INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 (b), which requires that reports of:

- i) changes in the facility as described in the FSAR
- ii) changes in the procedures as described in the FSAR, and
- iii) tests and experiments not described in the FSAR

which are conducted without prior commission approval be reported to the Commission at least annually. This report is intended to meet this requirement for the period July 1, 1987 through June 30, 1988.

This report is divided into three sections; the first, Plant Change/Modifications, covering changes in the facility as described in the FSAR; the second, Procedure Changes covering changes in the procedures as described in the FSAR; and the third, Tests and Experiments, covering tests and experiments not described in the FSAR.

Appendix A to this report is a list of safety and power operated relief valve actuations, which is submitted in accordance with FPL's commitment to comply with the requirements of Item IIK.3.3 of NUREG 0737. This report covers the period from July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988.

Appendix B to this report is a summary of the findings of the Steam Generator tube inspection performed on Unit 3 during the report period from July 1, 1987 through June 30, 1988.

Appendix C to this report contains the susmary of the Unit 3 Cycle 11 reload evaluation that was performed for that reload. Unit 4 did not refuel during this report period.

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TURKEY POINT PLANT UNITS 3 AND 4

DOCKET NUMBERS 50-250 AND 50-251

CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS MADE WITHOUT FRIOR COMMISSION APPROVAL

FOR PERIOD

JULY 1, 1987 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1988

IN COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE 19, SECTION 50.59(b) CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

PC/M NO.	PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION	UNIT
87-296	UTILIZATION OF C-BUS BATTERY FOR TESTING OF STATION BATTERY 3A	3 & 4
87-098	INSTALLATION OF UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP DEVICE FOR POLAR CRANE BREAKER	4
85-121	PLANT COMMUNICATION SYSTEM - UNDERVOLTAGE CONDUIT	364
83-086	GROSS MVAR TELEMETERING	3
82-100	AUXILIARY POWER UPGRADE TRANSFER OF LOADS	3
82-101	AUXILIARY POWER UPGRADE TRANSFER OF LOADS, UNIT 4	4
87-348	INSTALLATION OF PORTABLE BATTERY CHARGER FOR STATION BATTERIES, 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B EQUALIZERS	3
87-344	BATTERY CHARGER 3B, 4A, AND 4S VENDOR WIRING MODIFICATIONS	0
87-243	TRANSFER SWITCH UPGRADE FOR DP-312A AND DP-412A	364
87-093	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND INSTALLATION DETAILS FOR RAYCHEM SPLICES	3
87-008	NRC IE BULLETIN 85-03 MOV POSITION INDICATION	3
85-064	GENERAL ELECTRIC SAM RELAY MODIFICATION P.C. CARD REPLACEMENT	3
85-031	4100V SWITCHGEAR CONTROL MODS	3
85-029	4160V SWITCHGEAR SYNCHRONIZING CIRCUIT MODIFICATIONS	3
86-073	MAIN TRANSFORMER TIE LINE INSULATORS CHANGE OUT	4
86-093	INSTALLATION OF RACEWAY AND CABLE FOR PC/M	364

PC/M NO.	PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION	UNIT
85-125	CONTROL BUILDING ELEVATOR VESTIBULE POWER RECEPTACLE	0
87-005	I&E BULLETIN 85-03 MOV SWITCH SETTINGS	3
85-178	ADDITIONAL COMPONENT LIGHTING FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AREA	4
85-179	ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM	3
87-355	ICW PUMP 4-C MOTOR TERMINATION	4
85-177	ADDITIONAL COMPONENT LIGHTING FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AREAS	3
86-072	MAIN TRANSFORMER TIE LINE INSULATORS CHANGE OUT	3
87-328	REDESIGN OF SUPPORTS FOR MAIN STEAM FLOW TRANS'ITTER LINES	3
87-230	MISCL, ANEOUS GAS SYSTEM: TUBING/SUPPORT REPLACIMENT	3
86-028	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER INDICATION UNDER THE MAIN FEEDWATER PLATFORM	3
85-176	NITROGEN STITION ADDITIONS AND RELOCATION	4
85-173	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP/TURBINE RPM MONITORING	3 & 4
88-048	STEAM-TO-MSR "C' EYPASS FLOW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT	3
87-056	DEAREATOR VACUUM PUMP SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT	3
87-048	P1-4-1454 ROBERT SHAW VS. ASHCROFT	4
87-035	SSGFW PUMP DISCHARGE PI REPLACEMENT	0
87-032	ICW BASKET STRAINER DP GAUGE REPLACEMENT	4

PC/M NO.	PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION	UNIT
87-047	PI-1453, 1454 ROBERT SHAW GAUGES VS. ASHCROFT	3
86-231	L.P. HTR PI-1564 REPLACEMENT	4
86-221	FEEDWATER CONTROL BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE COIL REPLACEMENT	4
87-217	RCS SAMPLE HX OUTLET PRE-SURE GAUGE REPLACEMENT	4
87-173	CHANGE OUT OF POSITIONER ON CV-1606, 1607, 1608, STEAM DUMP TO ATMOSPHERE	4
87-172	CHANGE OUT OF POSITIONER ON CV-1606, 1607, 1608, STEAM DUMP TO ATMOSPHERE	3
87-216	RCS SAMPLE HX OUTLET PRESSURE GAUGES REPLACEMENT	3
8 '-112	APRI DETECTOR AND CABLE UPGRADE	4
85 001	MAIN CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY LIGHTING	0
84-005	CABLE TRAY MODIFICATIONS	4
84-004	CABLE TRAY MODIFICATIONS	3
84-003	CABLE TRAY MODIFICATION IN THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM	3
83-221	SECURITY LIGHTING UPGRADE	0
8€-019	INSTALLATION OF FLOW & PRESSURE INDICATION INSTRUMENTATION FOR SSGF PUMPS	364
85-090	CONTAINMENT PURGE SOLENOID VALVES	3
83-199	INSTALLATION OF REACTOR EX-CORE NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING SYSTEM	3
83-030	ADDITION OF RCP NO. 2 SEAL LEAKOFF MEASUREMENT	364
83-031	ADDITION OF RCP NO. 2 SEAL LEAKOFF MEASUREMENT	3 & 4

PC/M NO.	PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION	UNIT
85-097	S/G LEVEL CONTROL ALTERNATE/NORMAL CONTROL	3
85-098	S/G LEVEL CONTROL ALTERNATE/NORMAL CONTROL	4
84-195	ADDITION OF RHR TEMPERATURE ALARM	3
84-196	ADDITION OF RHR TEMPERATURE ALARM	4
88-011	NIS SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR HIGH VOLTAGE SHUTOFF CIRCUIT MODIFICATION	3
87-105	CRDM CONNECTOR AND CABLE REPLACEMENT	4
87-118	SOLENOID VALVE FOR RCDT ISOLATION TO PUMPS	3
87-119	SOLENOID VALVE FOR RCDT ISOLATION TO PUMPS	4
87-060	PRMS MONITOR DRAWER REPLACEMENT	3
87-082	UPGRADE OF APRI CABLES AND CONNECTORS	3
87-083	UPGRADE OF APRI CABLES AND CONNECTORS	4
87-011	PRESSURIZER HEATER AC POWER CONTROL METERING	3
86-251	PRESSURIZER LIQUID/STEAM SAMPLE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT	3
86-239	REPLACEMENT OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TEST SELECTOR SWITCH	3
86-224	PASS FLOW LINERIZER REPLACEMENT	364
86-050	N2 REGULATORS FOR OMS	3
86-123	REPLACEMENT OF HIGH-RANGE GAMMA RADIATION READOUT MODULES	3
86-118	FLEX HOSE REPLACEMENT CV-200A	3 & 4
86-014	REACTOR CAVITY SEAL REPLACEMENT	3
87-194	CONTAINMENT SPRAY RESTRICTING ORIFICE	3

PC/M NO.	PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION	UNIT
87-121	NORMAL CONTAINMENT COOLER DRIF PANS	3
87-122	EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLER DRIP PANS	3
87-346	UNIT 4 TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR SI ACCUMULATOR LINE	4
87-353	RHR PUMP RECIRC. INSTALLATION	3
87-384	CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE SYSTEM MODIFICATION	4
87-171	REACTOR VESSEL HEAD INSULATION PERMANENT REPLACEMENT	3 & 4
87-223	REACTOR HEAD VENT PIPE SUPPORT H-2 MODIFICATION	3
87-164	GREASE KIT REPLACEMENT - EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLERS AND FILTERS	3 & 4
86-045	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TURBINE EXHAUST SILENCER CONDENSATE REMOVAL	364
85-172	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUM AND STEAM TRAP AND DRAINAGE PIFING	3 & 4
86-104	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PLEPLACEMENT IMPELLER JPE-M-86-046	3&4
86-011	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STEAM SUPPLY VALVZ REPLACEMENT	3
86-009	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STEAM SUPPLY VALVE REPLACEMENT	4
84-089	CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE BOLTS	3
84-144	REPLACEMENT OF VALVE 3-896T FOR CTMT SPRAY RECIRCULATION TEST LINE	3
85-072	SPENT FUEL PIT BUILDING WALL JOINT REPAIR	4
85-129	CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE RECORDER REPLACEMENT	
86-115	NIS SOURCE RANGE PRE-AMPLIFIER REPLACEMENT	3
86-168	MOV-3-750 AND MOV-3-751 LIMIT SWITCH ADJUSTMENT	з
	87-121 87-346 87-353 87-384 87-384 87-171 87-223 87-164 86-045 85-172 86-104 86-011 86-009 84-089 84-089 84-144 85-072 85-129 86-115	 87-121 NORMAL CONTAINMENT COOLER DRIF PANS 87-122 EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLER DRIP PANS 87-346 UNIT 4 TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR SI ACCUMULATOR LINE 87-353 RHR PUMP RECIRC. INSTALLATION 87-384 CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE SYSTEM MODIFICATION 87-171 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD INSULATION PERMANENT REPLACEMENT 87-223 REACTOR HEAD VENT PIPE SUPPORT H-2 MODIFICATION 87-164 GREASE KIT REPLACEMENT - EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLERS AND FILTERS 86-045 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TURBINE EXHAUST STLENCER CONDENSATE REMOVAL 85-172 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUM AM STEAM TRAP AND DRAINAGE PIPING 86-014 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PI DEPLACEMENT IMPELLER JPE-M-86-046 86-011 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STEAM SUPPLY VALVE REPLACEMENT 84-089 CONTAINMENT PURE VALVE BOLTS 84-144 REPLACEMENT OF VALVE 3-8965 FOR CIMIT SPRAY RECIRCULATION TEST LINE 85-072 SPENT FUEL PIT BUILDING WALL JOINT REPAIR 85-129 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE RECORDET REPLACEMENT 86-115 NIS SOURCE RANGE PRE-AMPLIFIER REPLACEMENT

