediate and Radwaste Buildings, as well as the Control Complex, Turbine Power Complex, Heater Bay, Water Treatment Building, and all levels of the Reactor Building. The reports back to the Control Room indicated that the areas were found in satisfactory condition with no major damage. In addition, the Senior Operations Coordinator and I

made a specific survey of below grade areas. We found no unusual or abnormal conditions. Further steps taken to assess and evaluate the status of the plant included additional walkdowns by teams of plant maintenance personnel dispatched from the Operations Support Center.

PLANT IMPACT ASSESSMENT

10. As part of CEI's response to the earthquake, a team of approximately 65 engineers and technicians was organized on the evening of January 31 to perform systematic and thorough walkdowns of all plant areas. These walkdowns were performed using drawings of each area and checklists of components to inspect for any abnormal conditions. These included such items as piping, hangers, snubbers, valves, pumps, instrumentation and other components. The results of these walkdowns were recorded and compiled into a list of approximately 480 observations, many of which were later determined to be preexisting conditions. None of the observations involved structural damage to the plant or equipment. The 480 observations are typified by minor hairline cracks in concrete, burned out light bulbs and leaking valve or piping flanges, all of which are normal and expected conditions that would be identified in any comprehensive walkdown without the occurrence of a seismic event.

11. In the inspections that were conducted following the earthquake, plant personnel were instructed to document all unusual or abnormal conditions. Those conducting the inspections

did not attempt to determine whether the conditions were the result of the earthquake; instead, discrepant conditions regardless of potential cause were documented to insure that the status of the plant following the earthquake would be fully documented for subsequent evaluation by Engineering. Each of the observed discrepant conditions was subsequently evaluated by Engineering to determine whether the condition was caused by the earthquake or whether rework or repair was required. The engineering evaluation of the items concluded that 77% were preexisting conditions, and that only two minor items could be directly attributable to the earthquake. The remainder, approximately 100 items, have been classified as indeterminate, i.e., it could not be definitively established that the condition existed prior to the earthquake. About 25% of the approximately 480 items will need rework or repair. (See Exhibit B). These will be processed in accordance with a special procedure instituted in response to the earthquake.

12. A number of other inspections were also performed to determine the earthquake's effect, if any, on specific plant structures and conditions. A site survey was performed to assess any impact of the earthquake on the site environs, and in particular on the shoreline bluff. No evidence of any earthquake impacts could be found.

13. A survey of settlement monitoring points was undertaken to determine if the earthquake had any effect on building settlement. Monitoring points at various locations around the

perimeter of the plant buildings are surveyed on a monthly basis to monitor building settlement. The results of the surveys were that the recorded movements were consistent with those measured in the past, including the amount of change from prior surveys and the absolute elevations. For example, a comparison of the Reactor Building reading after the earthquake with that of February 1985, shows that the two readings were identical. Thus, it is concluded that the earthquake had no impact on building settlement. (See Exhibit B).

14. A walkdown of Unit 1 Cooling Tower was performed to determine whether any damage had resulted from the earthquake. The areas inspected included the basin walls, tower columns and footers, internal support columns, baffle system, discharge pipe and veil. While all inspections were done from ground level, any significant cracks in the veil would have been readily apparent since they would have been saturated by the previous day's rain. No structural damage was found in any area of the cooling tower. Water was observed seeping through the north and south vertical joints where the basin flume wall and pump house flume wall meet. Seepage at this joint has been noted in the past and stopped by the application of mastic material. (See Exhibit B).

15. As part of the design program for the plant, seismic clearance criteria were established to assure that a seismic event would not cause any impact on a safety system either by causing swaying or by impact from a non-safety item. Instances


of these criteria not being met are termed Seismic Clearance Violations (SCV's). SCV's are forwarded to Engineering for evaluation to determine whether repair is required. At the time of the earthquake, there were 29 SCV's that had been dispositioned for repair, where the repair had not yet been completed. Following the earthquake, inspectors were directed to reinspect these SCV's to determine whether the seismic event affected the SCV condition. These inspections found neither damage nor dimensional change. (See Exhibit B).

