

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

September 2, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 - DOCKET  
NOS. 50-327 AND -328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79 -  
SPECIAL REPORT 88-13

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being  
nonfunctional for greater than seven days. This event is being reported in  
accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation  
3.7.12.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
S. J. Smith  
Plant Manager

Enclosure  
cc (Enclosure):

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT  
UNIT 1  
SPECIAL REPORT 88-13

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On August 9, 1988, with unit 1 in mode 5 (cold shutdown) fire breach permit number 7044, which was issued on August 1, 1988 for fire door A-68 (1B-B residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) heat exchanger room on elevation 690 of the Auxiliary Building), exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by Technical Specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.12. The fire breach (permit No.7044) was issued at 1900 EDT on August 1 1988 and was not closed until 0200 EDT on August 9, 1988. The fire breach was issued initially to authorize opening of the door for ventilation during surveillance testing activities in the room. Ventilation was required because of undesirable fumes from painting in the room. While the door was breached, work activities were also initiated for wet layup of the 1B Containment spray heat exchanger which required a temporary water hose to be routed through the open door. The surveillance testing work activities under SI-260.2.1, "BIT Cold Leg Injection Flow Balance, Pump Performance and Check Valve Test" were completed at approximately 2131 EDT on August 1, 1988, but the heat exchanger wet layup work continued past the seven day interval.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The duration required to complete this work exceeded the seven-day interval allowed by TS 3.7.12 and the breaching permit. The wet layup work requires draining, flushing, refilling and chemical addition to the heat exchanger. This work also involves a large quantity of water to be processed and hence required a longer time interval than seven days.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is being reported in accordance with action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12. A roving fire watch was established to inspect the 1B-B RHR and CS heat exchanger room on an hourly basis as required by the associated action statement. In addition to the fire watch, the existing fire detection and suppression system for the RHR and CS heat exchanger room was operable during the time the fire door was breached and would have actuated in the event of the fire. Thus, there was no degradation in the overall level of fire protection at the plant.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

An hourly fire watch patrol was established immediately upon breaching the fire door to inspect the RHR and CS heat exchanger room. The fire watch was maintained until the door was returned to operable status at 0200 EDT on August 9, 1988. No further action is required.