PC/M NO.	PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION	UNIT
87-349	RESOLUTION OF DEFICIENCIES ASSOCIATED WITH PRESSURIZER INSTRUMENTATION	3
87-138	CCW HEAT EXCHANGER CHANNEL HEAD REPLACEMENT	3
86-183	ACCESS FOR EDG RADIATOR DRAIN VALVES	3 & 4
86-210	ICW CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT	3
87-022	HYDRAULIC SNUBBER REPLACEMENT MAIN STEAM SYSTEM	3
87-098	INSTALLATION OF UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP DEVICE FOR POLAR CRANE BREAKER	4
87-088	ASHCROFT TEMPERATURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT	3
86-101	EMERGENCY DIESEL "B" AUXILIARY POWER SUPPLY RELOCATION	3&4
85-175	NITROGEN STATION ADDITIONS AND RELOCATION	3
83-152	CABLE REROUTING FOR APPENDIX R MODIFICATIONS	4
81-162	INSTALLATION OF INADEQUATE CORE COOLING SYSTEM	3
87-127	ACCUMULATOR SI TEST LINE SOLENOID VALVES REPLACEMENT	з
86-122	LOW AIR P.S. TO START AIR GAUGE ON PANEL	0
86-141	TEST CONNECTIONS FOR SECONDARY PUMPS	3
86-172	NIS ROTARY SWITCH KNOBS	4
87-207	ICW CHECK VALVES FILTER REGULATOR OUTPUT RANGE SPRING REPLACEMENT	3
87-247	CV-3-2826 REPLACEMENT OF STEM CONNECTOR	3
87-298	MODIFICATION OF CCW PIPING AND SUPPORT FOR 3B RCP OIL COOLER	3

PC/M NO.	PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION	UNIT
87-331	HEAT TRACE PANELS 1A, 1B, 9A AND 9B REWORK	3 & 4
87-335	MODIFICATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS SR-36 AND WHIP RESTRAINT	3
87-407	RESUPPORT OF THERMOSTATS FOR BORIC ACID SYSTEM HEAT TRACING CIRCUITS 6A & 6B	364
88-0:8	VALTER POSITION FOR FOLLOWER PIN INSTALLATION	0
86-105	UNIT 3 ICW PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT	3
86-106	UNIT 4 ICW PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT	4
87-070	FEEDWATER SOLENG ALVE REPLACEMENT	3
87-071	FEEDWATER SOLENOIL .ALVE REPLACEMENT	3
88-044	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER N2 BACKUP SYSTEM PRESSURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT	3
88-045	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER N2 BACKUP SYSTEM PRESSURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT	4
88-050	BATTERY CHARGER 3B, 4A & 4S GATE-FILTER MODULE REPLACEMENT	3&4
85-174	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PERFORMANCE UPGRADE - REMOVAL OF ABANDONED EQUIPMENT	364
86-069	CONTROL ROOM HVAC TEST PENETRATIONS	3 & 4
67-042	SGBD FLOW CONTROL VALVES BODY/SEAT REPLACEMENT	364
87-123	PORTABLE VENTILATING FANS FOR THE DC EQUIPMENT/ INVERTOR ROOMS	3 & 4
87-178	UNIT 3 REACTOR VESSEL CRDM DUMMY, HOUSING G-7 CAP	3
87-181	CRDM VENT SHROUD INSPECTION DOORS	3
82-060	COMPUTER ROOM ADDITION	264

-vii-

PC/M NO.	<u>PC/M NO.</u> <u>PC/M TITLE DESCRIPTION</u>			
87-235	MAIN FEEDWATER VALVE TUBING REPLACEMENT	3		
85-117	ADDITIONAL CABLE REROUTING FOR APPENDIX R	3&4		
86-171	NIS ROTARY SWITCH KNOB REPLACEMENT	3		
87-045	PRMS CHANNELS R4-17A AND R4-17B CABLE REWORK	4		
87-185	REACTOR VESSEL CRDM DUMMY HOUSING G-7 AND G-9 CAP	3		

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 344 TURNED OVER DATE: 11/17/87

UTILIZATION OF C-BUS BATTERY FOR TESTING OF STATION BATTERY 3A

Summary:

Installation of raceway and cable such that non-safety related battery 4C can be used to supply the loads of DC Bus 3A while safety related station battery is being load tested.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification does not adversely affect safety related equipment or systems, require any change to plant Technical Specifications, or constitute an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>06/26/87</u>

INSTALLATION OF UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP DEVICE FOR POLAR CRANE BREAKER

Summary:

Installation of undervoltage trip device to the 480V Load Center Power Circuit Breaker serving the Unit 4 Containment Polar Crane.

Safety Evaluation:

Failure of the new component will not adversely affect any safety related system or function. In addition the U/V device has been seismically qualified and will be installed in accordance with specifications for safety related work. Therefore, this change does not involve an unreviewed safety guestion.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFIC	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	3&4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	07/13/87

PLANT COMMUNICATION SYSTEM - UNDERVOLTAGE CONDUIT

Summary:

This PC/M provides a raceway system for the new plant communication system being installed to replace the two existing telephone systems. The new communication system will be located in the new Administration Building.

Safety Evaluation:

This PC/M only adds a new raceway system for a new plant communication system. This raceway system does not interface with the Nuclear Units 3 or 4 nor are they installed within the power block. Also this raceway system is not installed in proximity to any safety related equipment. Therefore, this modification does not require a change to plant Technical Specifications, or constitute an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/22/86

GROSS MVAR TELEMETERING

Summary:

3CWI/3C14M-RTU-/4. Cable should not be deleted, therefore the new cable number should be 3GV/3C14M-RTU/6 to keep the cable numbering sequence correct.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is not Nuclear Safety Related Systems or features in the plant. All previous applications of the Data Acquisition package and the RTU will not be affected. Therefore, this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/04/87</u>

AUXILIARY POWER UPGRADE TRANSFER OF LOADS

Summary:

This modification transferred existing non-class 1E loads to the new C-bus switchgear, new load centers, existing condensate load center, and to the new 125 volt non-class 1E DC system for Unit 3.

Safety Evaluation:

This PC/M is not safety related and the written safety evaluation was provided under PC/M 82-98. This was done to evaluate the entire auxiliary power upgrade scope against existing licensing commitments and to determine if any unreviewed safety questions are involved.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>04/04/88</u>

AUXILIARY POWER UPGRADE TRANSFER OF LOADS, UNIT 4

Summary:

This modification transferred the following loads: SGFP 4B; Cond. P 4C; LC4E; MCC 4B, 4C; RA; Amertap MCC Unit 4; MCCD, 4E, F; SFPM 4P 12B; 125V DC Emer. B.O.P. 4P30; A.S.O.B.P. 4P38 and 120V AC Security System.

Safety Evaluation:

This PC/M is not safety-related and its design insured minimum interferences with safety related equipment, it does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>04/14/88</u>

INSTALLATION OF PORTABLE BATTERY CHARGER FOR STATION BATTERIES 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B CELL EQUALIZERS

Summary:

The purpose of this PC/M is to provide details for structural support of the portable battery charger.

Safety Evaluation:

While in use, the portable charger will be securely anchored to preclude potential interaction to safety related systems. This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 0 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/21/88

BATTERY CHARGER 3B, 4A, AND 4S VENDOR WIRING MODIFICATIONS

Summary:

The existing six gating and filter (GFM) cards in each of the three Exide model UPC 130-3-300 battery chargers 3B, 4A, and 4S shall be replaced with level revision H of electronic module card Part #101-071-629.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement GFM cards are qualified maintenance components procured from the original vendor to perform the same function as the original cards. Therefore, installation of these cards do not create an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	SR
			UNIT:	3&4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	02/19/88

TRANSFER SWITCH UPGRADE FOR DP-312A AND DP-412A

Summary:

This modification involves removing the existing obsolete automatic transfer switches located in DP-312A and DP-412A and installing new ones. The new switches are installed in NEMA-12 enclosures located outside DP-312A and DP-412A.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification enhances the operability and reliability of the 120V AC Normal/Emergency power supplied to Distribution Panels DP-412A and DP-312A. This modification does not alter the function of DP-312A and DP-412A. Therefore, replacement of these switches does not create an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 10/21/87

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND INSTALLATION DETAILS FOR RAYCHEM SPLICES

Summary:

Design details have been developed to depict the qualified Raychem splice details. These details are being issued to provide clarification for installation and acceptance criteria for existing Raychem splices.