16. As previously noted, the plant systems, both safety related and non-safety related, operated properly during and following the seismic event. Recognizing the sensitivity of electrical components to high frequency response, a detailed engineering study was undertaken to identify the number and types of electrical equipment that were energized during the earthquake. The components included motors, transformers, relays, switchgear breakers, switches, batteries, contacts, valve operators, chargers/inverters, meters, recorders, and transmitters. A wide variety of suppliers was represented. More than 70 separate systems were involved. The study showed that over 47,000 electrical components were energized and experienced no adverse effects in terms of spurious system actuation. (See Exhibit B).


17. On February 2, 1986, the Division II diesel generator response time test that was in preparation at the time of the earthquake (see Paragraph 4 above) was performed. The Division

II diesel operated properly and all equipment powered by that diesel operated as designed. The significant number of electrical and mechanical components included in this test, including pumps, valves, motors, relays, switches, etc., further demonstrates that the January 31 earthquake had no adverse impact on safety systems.

18. Based on all of these evaluations, inspections and tests, it is my conclusion that the plant structures and equipment were essentially unaffected by the January 31, 1986 earthquake. The large number of safety and non-safety related systems which were operating or energized at the time of the seismic event responded in accordance with their design. Extensive plant walkdowns and inspections revealed no structural or equipment damage. I therefore conclude that the plant's seismic design was adequate to handle the January 31 earthquake.


Robert A. Stratman

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 24th day of February, 1986.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

JANE E. MOTT
Notary Public, State of Ohio
My Commission Expires February 20, 1990
(Recorded in Lake County)

Exhibit "A"

Name: Robert A. Stratman, General Supervisor,
Operations Section, Perry Plant Operations
Department

Formal Education and Training:

Bachelor of Science Degree in Physics, Ohio State
University, 1971
Master of Business Administration Degree in Finance,
University of New Haven, 1981
Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering,
Cleveland State University, 1985
Five-Week Perry Nuclear Plant Technology (GE), 1980
Nine-Week Operator Training Course, Perry Simulator (GE),
1980 (SRO Certification)
Five-Week Station Nuclear Engineering (GE), 1982

Experience:

1980 - Present: The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company

Joined CEI as Operations Engineer. Initially assigned to assist the Operations Section General Supervisor. In 1982, assigned to develop the Plant Emergency Instructions.

In December, 1982 assumed position as General Supervisor, Nuclear Services Section with responsibility for developing and maintaining a qualified permanent plant security force and for all plant administrative and general maintenance support services.

In October, 1984 assumed position as General Supervising Engineer, Radiation Protection Section with responsibility for directing all activities of the Health Physics and Chemistry Units including the development of the Radiation Protection and Chemistry Programs for the Perry Plant. Reported to the Technical Superintendent, Perry Plant Technical Department.

In September, 1985, was named General Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Design and Analysis Section. As such, is responsible for the technical support on various licensing, start-up, and preoperational requirements. The Section assumes engineering responsibility for all systems turned over to Operations. Reported to the Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department.

Robert A. Stratman

In January, 1986, became General Supervisor, Operations Section, with responsibility for supervising all operations personnel.

1977 - 1980: Northeast Utilities

Engineer at Millstone Nuclear Plant. Responsibilities included evaluation of plant systems, the design, procurement and implementation of modifications to plant systems and conformance to code and regulatory requirements. Supervised refueling and unscheduled outages, and managed the test of the plant's reactor containment systems. Also served as a member of the Plant Operations Review Committee.

1971 - 1976: U.S. Navy

Officer - Qualified as Engineering Officer of the Watch and qualified Engineer of a naval nuclear powered propulsion plant - duties included Electronics Material Officer, Main Propulsion Assistant, Radiation Controls Officer and Submarine Qualifications Officer

Professional Membership:

Registered Professional Engineer - State of Ohio

TABLE 1

SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS POWERED BY
DIVISION II EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

1. 1E21-C002B, RHR Pump B
2. 1E12-C002C, RHR Pump C
3. 1E12-F042B, LPCI B Injection Valve
4. 1E12-F042C, LPCI C Injection Valve
5. M25-F250B, Control Room HVAC B Exhaust Damper
6. M25-F255B, Control Room HVAC B Relief Damper
7. M25-F010B, Control Room HVAC Outboard Supply Damper
8. M25-F020B, Control Room HVAC Inboard Supply Damper
9. M25-F263B, Control Room HVAC B Return Line Isolation Damper
10. 1C11-C001B, Control Rod Drive Pump B
11. C41-C002B, Standby Liquid Control Transfer Pump B
12. 1E12-F011B, RHR B Heat Exchanger Dump Valve
13. 1E12-F021, RHR C Test Valve to Suppression Pool
14. 1E12-F024B, RHR B Test Valve to Suppression Pool
15. 1E12-F026B, Steam Condensing B Shutoff to RCIC
16. 1E12-F027B, RHR B to Containment Shutoff
17. 1E12-F046B, RHR B Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve
18. 1E12-F051B, RHR B Steam Pressure Reducing Valve
19. 1E12-F052B, RHR B Heat Exchanger Steam Shutoff
20. 1E12-F065B, RHR B Heat Exchanger to RCIC Control Valve
21. 1E12-F087B, Steam Bypass Around Pressure Control Valve to
RHR B Heat Exchanger
22. G41-F285, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Filter/Demineralizer
Inboard Inlet Valve
23. G41-F290, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Filter/Demineralizer
Inboard Outlet Valve

24. 1M15-C001B, Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment Fan B
25. 1M15-D001B, Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment B Electric Heater Coil
26. M23-C001B, Motor Control Center Switchgear & Battery Rooms HVAC Supply Fan B
27. M23-C002B, Motor Control Center Switchgear & Battery Rooms HVAC Return Fan B
28. M23-F010B, Motor Control Center Switchgear & Battery Rooms Supply Damper B
29. M24-C001B, Battery Room Exhaust Fan B
30. M24-F011B, Motor Control Center Switchgear & Battery Rooms Exhaust Damper B
31. M24-F051B, Control Room Exhaust Damper B
32. M24-F065B, Motor Control Center Switchgear & Battery Rooms Recirculation Damper B
33. M25-C001B, Control Room HVAC Supply Fan B
34. M25-C002B, Control Room HVAC Return Fan B
35. M26-C001B, Control Room Emergency Recirculation Fan B
36. M26-D001B, Control Room Emergency Recirculation Electric Heater B Control
37. M26-F040B, Control Room Emergency Recirculation Damper B
38. M28-B001B, Emergency Closed Cooling Cooling Fan B
39. 1M39-B001B, RHR B Pump Room Cooling Fan
40. 1M39-B002, RHR C Pump Room Cooling Fan
41. 1M43-C001B, Division 2 Diesel Generator Room Supply Fan 1B
42. 1M43-C002B, Division 2 Diesel Generator Room Supply Fan 2B
43. 1M43-F070B & F071B, Division 2 Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Louvers
44. 1M43-F080B & F081B, Division 2 Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Louvers
45. 1M51-F090, Combustible Gas Drywell Purge Inboard Isolation Valve

46. P41-C001B, Service Water Pump B
47. 1P42-C001B, Emergency Closed Cooling Pump B
48. P42-F150B, Emergency Closed Cooling to Control Complex Chiller B Bypass Valve
49. P42-F290, Nuclear Closed Cooling to Control Complex Chiller Valve
50. P42-F295B, Nuclear Closed Cooling to Control Room Chiller B Inlet Valve
51. P42-F300B, Emergency Closed Cooling to Control Complex Chiller B Inlet Valve
52. P42-F325B, Nuclear Closed Cooling to Control Complex Chiller B Outlet Valve
53. P42-F330B, Emergency Closed Cooling to Control Complex Chiller B Outlet Valve
54. P42-F380A, Nuclear Closed Cooling to Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup Heat Exchanger A Inlet Valve
55. P42-F380B, Nuclear Closed Cooling to Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup Heat Exchanger B Inlet Valve
56. P42-F390A, Nuclear Closed Cooling to Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup Heat Exchanger A Outlet Valve
57. P42-F390B, Nuclear Closed Cooling to Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup Heat Exchanger B Outlet Valve
58. P43-C001B, Nuclear Closed Cooling Pump B
59. 1P43-F215, Nuclear Closed Cooling Containment Return Inboard Isolation
60. 1P43-F400, Nuclear Closed Cooling Drywell Return Inboard Drywell Isolation
61. 1P43-C001B, Emergency Service Water Pump B
62. 1P45-F014B, RHR B Heat Exchanger Emergency Service Water Inlet Valve
63. 1P45-F068B, RHR B Heat Exchanger Emergency Service Water Outlet Valve
64. 1P45-F130B, Emergency Service Water Pump B Discharge Valve
65. P47-B001B, Control Complex Chilled Water Chiller B
66. P47-C001B, Control Complex Chilled Water Chilled Water Pump B