Safety Evaluation:

No modifications to existing plant design are covered with this PC/M. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>S.</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>02/05/88</u>

NRC IE BULLETIN 85-03 MOV POSITION INDICATION

Summary:

This modification to motor operated valves (MOVs) in the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the High Head Safety Injection System provides for selecting the thermal overload heater sizes for the applicable MOVs.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification will increase the availability of the MOVs during safe shutdown conditions and improves the MOV position indication provided to control room operators. Since the MOVs being modified are classified as 1E, the modification is considered to be safety related and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>01/05/88</u>

GENERAL ELECTRIC SAM RELAY MODIFICATION P.C. CARD REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This PC/M incorporates a design change which replaces the existing printed circuit board in the GE Type SAM timing relay to eliminate the possibility of foreshortening timing by the relay.

Safety Evaluation:

No external wiring changes will be made and the relay's function will remain unchanged. This then precludes any new type of interaction with nuclear safety equipment. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	TION:	NSR
			UNIT:	3
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	09/11/87

4160V SWITCHGEAR CONTROL MODS

Summary:

This PC/M modifies the control circuit for 4KV Breakers. The 3A and 3B Bus modifications rewire the indicating light circuit and add a diode to prevent false actuation of the breaker failure scheme. The 3C Bus modifications include the above change plus the addition of an interlock to prevent the tripping of each bus feeder breaker from the C-Bus transformers when the alternate breaker is operated in the test position.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification does not affect the salety function of any of the breakers. This modification does not add any functional interconnection to any safety-related systems. All modifications are internal to the switchgear cubicle. The basic function of the incoming transformer breakers remains unchanged. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>01/05/88</u>

4160V SWITCHGEAR SYNCHRONIZING CIRCUIT MODIFICATIONS

Summary:

This modification adds a control switch 'close' contact in series with the synchronism check relay (Type IJS) to eliminate the possibility of contact welding, thus improving breaker closed circuit reliability.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification utilizes an existing breaker control switch contact to protect the synchronizing check relay contact from continuous loading and possible welding. The relay contact will carry current only when the breaker control switch is operated to close the breaker. The modifications involve existing devices and internal wiring changes with the addition of fully qualified field cables. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>04/14/88</u>

MAIN TRANSFORMER TIE LINE INSULATORS CHANGE OUT

Summary:

This modification replaces the dead end insulators attached to the Unit 3 and Unit 4 main transformers with new insulators of the same form, fit, and function.

Safety Evaluation:

These insulators perform no safety related function. Since the new insulators being installed are of equivalent form, fit, and function of the existing insulators, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______ 86-093___

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	3&4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	11/11/87

INSTALLATION OF RACEWAY AND CABLE FOR PC/M 86-095 & 096

Summary:

This modification installs raceway and cable associated with the repowering of the non-vital sections of MCC 3A, 3D, and 4A under PC/M 86.095 and 86-096.

Safety Evaluation:

This PC/M merely provides direction for the installation of raceway and raceway support and the pulling of cables within the installed raceway. No cable termination or determination is authorized by this PC/M. Based on the preceding, this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

CONTROL BUILDING ELEVATOR VESTIBULE POWER RECEPTACLE

Summary:

This PC/M installs cable and conduit from the C-Bus DC Enclosure Building lighting panel No. 80 to the Control Building elevator vestibule at the 18 foot elevation and terminates in a power receptacle. This outlet will provide a permanent power feed to operate a Coke machine now used by the control room personnel.

Safety Evaluation:

This additional conduit and power receptacle perform no safetyrelated function. There is no design intent discussed in the FSAR which may be altered by this installation. The conduit shall be mounted in accordance with the requirements for Class 1E Conduit in the vicinity of safety related components. The lighting panel is fed from a non-vital source. Therefore, this PC/M is nonnuclear safety related QA/QC required and does not involve an unreviewed, safety question. PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICAL & 87-005

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 02/12/08

ILE BULLETIN 85-03 MOV SWITCH SETTINGS

Summary:

This modification addresses Item b) of the Bulletin. It provide the overall MOV switch setting policy for the Bulletin MOVs. This also provides guidelines for use of thermal overloads and space heaters.

Safety Evaluation:

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. This engineering package only provides the necessary design information required to set MOV switch settings utilizing MOVATS signature analysis techniques. The recommended switch settings are considered enhancements to the existing settings to further ensure valve operability. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>HSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>C7/28/87</u>

ADUITIONAL COMPONENT LIGHTING FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AREA

Summary:

Modify and install new component lighting in the Auxiliary Feedwater Areas providing light fixtures and associated raceways for Auxiliary Feedwater Control Valve Platforms & adjacent areas, Auxiliary Steam Supply MOV Platform and the Main Feedwater Platforms for Unit 4.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification merely adds new lighting to the existing Auxiliary Feedwater Area, it does not change the operation of any system related to safety, therefore this does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 00/09/87

ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

Summary:

This modification adds a dedicated Alternate Shutdown Communication System on the Auxiliary Feedwater Control Valve Platforms and the Main Feedwater Platforms for Units 3 and 4.

Safety Evaluation:

This installs a communication system in areas of the plant that contain equipment required for safe shutdown. This system is designed to upgrade the existing communication system for safe shutdown. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION:			SR
		UNIT:	4
TURNED	OVER	DATE:	12/21/87

ICW PUMP 4-C MOTOR TERMINATION

Summary:

Field fabricated (taped) stress cones on ICW Pump 4-C Motor Leads are being replaced with Nuclear Class 1E qualified Raychem Connectors.

Safety Evaluation:

The Raychem kits are superior to the existing stress cones in that their installation is more repeatable and their performance is more predictable. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>07/28/87</u>

ADDITIONAL COMPONENT LIGHTING FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AREAS

Summary:

This modification modified existing lighting and installed new lighting in the Auxiliary Feedwater Areas.

Safaty Evaluation:

This modification did not interface with any safety-related systems, no new loads were added to the Emergency Diesel Generators or Station Battery and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any plant Tech. Spec. was not decreased. This modification was quality related and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>04/14/88</u>

MAIN TRANSFORMER TIE LINE INSULATORS CHANGE OUT

Summary:

This modification replaces the dead end insulators attached to the Unit 3 and Unit 4 main transformers with new insulators of the same form, fit, and function.

Safety Evaluation:

These insulators perform no safety related function. Since the new insulators being installed are of equivalent form, fit, and function of the existing insulators, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 02/04/88

REDESIGN OF SUPPORTS FOR MAIN STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER LINES

Summary:

This modification enhances the tubing and supports for the Main Steam Flow Transmitters (FT-474,-475,-484,-485,-494 and -495) to reduce the vibration problem.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification will enhance the operation of the flow transmitters by reducing the existing vibration in the line. The function of the flow transmitters will not be affected by this. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>01/04/88</u>

MISCELLANEOUS GAS SYSTEM: TUBINC/SUPPORT RZPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces damaged tubing with identical tubing, reroute tubing if required, and replace the gang supports.

Safety Evaluation:

The support designs have considered all applicable load combinations for normal and accident conditions. The supports transmit loads to the existing trench structure in a similar manner and magnitude as the existing supports. The mounting of the supports will not affect any of the equipment in the surrounding area. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>07/31/87</u>

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER INDICATION UNDER THE MAIN FEEDWATER PLATFORM

Summary:

This modification provides details for the installation of flow indicators for AFW Trains 1 and 2 and Steam Cenerator wide range level indicators.

Safety Evaluation:

Installation of new and replacement of existing indicators introduce no new failure modes to the AFW system. Instruments being installed are of higher reliability and improved quality. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______85-176___

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>06/26/87</u>

NITROGEN STATION ADDITIONS AND RELOCATION

Summary:

This modification provides for relocation of an existing N2 bottle station for AFW control valve and adds a new redundant bottle station and associated tubing and instruments.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is an enhancement of the existing AFW backup nitrogen system, and does not alter the basic function of the system. Therefore, this does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______85-173

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	NSR	
			UNIT:	3 & 4	
TU	JRNED	CVER	DATE:	07/31/87	

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP/TURBINE RPM MONITORING

Summary:

This modification installs RPM indicators on the Overhead Clock Panel in the Main Control Room, thus informing the operators of the status of the Auxiliary Feedwater Turbines.

Safety Evaluation:

The RPM monitoring equipment is electrically isolated from all other safety related equipment. This does not functionally alter the operation of the AFW system. No safety characteristics will be affected and existing control functions are unchanged. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>04/14/88</u>

STEAM-TO-MSR "C" BYPASS FLOW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification will replace the existing ASCO solenoid model 831424 with model 8314C24. This solenoid is installed in the MSR "C" Steam Control Bypass Valve CV-2912.

Safety Evaluation:

The proposed replacement model provides the same function, specifications and piping/electrical connections to that of the existing model. Therefore, installation of this replacement solenoid will not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 01/25/88

DEAREATOR VACUUM PUMP SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification will replace the obsolete ASCO model WP 8210B2LB with ASCO model 8211C94 on the SV-3420, control of cooling water to the Deareator Vacuum Pump.

Safety Evaluation:

SV-3420 serves no safety function, it is not required for safe shutdown nor is it directly associated with any safety related functions. Therefore, the replacement of the obsolete solenoid valve does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/14/88

PI-4-1454 ROBERT SHAW VS. ASHCROFT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing Robert Shaw pressure indicator PI-4-1454 with an Ashcroft Duragage Model 1379.

Safety Evaluation:

The Screen Wash Pump discharge pressure gauge PI-4-1454 maintains a non-safety related pressure boundary and it has no safety function. The Q-list does not show this gauge. Therefore, any modifications to this gauge do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>0</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>01/25/88</u>

SSGFW PUMP DISCHARGE PI REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing Robert Shaw pressure indicators PI-6511 A & B with Ashcroft Duragage Model 1379.