67. P49-C002B, Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Pump
(Division 2)
68. P49-D001B, Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Screen
(Division 2)
69. P49-D003B, Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Strainer
(Division 2)
70. 1R25-S043 & S047, Division 2 Space Heaters Distribution
Panels
71. 1R25-S045, Division 2 Space Heaters Distribution Panel
72. EH1214, BUS EH12 Isolating Breaker

TABLE 2

SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS
ENERGIZED DURING THE SEISMIC EVENT
OF JANUARY 31, 1986

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
C11	Control Rod Drive
C41	Standby Liquid Control
C71	Reactor Protection System
D17	Plant Radiation Monitors
E12	Residual Heat Removal
E21	Low Pressure Core Spray
E22	High Pressure Core Spray
G41	Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup
M15	Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment
M23	MCC, Switchgear, & Misc. Area HVAC
M24	Battery Room Exhaust
M25	Control Room HVAC
M26	Control Room Emergency Recirculation
M32	ESW Pumphouse Ventilation
M40	Fuel Handling Building Ventilation
M43	Diesel Building Ventilation
P11	Condensate Transfer and Storage
P22	Mixed Bed Demineralizer
P41	Service Water
P42	Emergency Closed Cooling
P43	Nuclear Closed Cooling
P45	Emergency Service Water
P47	Control Complex Chill Water
P49	ESW Screen Wash
P52	Instrument Air
P54	Fire Protection
C95	Emergency Response Information System
P51	Service Air
R14	110 VAC Vital Inverters
R22	Metalclad Switchgear
R23	480 V Load Centers
R24	Motor Control Centers
R25	Distribution Panels - 120, 208 & 480 volts
R42	D. C. System
R43	Standby Diesel Generator (SDG)
R45	SDG Fuel Oil
R46	SDG Jacket Water Coolant
R47	SDG Lube Oil
R61	Main Control Room Annunciator

TABLE 3

NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS
ENERGIZED DURING THE SEISMIC EVENT
OF JANUARY 3, 1986

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
F42	Fuel Transfer Equipment
G33	Reactor Water Cleanup
M11	Containment Vessel Cooling
M13	Drywell Cooling
M21	Controlled Access HVAC
M27	Computer Room HVAC
M35	Turbine Building Cooling & Ventilation
M36	Off-Gas Building Exhaust
M41	Heater Bay Ventilation
M45	Circulating Water Pump House Ventilation
N21	Condensate
N23	Condensate Filtration
N24	Condensate Demineralizers
N32	Turbine Control (EHC)
N71	Circulating Water
P20	Water Treatment
P21	Two Bed Demineralizer
P44	Turbine Building Closed Cooling
P55	Building Heating
P61	Auxiliary Steam
P62	Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil
P72	Plant Underdrain
C91	Process Computer
C94	Health Physic Computer
P56	Security
R11	Station Transformers
R15	Technical Support Center UPS
R36	Heat Tracing & Anti Freeze Protection
R44	SDG Starting Air
R51	Intra Plant Communications
R52	Maintenance & Calibration
R53	Exclusion Area Paging System
R57	Radio & In-Plant Antenna System
R71	Lighting
S11	Power Transformers
S41	Step Up Station

APPENDIX

RESULTS OF SPECIFIC INSPECTIONS

EVALUATION OF WALKDOWN ITEMS
PLANT SETTLEMENT READINGS
SEISMIC CLEARANCE WALKDOWN
COOLING TOWER WALKDOWN
REVIEW OF ENERGIZED CIRCUITS

MEMORANDUM

 I no longer wish to receive this material.G-3
REV. 1-82

TO F. R. Stead

ROOM E270 FROM K. R. Pech
PHONE 5246 ROOM W220
SUBJECT Evaluation of Walkdown
Items

DATE 11-Feb-86

As a result of the plant walkdowns conducted the evening of 1/31/86, Perry Plant Technical Department prepared a list of the observations of the inspection teams. These observations were given the title Earthquake Inspection Team Items or EITI's. The list of EITI's was then forwarded to Engineering for determination of whether the item was a result of the earthquake and whether or not the item needed to be repaired. The assessment of the need for repair and the documentation of that decision whether on a Non-Conformance Report or a Work Request was done in accordance with POP-1501.

The evaluation of all 473 items was completed this afternoon, and the final summary of determinations is presented in the attached table. Each item was placed in one of three categories with respect to its relationship to the earthquake.

1. Caused by the earthquake
2. Indeterminate
3. Not caused by the earthquake

As shown in the summary, 375 items were determined not to be caused by the earthquake, 96 to be indeterminate, and 2 to be caused by the earthquake. With respect to the latter two items, one was the trip of the main transformer, noted in the walkdown of electrical bus L10. The second was a non-safety heater exchanger drain valve that was found dripping water during the walkdown and was reported to be closed and not dripping prior to the earthquake.

In addition each item was categorized as to its final disposition using the procedures contained in POP-1501. Through this process, 330 items were determined to require no repair, 119 to be repaired via a Work Request and 24 items were determined to require dispositioning via a Non-Conformance Report. Of the 24 NR's, 20 are anticipated to be use-as-is and the remainder constitute cosmetic repairs to concrete and drywall walls.

Page 2
Evaluation of Walkdown Items

By copy of this memo, the Engineering evaluation of the EITI's is being issued to the Perry Plant Technical Department for preparation of appropriate documentation and inclusion in their Condition Report.

KRP:jg

ETI LIST EVALUATION SUMMARY

13:15 2/11/86

DISCIPLINE	TOTAL	C	I	N	NR	WR	NA
ELECTRICAL	35	1	22	12	0	25	10
I & C	18	0	10	8	0	15	3
MECHANICAL	83	1	29	53	2	53	28
PIPING	23	0	18	5	2	10	11
STRUCTURAL	314	0	17	297	20	16	278
TOTAL	473	2	96	375	24	119	330

C = Caused by Earthquake
I = Indeterminate
N = Not Caused by Earthquake
N/A - No Action Required

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

d-2
REV. 1-82

MEMORANDUM

 I no longer wish to
receive this material.

K. Pech

ROOM W210

FROM M.R. Kritzer

DATE 2-6-86

PHONE 6460

ROOM TQ6

SUBJECT PLANT SETTLEMENT READINGS

Per our discussion, plant settlement readings were taken on February 5, 1986 (Attached). No significant difference in the building elevation before and after the seismic event was observed. The maximum change occurred in the Reactor Building #1. This change was only a minus (-)0.006 of a foot or 1/16 of an inch. The maximum growth was +0.003 of a foot or 1/32 of an inch, which occurred in the Radwaste Building.

A review of settlement readings taken last February 15, 1985, revealed that the Reactor Building #1 was at the same elevation as it is today.

The minute changes in plant elevation can be expected due to structural growth as a result of weather.

cc: E. Riley
J. Eppich
C. Angstadt
T. Keaveney
S. Dodeja
302.MRK

RETTE & ASSOC.

REG. ENGINEERS & SURVEYORS

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PERRY, OHIO.