Safety Evaluation:

The SSGFP are usually required during normal plant startup, shutdown and hot standby modes of operation. They do not serve any safety function, they are not required for safe shutdown of the plant nor are they directly associated with any safety related equipment. Therefore, any modifications to these pressure instruments do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>04/04/88</u>

ICW BASKET STRAINER DP GAUGE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification installs Barton Model 227A in lieu of Barton Model 227 differential pressure indicators for DPI-1400, 1401, 1402, and 1403. DPI-1400 and DPI-1401 provide local indication of DP across basket strainers in the intake cooling water lincs to the turbine plant cooling water heat exchangers. DPI-1402 and DPI-1403 provide local indication of DP across basket strainers in the intake cooling water lines to the component cooling water heat exchangers.

Safety Evaluation:

The local indicators do not serve a safety function, however, the indicators wetted parts form part of the safety related pressure boundary. Their failure would not cause sufficient intake cooling water flow diversion to impede the ICW safety function since loss of intake cooling water flow is less than one percent. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	3
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	04/14/88

PI-1453, 1454 ROBERT SHAW GAUGES VS. ASHCROFT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing Robert Shaw pressure indicators PI-1453 and PI-1454 with an Ashcroft Duragage, Model 1379.

Safety Evaluation:

The Screen Wash Pump discharge pressure gauges PI-1453 and PI-3-1454 maintain the non-safety related pressure boundary and have no safety or control functions. The Q-list does not show these gauges. Therefore, any modifications to these gauges does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFIC	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	09/11/87

L.P. HTR PI-1564 REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification will replace the existing L.P. HTR PI-1564, a Robert Shaw model 672-B, with an Ashcroft model 1379.

Safety Evaluation:

The L.P.H. 5A local pressure gauge PI-4-1564 does not provide a safety related function and is classified as non-safety related. Therefore, a replacement of the existing model with a better model does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	SR
			UNIT:	4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	04/14/88

FEEDWATER CONTROL BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE COIL REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing coil in the ASCO solenoid valve for FW control valve FCV-4-498.

Safety Evaluation:

The substitute coils are identical in form, fit and function to the existing coils, Furthermore, the substitute coils are of a higher temperature rating than the existing coil. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	04/06/88

RCS SAMPLE HX OUTLET PRESSURE GAUGE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces U.S. Gauge model 1933 with Ashcroft 1377 for PI-902, PI-906, and PI-908.

Safety Evaluation:

The subject pressure gauges do not perform any safety function, and they have no input to safety related systems. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	SR
			UNIT:	4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	09/11/87

CHANGE OUT OF POSITIONER ON CV-1606, 1607, 1608, STEAM DUMP TO ATMOSPHERE

Summary:

This rodification replaces the existing Fisher model 3560 positioner with seismically qualified Fisher model 3582G positioner.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement positioner is equal to or better than the existing positioner in quality, form, fit and function. Both have the same accuracy, repeatability, range and cam characteristics. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

CHANGE OUT OF POSITIONER ON CV-1606, 1607, 1608, STEAM DUMP TO ATMOSPHERE

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing Fisher model 3560 positioner with seismically qualified Fisher model 3582G positioner.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement positioner is equal to or better than the existing positioner in quality, form, fit and function. Both have the same accuracy, repeatability, range and cam characteristics. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVEF DATE: 04/06/88

RCS SAMPLE HX OUTLET PRESSURE GAUGES REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing U.S. Gauge model 1933 with Ashcroft model 1377 for:

PI-902, Pressurizer steam sample line HX outlet pressure indicator PI-906, Pressurizer liquid space sample line HX outlet pressure indicator

PI-908, Hot leg/RHR sample line HX outlet pressure indicator

Safety Evaluation:

The subject pressure gauges do not perform any safety functions, and they do not have input to carety related sy tems. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______ 87-112___

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>12/09/87</u>

APRI DETECTOR AND CABLE UPGRADE

Summary:

This modification will replace the cables and connectors for the APRI detectors.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement parts are equal to or better than the existing cable and connectors in quality, fit, form, and function. Therefore, this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>0</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>11/06/87</u>

MAIN CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY LIGHTING

Summary:

This modification consists of installing additional DC, battery powered, emergency lights; and relocating certain others in the control room to ensure adequate lighting needs.

Safety Evaluation:

This PC/M provides supplemental emergency DC lighting in the main control room. These modifications are non-nuclear safety related and arr not connected to any safety features equipment other than the station batteries. Therefore, this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASS	SIFIC	ATION:	SR	
		UNIT:	4	
TURNED	OVER	DATE:	12/03/87	

CABLE TRAY MODIFICATIONS

Summary:

Evaluation and modification of existing safety related and seismic II/I Unit 4 cable tray supports (excluding those in the Cable Spreading Room) are performed to establish fill load allowables.

Safety Evaluation:

All work associated with this PC/M is safety related. Modifications to the cable tray support systems will not affect the operating function of the cable trays. This PC/M upgrades existing cable tray supports for the future addition of cable which will be evaluated under future PC/Ms. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question exists.

PC,	M CLASS	SIFICA	TION:	SR
			UNIT:	3
	TURNED	OVER	DATE:	12/03/87

CABLE TRAY MODIFICATIONS

Summary:

Evaluation and modification of existing safety related and seismic II/I Unit 3 cable tray supports (excluding those in the Cable Spreading Room) are performed to establish fill load allowables.

Safety Evaluation:

All work associated with this PC/M is safety related. Modifications to the cable tray support systems will not affect the operating function of the cable trays. This PC/M upgrades existing cable tray supports for the future addition of cable which will be evaluated under future PC/Ms. Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exist.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______84-003

PC/M	CLASS	SIFIC	ATION:	SR
			UNIT:	3
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	12/03/87

CABLE TRAY MODIFICATION IN THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM

Summary:

Evaluation and modification of existing safety related and seismic II/I cable tray supports in the Cable Spreading Room are performed to establish fill load allowables.

Safety Evaluation:

All work associated with this PC/M is safety elated. Modifications to the cable tray support systems will not ? .ect the operating function of the cable trays. This PC/M upgrades existing cable tray supports for the future addition of cable, which will be evaluated under future PC/Ms. Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exist.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFIC	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	0
TU	IRNED	OVER	DATE:	09/03/87

SECURITY LIGHTING JPGRACE

Summary:

This PC/M modifies the security lighting for PTP Units 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Safety Evaluation:

The security lighting upgrade circuits in this PC/M are classified as non-safety related because they do not perform, or interface with, any nuclear function. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 03/07/88

INSTALLATION OF FLOW & PRESSURE INDICATION INSTRUMENTATION FOR SSGF PUMPS

Summary:

This modification installs pressure indicators and DP flow sensors and flow indicators to measure flow in the discharge and recirculation lines and suction pressure of the SSGF pumps.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is non-safety related and will not degrade the existing installation. The Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pump System flow and pressure indication are completely independent and have no affect on the operability of any safety system. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>12/14/87</u>

CONTAINMENT PURGE SOLENOID VALVES

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing sclenoid valves with better temperature rating and environmentally qualified valves.

Safety Evaluation:

There is no unreviewed safety question, this modification will improve the performance of the equipment, and there is no physical or dimensional changes.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/25/88

INSTALLATION OF REACTOR EX-CORE NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING SYSTEM

Summary:

This modification installs two new, redundant safety grade instrument loops which will provide source and power range neutron flux monitoring.

Safety Evaluation:

This system does not interface with the existing NSSS supplied nuclear instrumentation. All outputs from this new system which interface with non-safety related systems are isolated. This new system does not provide any protective or control functions and does not interface with any reactor protection circuitry. Therefore, this installation does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFIC	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	3 & 4
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	01/25/88

ADDITION OF RCP NO. 2 SEAL LEAKOFF MEASUREMENT

Summary:

This modification installs additional RCP seal leakoff flow measurement devices on the No. 2 seal.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is non-safety related as it has no interconnection with any nuclear safety related system and does not perform any nuclear safety related function. Therefore, this modification will not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFIC	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	364
TI	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	01/25/88

ADDITION OF RCP NO. 2 SEAL LEAKOFF MEASUREMENT

Summary:

This modification installs additional RCP seal leakoff flow measurement devices on the No. 2 seal.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is non-safety related as it has no interconnection with any nuclear safety related system and does not perform any nuclear safety related function. Therefore, this modification will not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/11/87</u>

S/G LEVEL CONTROL ALTERNATE/NORMAL CONTROL

Summary:

This modification will replace the existing S/G Alternate/Normal control selector switches with Westinghouse OT-2 switches with OT-2V contact blocks.

Safety Evaluation:

The Alternate/Normal selector switch pertains to control function only and is completely isolated from protection circuits. There is no modification or elteration in the system, and the replacement switches will not impact any safety related equipment. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/11/87</u>

S/G LEVEL CONTROL ALTERNATE/NORMAL CONTROL

Summary:

This modification will replace the existing 3/G Alternate/Normal control selector switches with Westinghouse OT-2 switches with OT-2V contact blocks.

Safety Evaluation:

The Alternate/Normal selector switch pertains to control function only and is completely isolated from protection circuits. There is no modification or alteration in the system, and the replacement switches will not impact any safety related equipment. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>12/21/87</u>

ADDITION OF RHR TEMPERATURE ALARM

Summary:

This modification will install the "Alarm Option Kit" to existing Recorder TR-3-604. The alarm option kit will provide a high and low alarm setpoint for each of the three pens on TR-3-604.