SKETCH OF: PLANT SETTLEMENTS

DATE:

(M)

SCALE:

FIELD BOOK:

see 7/11

DISC #	DATE	1/18/86	2/5/86
1-F		625.406	625.402
2-D		624.339	624.333
3-D		624.363	624.359
4-F		626.391	626.386
5-D		624.540	624.538
6-D		622.105	622.108
7-C		621.300	621.298
SP-3		624.458	624.459
SP-9		624.924	624.921
SP-10		624.450	624.453
SP-11		624.491	624.487

Jurisdiction

Quadrant 4-1/2 mile 1/2 ps

DISC #	DATE
1-F	
2-D	
3-D	
4-F	
5-D	
6-D	
7-C	
SP-8	
SP-9	
SP-10	
SP-11	

GARRETT & ASSOC. REG. ENGINEERS & SURVEYORS PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PERRY, OHIO.

SKETCH OF: PLANT SETTLEMENTS

DATE: (M) SCALE: FIELD BOOK:

PT	DATE	AUG 20, 1985	SEPT. 25, 1985	OCT. 18, 1985	NOV. 14, 1985	DEC. 17, 1985	JAN. 16, 86
1-F		625.402	625.410	625.411	625.413	625.404	625.406
2-D		624.341	624.342	624.340	624.345	624.338	624.339
3-D		624.358	624.361	624.365	624.366	624.362	624.363
4-F		626.388	626.390	626.390	626.387	626.388	626.391
5-D		624.538	624.541	624.544	624.548	624.540	624.540
6-D		622.106	622.106	622.104	622.103	622.106	622.105
7-C		621.303	621.301	621.304	621.300	621.292	621.300
PT	DATE						
1-F							
2-D							
3-D							
4-F							
5-D							
6-D							
7-C							
PT	DATE						
1-F							
2-D							
3-D							
4-F							
5-D							
6-D							
7-C							

GARRETT & ASSOC. REG. ENGINEERS & SURVEYORS PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PERRY, OHIO.

SKETCH OF: PLANT SETTLEMENTS

FIELD BOOK:

SCALE:

DATE: (M)

PT.	SEPT 27, 83	OCT 27, 1983	NOV. 22, 83	DEC 21, 83	JAN. 5, 1984	FEB 10, 84	MAR. 24, 84		
1-F	625.396	625.395	625.402	625.407	625.405	625.406	625.401		
2-D	624.332	624.329	624.335	624.333	624.334	BLOCKED	624.331		
3-D	624.372	624.365	624.365	624.363	624.361	624.362	624.361		
4-F	626.389	626.384	626.388	626.388	626.385	626.391	626.381		
5-D	624.543	624.517	624.547	624.549	624.550	624.546	624.542		
6-D	622.101	622.098	622.096	622.101	622.093	622.101	622.099		
7-C	621.295	621.295	621.294	621.303	621.295	621.290	621.281		
PT.	APRIL 28, 84	MAY 24, 84	JUNE 20, 1984	JULY 10, 84	AUG. 21, 84	SEPT 14, 84	OCT 10, 84	NOV. 23, 84	
1-F	625.397	625.401	625.400	625.402	625.405	625.403	625.406	625.402	
2-D	624.335	624.334	624.337	624.336	624.338	624.341	624.339	624.333	
3-D	624.365	624.365	624.369	624.368	624.369	624.370	624.366	624.363	
4-F	626.385	626.383	626.394	626.390	626.389	626.393	626.391	626.391	
5-D	624.537	624.544	624.545	624.546	624.552	624.553	624.550	624.535	
6-D	622.102	622.102	622.105	622.108	622.106	622.106	622.103	622.094	
7-C	621.287	621.291	621.300	621.298	621.298	621.301	621.300	621.297	
PT.		1/10/85	2/15/85	3/22/85	4/12/85	5/15/85	6/25/85	7/9/85	
1-F	625.405	625.403	625.406	625.401	625.403	625.396	625.398	625.398	
2-D	624.335	624.334	624.333	624.341	624.343	624.336	624.333	624.330	
3-D	624.362	624.358	624.361	624.359	624.360	624.360	624.357	624.364	
4-F	626.387	626.384	626.389	626.380	626.382	626.384	626.381	626.384	
5-D	624.546	624.542	624.544	624.547	624.543	624.542	624.541	624.543	
6-D	622.096	622.094	622.105	622.103	622.106	622.100	622.101	622.108	
7-C	621.297	621.296	621.292	621.297	621.297	621.297	621.306	621.299	