Safety Evaluation:

This change does not involve a safety related function, does not interface with or affect any nuclear safety related system. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/21/87

ADDITION OF RHR TEM RATURE ALARM

Summary:

This modification will install the "Alarm Option Kit" to existing Recorder TR-4-604. The alarm option kit will provide a high and low alarm set; int for each of the three pens on TR-4-604.

Safety Evaluation:

This change does not involve a safety related function, does not interface with or affect any nuclear safety related system. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/04/88

NIS SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR HIGH VOLTAGE SHUTOFF CIRCUIT MODIFICATION

Summary:

This modification will replace the existing electronic high voltage shutoff circuit in the Source Range Drawer with an improved relay circuit.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification does not change the function of the Source Range detectors and eliminates the probability of failures with the improved circuit. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>12/09/87</u>

CRDM CONNECTOR AND CABLE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces existing connectors and cables associated with the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms.

Safety Evaluation:

The cables and connectors are not considered safety related because the electrical power is not required to be transmitted to the CRDM in order for the control rods to perform their safety function. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>01/05/88</u>

SOLENOID VALVE FOR ROT ISOLATION TO PUMPS

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing ASCO model LB 83146 SV-1003A, RCDT Pump Isolation, with ASCO model HC 8314C6.

Safety Evaluation:

The proposed ASCO HC 3314C6 is identical in quality, form, fit and function to the existing ASCO LB 83146. SV-1003A is located in non-safety, non-seismic piping. SV-1003A does not serve any safety function, and is not required for safe shutdown of the plant. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICA		ATION:	NSR	
		UNIT:	4	_
TURNED	OVER	DATE:	01/0	5/88

SOLENCIP VALVE FOR RCDT ISOLATION TO PUMPS

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing ASCO model LB 83146 SV-1003A, RCDT Pump Isolation, with ASCO model HC 8314C6.

Safety Evaluation:

The proposed ASCO HC 8314C6 is identical in quality, form, fit and function to the existing ASCO LB 83146. SV-1003A is located in non-safety, non-seismic piping. SV-1003A does not serve any safety function, and is not required for safe shutdown of the plant. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICATION:		SR	
			UNIT:	3	
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	12/21/87	

PRMS MONITOR DRAWER REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing PRMS monitor dragers for channels R-11, R-12, R-14, R-15, R-17A, R-17B, R-18 and R-19.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement drawers are equivalent in form, fit, and function with the existing system. Therefore, replacement of these drawers does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/09/87

UPGRADE OF APRI CABLES 'NL CONNECTORS

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing cables and connectors for the APRI system with improved cables and connectors.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement connectors and cables are equal to the existing cables and connectors in fit, form, and function. The APRI system is not considered safety related. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/09/87

UPGRADE OF APRI CABLES AND CONNECTORS

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing cables and connectors for the APRI system with improved cables and connectors.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement connectors and cables are equal to the existing cables and connectors in fit, form, and function. The APRI system is not considered safety related. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>12/21/87</u>

PRESSURIZER HEATER AC POWER CONTROL METURING

Summary:

This modification provides a new Pressurizer Heater AC power metering instrumentation system.

Safety Evaluation:

The Pressurizer Heater group wattmeter instrumentation does not perform a safety related function or effect the operation of any safety related equipment. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

PRESSURIZER LIQUID/STEAM SAMPLE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the ASCO model no. LB 831614 solenoid valves SY-956A&B with ASCO model no. NP 831654E. These solenoid valves are requred fc operation of containment isolation valves, CV-956A&B.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement ASCO is identical to the existing ASCO in fit, form, and function. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/06/88

REPLACEMENT OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TEST SELECTOR SWITCH

Summary:

Thi - modification replaces the existing two RPS selector switches, one each located in Train-A and Train-B reactor protection racks.

Safety Evaluation:

The implementation of the change does not alter the functional or operational requirements of the existing system as required for normal plant operation or plant safety. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

PASS FLOW LINERIZER REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing PASS turbine flowmeters' flow linearizer "ith an upgrade model.

Safety Evaluation:

The PASS does not perform a safety function and is not required for safe shutdown of the plant. The new flow linearizer is identical in form, fit, and function of the existing model. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASSIFICATION:			SR	
			UNIT:	3	
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	04/14/88	

N2 REGULATORS FOR OMS

Summary:

This modification replaces the pressure regulator on the N₂ backup system for the Power Operated Relief Valves.

Safety Evaluation:

The new regulator meets the original design and material specification requirements of the existing regulator. The installation of the replacement regulator does not adversely affect the integrity of the existing nitrogen back-up system. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

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REPLACEMEN' OF HIGH-RANGE GAMMA RADIATION READOUT MODULES

Summary:

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This PC/M provides for design modifications to the Containment High Range Gamma Radiation Readout Modules RaT-3-6311A and TaT-3-6311B.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement of the existing High-Range Gamma Radiation Modules will not change the design function of the system. This modification does not change the inherent function of any safety related systems. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M	CLASS	SIFICA	ATION:	NSR
			UNIT:	3&4
TU	RNED	OVER	DATE:	04/14/88

FLEX HOSE REPLACEMENT CV-200A

Summary:

This modification replaces existing black rubber hoses and bronze unions with flexible stainless steel braided hoses and fittings.

Safety Evaluation:

This change does not alter the ability of the letdown isolation valves to perform their intended function, nor any other component in the area adjacent to the hose installation. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/18/87</u>

REACTOR CAVITY SEAL REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This Engineering package provided a replacement for the Unit 3 Presray Paruma-Seal Model 585, Reactor Cavity Seal. The new seal design provides a redundant, passive, safety related means to limit reactor cavity leakage to less than 50 gpm. Furthermore, this PC/M provided a non-safety related inflatable seal to reduce leakage flows to as low as practical. This change was committed to by FPL in their revised response to IE Bulletin 84-03.

Safety Evaluation:

The reactor cavity seal system is safety related and performs the function of maintaining reactor cavity water inventory so that the fuel can be cooled and is shielded during refueling operations. The replacement seal system uses redundant safety related passive compression seals to eliminate the possibility of a high volume loss of refueling water from the reactor cavity. The replacement seal retains the original design concept of two passive seals and also includes the inflatable seal concept added in 1974. Accordingly this change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. It does not increase the probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 07/31/87

CONTAINMENT SPRAY RESTRICTING ORIFICE

Summary:

This modification directs the installation of flow orifices in the discharge piping of each CS pump.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification will reduce flows and determine the rise in the RWST Lo Level alarm setpoint. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>SR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/11/87</u>

NORMAL CONTAINMENT COOLER DRIP PANS

Summary:

The Unit 3 Normal Containment Cooler drip pans were replaced with duplicate drip pans made of stainless steel. The original pans were made of galvanized sheet steel and had corroded.

Safety Evaluation:

The use of stainless steel will increase the corrosion resistance of the drip pans. The new material is considered to be equal or better in strength characteristics.

This project does not involve a physical design change and will only increase the functional reliability of the drain pans. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLER DRIP PANS

Summary:

The Unit 3 Emergency Containment Cooler drip pans were replaced with duplicate drip pans made of stainless steel. The original pans were made of galvanized sheet steel and had corroded.

Safety Evaluation:

The use of stainless steel will increase the corrosion resistance of the drip pans. The new material is considered to be equal or better in strength characteristics.

This project does not involve a physical design change and will only increase the functional reliability of the drain pans. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

PC/M	CLASSIFICATION:			NSR
			UNIT:	4
TT	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	12/08/87

UNIT 4 TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR SI ACCUMULATOR LINE

Summary:

This modification evaluates the installation of a temporary support which will enable the removal of a portion of support SR-450.

Safety Evaluation:

The temporary support will provide the equivalent function of the existing support during Mode 5, therefore having no effect on the existing stress analysis of record. The support will be removed prior to leaving Mode 5. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>03/07/88</u>

RHR PUMP RECIRC. INSTALLATION

Summary:

During the select safety system review for RHR, it was discovered that the existing mini-recirc design configuration was inadequate. This modification installs the new design configuration to meet minimum recirculation requirements.

Safety Evaluation:

This change is classified as Nuclear Safety Related. The safety evaluation concludes an unreviewed safety question does not result from this change.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/28/88

CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE SYSTEM MODIFICATION

Summary:

This Engineering Package provides a backup means of sampling the containment atmosphere. The modification includes the addition of a seismically mounted, non-safety related pump, two safety related valves and various non-safety related fittings and tubing.

Safety Evaluation:

The pump will be seismically mounted to preclude potential interaction with safety related equipment. This modification will not effect the normal operation of the existing sampling system. The additional required flow has been evaluated as having no impact on RD-4-11 and RD-4-12. The safety evaluation concludes that no unreviewed safety concerns exist as a result of this modification.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: QR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 07/28/87

REACTOR VESSEL HEAD INSULATION PERMANENT REPLACEMENT

Summary:

The existing insulation around CRDM penetrations G-7 and G-9 was damaged and in poor condition due to its age. This insulation was replaced to obtain access to the reactor head and to increase its thermal performance. The insulation is in two perpendicular layers between the rows of CRDM's with cutouts for the CRDM's.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement of the insulation is Quality Related and does not involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The new insulation meets the requirements of FP&L Specification MN-2.72 "Rx Vessel Head Permanent Insulation" which provides requirements such that the replacement insulation is equivalent or better as compared to the original insulation.