PEK KY NUCLEAR JWEI PLANT
FOUNDATION SETTLEMENT CHART CONTINUED BY GARRETT
SHEET NO. 3-6

MARK NO.	FEB. 16, 78	MARCH 13, 78	APRIL 7, 1978 WILL BE CLEAR MAY 9, 1978	MAY 25, 78	JUNE 15, 78	JULY 20, 78	JULY 31, 78	AUG. 17, 78	AUG 28, 78	SEPT 27, 78
1-B	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	595.625	COVERED	NOT CLEAR	COVERED	COVERED		
2-D	624.362	NOT ABLE TO READ	624.355	624.360	624.360	624.348	624.358	624.357		624.360
3-B	597.046	597.041	599.040	599.052	COVERED	604.047	604.032	604.041		
4-B	596.940	596.938	596.929	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED		
5	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	"	"		
6-B	602.188	602.170	602.191	602.188	602.118	602.200	602.197	602.210		
7	NOT ABLE TO READ	NOT ABLE TO READ	NOT ABLE TO READ	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED		
5-A		NEW POINT SET ON DATE	591.524	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	"	"		
2-C	600.144			600.146	COVERED	COVERED	"	"		
1-C			NEW	593.514	593.517	COVERED	"	"		
B				598.794	COVERED	COVERED	"	"		
1-D				NEW 614.267	COVERED	COVERED	"	"		614.271
3-C				623.514	623.507	623.506	"	"		614.275
1-C				596.018	COVERED	COVERED	595.997	595.999		596.007
7-A	MARK ON WALL	15' W. OF SE COR		563.143	562.122	562.112	COVERED	COVERED		563.100
3-D				PERMANENT DIS		REACTOR N92 (270°)			624.425	624.422
4-D										NEW →
1-E										NEW →
1-C										NEW →
2-C										NEW →

SEE NOTE A

FERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
FOUNDATION SETTLEMENT CHART CONTINUED BY GARRETT & ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED
SHEET NO. 2

NO.	MAY 2, 77	JUN 15, 77	JULY 29	8/5/77	AUG 11, 77	AUG 19, 77	SEPT 14, 77	SEPT 26, 77	OCT 12, 77
1-A	582.090	582.093	582.095	582.095	582.087	582.092	COVERED	COVERED	—
1-B	575.612	575.617	575.625	575.627	575.615	575.624	575.620	575.619	575.622
2	572.434	572.983	COVERED	COVERED	572.779	572.784	COVERED	COVERED	—
2-A	576.374	578.333	COVERED	COVERED	—	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	—
2-B	582.980	COVERED	582.981	582.984	582.973	572.710	589.981	COVERED	—
3	572.952	572.982	572.987	COVERED	572.986	572.993	577.987	COVERED	—
4	585.771	585.493	585.493	585.493	585.493	585.493	585.495	585.494	585.498
5	572.906	572.909	572.905	572.909	572.909	572.906	572.905	572.878	572.871
6	587.472	587.496	587.481	587.496	587.477	587.478	587.474	587.477	587.474
3A	NEW MARK	—	—	—	590.267	590.267	590.266	590.262	590.270
2-C	—	—	—	—	—	—	600.146	600.144	600.144
2-D	BRASS DISC	—	—	—	—	—	624.351	624.360	624.365
1-B	NOV. 17, 77	DEC. 2, 77	DEC. 29, 77	JAN 25, 78	FEB 16, 78	—	—	—	—
2-D	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	—	—	—	—	—
3-A	624.358	624.358	624.362	624.358	624.362	—	—	—	—
4-A	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	—	—	—	—	—
5	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	COVERED	—	—	—	—	—
6-A	587.470	587.470	587.460	587.466	587.496	—	—	—	—
4-B	576.943	576.942	576.940	576.940	576.940	—	—	—	—
6	600.142	—	600.155	600.155	—	—	—	—	—
7	602.193	602.180	602.194	602.194	602.188	—	—	—	—
8	577.045	577.048	577.044	577.049	577.046	—	—	—	—

CONTINUED "SC"
M.V.C.
ET