PC/M	CLASSIFICATION:			SR
			UNIT:	3
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	09/04/87

REACTOR HEAD VENT PIPE SUPPORT H-2 MODIFICATION

Summary:

The Reactor Head Vent System piping support H-2 was replaced to better distribute its resultant load over the reactor cavity liner plate embedded attachment and in the support itself. The new support is in the same location and is identical to the original support except for additional reinforcement.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is Nuclear Safety Related and does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The new support is better able to perform its intended function than the original support, therefore the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification will not be reduced, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type and the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

GREASE KIT REPLACEMENT - EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLERS AND FILTERS

Summary:

The modification replaced the original grease fittings and lines that were removed due to deterioration. The replacement parts were obtained from the original manufacturer and installed per their instructions. The grease fittings and lines are used to lubricate the E.C. Coolers and Filter Fan Units.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement of the grease fittings and lines were procured and installed per the original manufacturer instructions, thus returning the E.C. Coolers and Filter Fan Units to a configuration similar to the original equipment. The installation of these parts is classified as Nuclear Safety Related and does not involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 since the replacement is equal to or better than the original installation.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NNSR-QA/QC</u> UNIT: <u>3&4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>07/30/87</u>

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TURBINE EXHAUST SILENCER CONDENSATE REMOVAL

Summary:

The modifications consist of locking the existing manual isolation valves in the open position, enlarging the discharge piping downstream of the existing steam orifices, and connecting the discharges to a new 1½ inch drain header. These modifications are required to ensure adequate condensate removal from the turbine exhaust lines to preclude the discharge of hot condensate from the silencers upon AFW pump actuation. The modifications direct the turbine exhaust piping drain discharge to a storm drain in the Unit 3 Steam Generator Blowdown Area.

Safety Evaluation:

The possibility of an accident occurring due to this modification will not be increased because this modification does not alter the basic function of the AFW system or other safety related systems. This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question as directed by 10 CFR 50.59.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 08/13/87

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AREA STEAM TRAP AND DRAINAGE PIPING

Summary:

This modification provides for the connection of selected steam trap outlets of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System to a new 6 inch discharge header and storm drain.

The modifications for connecting selected steam trap and turbine casing drains discharge piping to a new 6 inch drain header was required to prevent the condensate released by these lines from flashing into steam in an area which may be occupied by operation and maintenance personnel.

Safety Evaluation:

The modifications to the discharge piping of the steam traps and turbine casing drains do not alter the basic function of the AFW System or other safety related systems. This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question as directed by 10 CFR 50.59.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION _____85-104___

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 02/05/88

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP A REPLACEMENT IMPELLER JPE-M-86-046

Summary:

This PC/M replaced the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "A" impeller assembly (rotating element) with a spare assembly recently removed from Plant Stores. The assembly removed from Stores was returned to Ingersoll-Rand, Phillipsburg, New Jersey facility to have the impeller vanes underfiled. This would achieve a minimum of 4 to 5 percent head increase in pump performance.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification did not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a design basis accident or malfunction as evaluated in the FSAR; did not introduce the possibility of an accident or malfunction not previously analyzed for; and did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications. A performance test was performed upon completion of this PC/M which verified the minimum 4 to 5% increase in pump head was met. The amount of metal removed during underfiling was negligible; hence the seismic characteristics were not changed.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>03/21/88</u>

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STEAM SUPPLY VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This PC/M replaces the existing motor operated solid wedge gauge valves of the Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply System with motor operated globe valves. This PC/M also installs tilting disc check valves both upstream and downstream of the motor operated globe valves, removes the existing downstream stop check valves, and converts the existing upstream stop check valves into manually operated globe valves.

Safety Evaluation:

The 900# Class Globe Valves are suitable replacements for the 600# Class Gate Valves and are considered superior in precluding seat erosion and thermal binding. Opening and closing times have been reviewed and verified to be within design limits.

All valves are seismically qualified and have been manufactured to ASME Section III, Class 2, which meets the requirements of ANSI B31.1 and Quality Group B. The existing upstream stop check valves are to be modified to globe valves according to manufacturer's recommendations. The modified valve is suitable for steam service per the valve manufacturer. Deletion of the downstream stop function on the downstream check valve has no adverse effect on plant safety. The replacement tilting disc check valve is suitable for steam service.

Pressure drop calculations have been performed to verify that adequate steam conditions (flow/pressure) will exist at the AFW turbines to provide the required feedwater flows to the steam generators.

This modification does not present an unreviewed safety question as required by 10 CFR 50.59.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STEAM SUPPLY VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This PC/M replaces the existing motor operated solid wedge gauge valves of the Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply with motor operated glove valve. This PC/M also installs tilting disc check valves both upstream and downstream of the motor operated glove valves, removes the existing downstream stop check valves, and converts the existing upstream stop check valves into manually operated globe valves.

Safety Evaluation:

The 900# Class Globe Valves are suitable replacements for the 600# Class Gate Valves and are considered superior i., precluding seat erosion and thermal binding. Opening and closing times have been reviewed and verified to be within design limits.

All valves are seismically qualified and have been manufactured to ASME Section III, Class 2, which meets the requirements of ANSI B31.1 and Quality Group B. The existing upstream stop check valves are to be modified to globe valves according to manufacturer's recommendations. The modified valve is suitable for steam service per the valve manufacturer. Deletion of the downstream stop function on the downstream check valve has no adverse effect on plant safety. The replacement tilting disc check valve is suitable for steam service.

Pressure drop calculations have been performed to verify that adequate steam conditions (flow/pressure) will exist at the AFW turbines to provide the required feedwater flows to the steam generators.

This modification does not recent an unreviewed safety question as required by 10 CFR 50.59.

PC/M	CLASSIFICATION:			NS	
			UNIT:	3&4	
TU	JRNED	OVER	DATE:	05/03/85	

CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE POLTS

Summary:

This modification replaced the existing operator and trunion bolts, including respective nuts, on the 54" containment purge valves POV-3-2602, POV-3-2603, POV-4-2602 and POV-4-2603. The replacement bolts were of SAE Grade 8 carbon steel and the replacement nuts were heavy hex os ASTM A194 Grade 2H carbon steel. The original bolts and nuts were SAE Grade 2 carbon steel.

Safety Evaluation:

This design package is nuclear safety related because containment purge valves function to perform/maintain containment isolation. Stress reports show that the new components are better than the originals and appropriate for substitution. Therefore, the use of the new bolts and nuts is acceptable and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 08/13/87

REPLACEMENT OF V. (VE 3-696T FOR CTMT SPRAY RECIRCULATION TEST LINE

Summary:

The purpose of this PC/M is to replace the existing recirculation test line isolation valve with a valve that will not cavitate under pump test recirculation conditions. The replacement valve is an ASME Section III, Class 2, 2" globe valve.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement value is larger than the original value and the piping stress analysis has been reviewed and revised to verify the existing supports are adequate. The replacement values are identical in fit, form and function to the existing values and therefore, this modification is nuclear safety related with no unreviewed safety question since the probability/consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR has not increase nor was the possibility of an equipment malfunction/accident important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. This modification will not decrease the margin of safety as defined in the bases of any Technical Specification.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NNS-QA/QC UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/16/87

SPENT FUEL FIT BUILDING WALL JOINT REPAIR

Summary:

This design ackage covers the repair of the expansion/contraction joint in the walls of the Spent Fuel Pit Building (SFPB).

Safety Evaluation:

The purpose of the joint material is to prevent joint deterioration, protect reinforcing and stop foreign material from entering the joint. It doesn't perform a safety related function. Therefore, walls do not pose an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/16/87

CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE RECORDER REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing Main Control Room containment temperature recorder with an upgraded model.

Safety Evaluation:

The temperature recorder is required to provide data for plant performance records only, it will be seismically supported to avoid interaction with safety related equipment. The recorder's function does not affect the operation of any safety related components. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/14/87.

NIS SOURCE RANGE PRE-AMPLIFIER REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification installs a new excore neutron flux monitoring system in order to meet the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.97 Revision 3.

Safety Evaluation:

The new low noise preamplifier is electronically compatible with the existing source range drawer electronics. Installation dimensions and seismic responses are essentially unchanged. The temperature, pressure, and humidity capability of the new amplifier bounds its expected operating environment. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 01/14/88

MOV-3-750 AND MOV-3-751 LIMIT SWITCH ADJUSTMENT

Summary:

This modification will relocate the close limit switch LS-8 wiring from Rotor #2 to a spare limit switch LS-15 on Rotor #4 on RHR Inlat Isclation Valves MOV-3-750 and MOV-3-751.

Salety Evaluation:

This modification will eliminate the misadjustment of the open bypass or closed limit switch setting, which could result in failure of the disk to properly seat. The relocation of the limit switch will improve the reliability of the isolation valves. This does not affect the integrity operation or function of any safety related systems. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/08/87

RESOLUTION OF DEFICIENCIES ASSOCIATED WITH PRESSURIZER INSTRUMENTATION

Summary:

This modification identifies the material replacement and addition of conduit supports to maintain capability of RTD's and accelerometers for the pressurizer.

Safety Evaluation:

Raceway supports have been designed in accordance with Class I requirements. The replacement cable is qualified for Class IE application. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

CCW HEAT EXCHANGER CHANNEL HEAD REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing channel heads with other heads less susceptible to corrosion.

Safety Evaluation:

The only change being made per this modification is to provide channel heads of less corrosive material. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: QR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/04/87

ACCESS FOR EDG RADIATOR DRAIN VALVES

Summary:

This modification installs two access panels in the EDG Radiator Cooling System to allow operation and maintenance to drain valves 292A&B and 293A&B.

Safety Evaluation:

The safety evaluation concludes that this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require any changes to Technical Specifications.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______ 86-210___

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 01/29/88

ICW CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing check valves with a new folding disc type check valve.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement value is a one-for-one replacement and the function of the system is unchanged. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/24/87</u>

RIDRAULIC SNUBBER REPLACEMENT MAIN STEAM SYSTEM

Summary:

This modification replaces hydraulic snubbers on the Main Steam System, with mechanical snubbers.

Safety Evaluacion:

The replacement snubbers are equal to or better than the existing snubbers and will not affect nuclear safety. This modification is considered a one-for-one replacement and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 06/26/87

INSTALLATION OF UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP DEVICE FOR POLAR CRANE BREAKER

Summary:

This modification covers breaker accessory addition to the 480V Load Center Power Circuit Breaker serving the Unit 4 Containment Polar Crane.

Safety Evaluation:

The failure of this component will not adversely affect any safety system or function. The U/V device is seismically qualified, it is being incorporated into an existing safety related circuit and the added tripping function upon an undervoltage condition isolates non-vital load. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATICN: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>05/12/88</u>

ASHCROFT TEMPERATURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT

Summary:

The existing Ashcroft model no. 506060EHT56 is obsolete, this modification will replace the affected indicators with Ashcroft Model 50-EI42E060.

Safety Evaluation:

The subject indicators are not part c a safety related boundary, serve no safety function, and are not used in conjunction with any other safety related device or system. The replacement indicators are equal to the original indicators in quality, form, fit and function. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______ 86-101

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3&4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>08/04/87</u>

EMERGENCY DIESEL "B" AUXILIARY POWER SUPPLY RELOCATION

Summary:

This modification relocates certain auxiliary of EDG-B from EDG-A associated MCC 4A to EDG-B associated MCC-4B.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification will eliminate the possibility of losing EDG-B at a time when it is the only emergency power source available, hence increasing the reliability of the Emergency Diesel Generator System. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

NITROGEN STATION ADDITIONS AND RELOCATION

Summary:

This modification relocates an existing backup Nitrogen bottle station for ΛFW control value and adds a new bottle station and associated tubing and instruments.

Safety Evaluation:

This ensures a more reliable source of backup supply and separation of two independent trains of supply of AFW to the Steam Generators. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/03/87

CABLE REROUTING FOR APPENDIX R MODIFICATIONS

Summary:

This modification provides physical protection between channels for those devices required to ensure hot and/or cold shutdown capability.

Safety Evaluation:

This change improves plant safety by providing separation between channels. All new or relocated equipment is seismically supported and qualified and will not degrade the safety function of other systems. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 02/09/88

INSTALLATION OF INADEQUATE CORE COOLING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

Summary:

This modification installs silicon dioxide mineral insulated cable to bring the core exit thermocouple signals and heated "unction thermocouple signals from the reactor to the containment penetrations.

Safety Evaluation:

The installation of mineral insulated cable does not involve an unreviewed safety question because the addition does not affect the pressure boundary or any other safety system.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>02/12/88</u>

ACCUMULATOR SI TEST LINE SOLENOID VALVES REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces existing ASCO model LB831654 for SV-850A,C,&E with ASCO model NP831654E.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification replaces existing solenoid valves with solenoid valves that are equal to or better in fit, form, and function. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 0 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/14/88

LOW AIR P.S. TO START AIR GAUGE ON PANEL

Summary:

The modification replaces the 12" X $\frac{1}{4}$ " rubber hose for the low air pressure switch with $\frac{1}{4}$ " - .030 wall thickness copper tubing approximately 12" long.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement tubing is acceptable for all anticipated operating conditions, therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION __ 86-141_

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>08/04/87</u>

TEST CONNECTIONS FOR SECONDARY PUMPS

Summary:

This modification is to provide evaluation and documentation for existing pressure test connections for the Feedwater, Condensate, and Heat Drain Fump performance testing.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is non-safety related where the test connections for pump performance testing are required, and do not perform any safety function. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______ 86-172____

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

NIS ROTARY SWITCH KNOBS

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing NIS and PRMS rotary selector switches with a point or shape knob to alleviate human factors concerns.

Safety Evaluation:

Replacing the existing NIS, PRMS, rotary switch knobs wich the new knobs will not degrade either system. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

ICW CHECK VALVES FILTER REGULATOR OUTPUT RANGE SPRING REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification will replace the existing control springs with ones suitable for the regulator.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement regulator is equal to or better than the existing quality, form, fit and function. This does not change the operating function or condition of the plant. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______ 87-247___

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

C'-3-2826 REPLACEMENT OF STEM CONNECTOR

Summary:

This modification installs a stem connector made of INcut 200, for a replacement of the existing stem connector made of ASTM A-316.

Safety Evaluation:

The replacement part will perform the same function as the existing with equivalent or better quality and will not compromise system integrity. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 12/22/87

MODIFICATION OF CCW PIPING AND SUPPORT FOR 3B RCP OIL COOLER

Summary:

This modification will make minor pipe routing and support changes to Component Cooling Water piping for the 3B Reactor Coolant Pump lower bearing lube oil cooler.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is only minor rerouting of safety related piping and associated supports. Therefore, this m lification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 11/24/87

HEAT TRACE PANELS 1A, 1B, 9A AND 9B REWORK

Summary:

This modification identifies the material replacements and mounting requirements to assure seismic capability of heat trace power panels 1A, 1B, 9A and 9B.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification replaces two electrical type devices with equivalent rated material having appropriate documentation, and will assure the seismic qualifications of the installations. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 11/02/87

MODIFICATION OF PIPE SUPPORT SR-36 AND WHIP RESTRAINT

Summary:

This change modifies the support location and method of attachment for Support SR-36 and support configuration for Restraint SI-13.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification enhances the existing support system and therefore, does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 01/25/88

RESUPPORT OF THERMOSTATS FOR BOR, C ACID SYSTEM HEAT TRACING CIRCUITS 6A & 6B

Summary:

This modification is required to provide appropriate documentation and assurance that the support for the thermostats meets the requirements for Class I structures.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is an enhancement to the existing system. This has no impact on the functioning of the system. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 0 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/24/88

VALTER POSITION FOR FOLLOWER PIN INSTALLATION

Summary:

This modification installs 80 and 80R positioner follower pins on the Auxiliary Feedwater control valves, and other similar installations.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is to provide details that will assure the proper installation of the follower pin assemblies in accordance with vendor requirements. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 01/05/88

UNIT 3 ICW PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification is for replacement of valves 3-50-311, 3-50-321, 3-50-331, TEC check valves. The replacement valves have been redesigned to incorporate a new seal arrangement and a square keyway for the shaft disk key.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification will not alter the function of the system, its seismic response, or compromise system integrity. Therefore, this modification does not involvo an unraviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 01/05/38

UNIT 4 ICW PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification is for replacement of valves 4-50-311, 4-50-321, 4-50-331, TEC check valves. The replacement valves have been redesigned to incorporate a new seal arrangement and a square keyway for the shaft disk key.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification will not alter the function of the system, its seismic response, or compromise system integrity. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 10/16/87

FEEDWATER SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing ASCO solenoid valves for SV-478A,C, 498A and C with an upgraded ASCO model solenoid valve.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is a one-for-one replacement with an upgraded solenoid valve. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 10/16/87

FEEDWATER SOLENOID VALVE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the existing ASCO solenoid valves for SV-478B, 488B, and 498B with an upgraded ASCO model solenoid valve.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is a one-for-one replacement with an upgraded solenoid valve. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/04/88

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER N2 BACKUP SYSTEM PRESSURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification provides for the replacement of the existing indicators with seismically qualified indicators and will permit the isolation valve for each indicator to remain in the "normal open" position

Safety Evaluation:

This modification replaces the existing pressure indicators seismically qualified indicators which meet the same functional requirements as the original indicators. This has no adverse effect on safety related components.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/14/88

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER N2 BACKUP SYSTEM PRESSURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification provides for the replacement of the existing indicators with seismically qualified indicators and will permit the isolation valve for each indicator to remain in the "normal open" position

Safety Evaluation:

This modification replaces the existing pressure indicators seismically qualified indicators which meet the same functional requirements as the original indicators. This has no adverse effect on safety related components.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 04/14/88

BATTERY CHARGER 3B, 4A & 4S GATE-FILTER MODULE REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This change in selection of a capacitor to install in the original charger has resulted in a revision level "K" to the old part no. 101-071-629 for gate-filter modules and is noted in the Exide letter dated 02/08/88.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is an improvement to the existing battery chargers. It has no adverse effect on safety related systems and therefore, does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PERFORMANCE UPGRADE -REMOVAL OF ABANDONED EQUIPMENT

Summary:

This modification provides for the removal of components and equipment that have been abandoned and are no longer required for plant operation.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification does not degrade the plant safety, the changes are not safety related. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

CONTROL ROOM HVAC TEST PENETRATIONS

Summary:

This modification drills 12 holes, each 3/8" diameter on the return duct for the Control Room HVAC air handlers. These holes will be used to gather flow data.

Safety Evaluation:

The resultant short circuiting will not change the seismic, fire protection, environmental characteristics of the HVAC duct. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>SR</u> UNIT: <u>3&4</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/11/87</u>

SGBD FLOW CONTROL VALVES BODY/SEAT REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification replaces the Chrome-Moly valve bodies on the Unit 3 SGBD FCV's with stainless steel bodies. Also, diffuser type seat rings will be installed in the Unit 3 and Unit 4 FCV's to replace the existing seat rings.

Safety Evaluation:

The S.S. replacement bodies are a direct replacement for the Chrome-Moly valve bodies. The diffuser seat ring is also a direct replacement for the existing seat ring. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/18/87

PORTABLE VENTILATING FANS FOR THE DC EQUIPMENT/INVERTOR ROOMS

Summary:

This modification installs the following: 1) Portable ventilation fans for storage locations, 2) Power receptacles in DC Equipment/ Invertor rooms, 3) Dial thermometers in DC Equipment/Invertor rooms and 4) Emergency Lighting in the DC Equipment/Invertor rooms.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification is to assure adequate ventilating capability for the DC Equipment/Invertor rooms. The electrical supply is Class IE, the fan storage racks are seismically qualified, and the thermometers and lights do not perform a safety function. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 07/28/87

UNIT 3 REACTOR VESSEL CRDM DUMMY, HOUSING G-7 CAP

Summary:

This modification installs a dummy can over the vertical pipe at location G-7 to maintain proper air flow around the CRDM.

Safety Evaluation:

Analysis has shown that securing the dummy can to an adjacent housing will not change the conclusion that the stresses within the CRDM pressure housing or the reactor vessel penetration are within acceptable limits. Therefore, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 07/28/88

CRDM VENT SHROUD INSPECTION DOORS

Summary:

This modification will install doors in the CRDM Shroud to allow inspection of RV head and CRDM penetration.

Safety Evaluation:

Per the evaluation of seismic concerns, dynamic loading and operating variances, this modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 02/12/88

COMPUTER ROOM ADDITION

Summary:

This modification provides instruction to spare six breakers that were used to feed original plant air conditioners for the hot and cold locker room. The hot and cold locker rooms are to be converted into a Computer Room and this modification adds a permanent air conditioning system.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification replaces the original air conditioners for the hot and cold locker rooms which are to be converted into a Computer Room. This PC/M does not involve an unreviewed safety question, and does not affect the conclusion of the original Safety Evaluation.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 10/12/87

MAIN FEEDWATER VALVE TUBING REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification involves the replacing of the existing 3/8" OD tubing with 1/2" OD stainless tubing. The results will be a decrease in the maximum closing time as controlled by SV-478A, 488A, and 498A.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification replaces existing instrument air tubing with a larger diameter as to decrease maximum closing times of the above S.V. Therefore this modification adds no adverse effects or constitutes an unreviewed safety question.

PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION ______85-117___

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3&4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/03/87

ADDITIONAL CABLE REROUTING FOR APPENDIX R

Summary:

This modification provides for the rerouting of cables as required by Appendix R. This involves addressing: physical separation, environmental service conditions and seismic criteria.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification consists of only pulling and routing of new cables to meet fire protection requirements, and does not represent a change in the way the systems are operated or function. This modification does not adversely affect safety related equipment or systems, require any change to plant Technical Specifications, or constitute an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: <u>NSR</u> UNIT: <u>3</u> TURNED OVER DATE: <u>09/14/87</u>

NIS ROTARY SWITCH KNOB REPLACEMENT

Summary:

This modification provides for the replacement of the round knobs on the existing Westinghouse NI and PRMS racks 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, and 67 with similar but pointed knobs to alleviate human factors concern.

Safety Evaluation:

The knobs are both made of plastic with nearly identical weight and size. The mounting of the new knobs is identical to the old round knobs. The new knobs add no adverse effect on the system or constitute an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: NSR UNIT: 4 TURNED OVER DATE: 09/11/87

PRMS CHANNELS R4-17A AND R4-17B CABLE REWORK

Summary:

This modification provides instructions to add a splice at an existing pull box, PB4314, in the cabling for detectors R4-17A and R4-17B. This repair has become necessary due to R4-17A cable failure and R4-17B being highly prone to failure.

Safety Evaluation:

The only modification to the PRMS is the addition of the splice on the detector cable in the existing pull box, the operational and physical characteristics of the system remain the same. Therefore, this modification does not require a change to the plant Technical Specifications, or constitute an unreviewed safety question.

PC/M CLASSIFICATION: SR UNIT: 3 TURNED OVER DATE: 07/28/87

REACTOR VESSEL CRDM DUMMY HOUSING G-7 AND G-9 CAP

Summary:

This modification provides for design changes involving the reactor vessel head, penetrations at locations G-7 and G-8. The existing head adapter plug is to be cut off and replaced with a welded pipe cap design. In addition, this modification also provides for the addition of dummy cans over locations G-7 and G-8 to maintain proper air flow.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

11) PROCEDURE CHANGES & SAFETY EVALUATIONS

The following procedures were changed, reviewed, and approved and reissued during the reporting period. The procedure changes are as described below and only those procedure changes constituting changes in the procedures as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are reported. Minor or routine procedure changes not affecting procedures as described in the FSAR are not reported. In addition other safety evaluations that did not result in procedure changes are included in this section.

1) The setpoint for the CCW pump auto start was changed from 75 \pm 1.5 psi to 60.0 \pm 1.5 psi to prevent nuisance auto starts. The following procedure was revised:

AP 0140.2 - Changing Setpoints

Safety Evaluation Summary:

Due to changes in the available CCW heat sink temperatures and system flow balancing requirements, CCW flow rate and pressure have changed from two pump to one pump operation. The new setpoint still assures the minimum required flow rates to essential components needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The probability of malfunction of equipment will of be increased since no equipment will be modified. Special test 86-05 demonstrated that single CCW pump operation just below the proposed setpoint value of 60 psig provides adequate CCW to essential components. No margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is decreased.

Date of Change: January 6, 1988

2) To improve backflush, a new method was reviewed. This method increased backflush flow by closing the inlet valve and opening the strainer drain valve. This mechod still requires entering an LCO but for a much shorter duration than original backflush method or manual cleaning. The following procedure was changed to reflect the new backflush method:

TP - 430 ICW/CCW Basket Strainer Fullflow Backwash

Safety Evaluation Summary:

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis will not be increased. This is assured by stationing an operator in the vicinity of the strainer drain valve. Full ICW flow will be restored in such a short time frame that an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety enalysis will not be created. The requirements placed on the procedure will ensure that the safety margin as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

ii - 1

In conclusion, there is no unreviewed safety questions.

Date of Change: March 17, 1988

- 3) The review of the monthly maintenance records on station battery "4B" indicated that over the period of several months, the float voltages of a few cells have drifted downward to the minimum acceptable value of 2.13 volts. The following procedure which provides instructions to perform individual cell equalizing charge was reviewed:
 - TP 415 Individual Cell Equalization Charge for Station Batteries 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B

Safety Evaluation Summary:

No new equipment or component (except the temporary use of a portable battery charger) has been added to the system. The portable charger is to be located and seismically supported outside the respective battery rooms. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been increased.

The portable battery will be temporarily connected in parallel to the individual cell of the battery. During this process should a design basis event occur, the 125 VDC battery system has adequate capability to supply the vital DC loads without any adverse effects. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR has not been created.

The individual equalizing of the batter cell(s) is intended to elevate the low voltage of the weak cell, thus improving the margin of safety noted in the Technical Specifications.

Date of Change: March 17, 1988

- 4) To correct the electrolyte level of the low specific gravity cells on a one time basis, the following procedure was prepared and reviewed:
 - TP 414 One Time Electrolyte Level Correction of Station Batteries 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B

Safety Evaluation Summary

No new equipment or component (except the temporary use of a portable battery charger) has been added to the system. The portable charger is to be located and seismically supported outside the respective battery rooms. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been increased.

The portable battery will be temporarily connected in p callel to the

individual cell of the battery. During this process should a design basis event occur, the 125 VDC battery system has adequate capability to supply the vital DC loads without any adverse effects. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR has not been created.

The individual equalizing of the batter cell(s) is intended to elevate the low voltage of the weak cell, thus improving the margin of safety noted in the Technical Specifications.

Date of Change: March 18, 1988

5) To fill condenser hotwells of both units with the standby steam generator feedwater pump system. The following procedure change was written and reviewed:

0-0P-074.1 Standby S/G FW System

Safety Evaluation Summary

Location, configuration and operation of the new Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SSGFPs) have no effects on the accidents analyzed in the FSAR. This addition of providing backup in case of a fire in the Auxiliary FW pump area increases the inherent reliability of that area. The SSGFPs are located sufficiently remote from the Auxiliary FW pumps and are powered from the C-Bus 4KV system, which can be fed by the Unit 1 and 2 cranking diesel generator upon loss of offsite power. Therefore, the proposed procedural change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident analyzed in the FSAR, nor will it impact the functioning of any safety related equipment important to safety. No new accident or malfunction of a different type will be created and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is decreased.

6) EDG loading was reviewed against the conflict with the operability of the control room ventilation system and the charging pump KW requirement which was higher than originally evaluated. As a result, the following procedures were revised:

a)	3(4)-BOP-E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
b)	3(4)-EOP-ES-0.2	Natural Circulation Cooldown
C)	3(4)-EOP-ES-0.4	Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Vessel (Without RVIMS)
d)	3(4)-EOP-ES-0.3	Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Vessel (With RVIMS)
e)	AP-0103.32	Reactor Cold Shuidown Conditions

ii - 3

Safety Evaluation Summary

With the compressor for Control Room Air Compressor (CRAC) Unit C disabled for the special case of a unit in cold shutdown less than 30 hours with the other unit at power, the control room will remain habitable and EDG loading will be acceptable even with a single failure. The details are described in JPE-PIN-SELJ-88-024 (Rev. 0) and JPE-L-86-74 (Rev. 2).

Tests were conducted to show that average temperatures in the control room will not exceed allowables. Accordingly, operation with two control room air handlers and one compressor would be within the documented design basis for control room ventilation system operation post-LOCA. Using test data obtained from the plant for the charging pumps, a value of 114 KW was calculated for maximum pump power requirements. This value has been incorporated into the calculation for EDG loading and has been determined that diesel loading remains acceptable. Therefore, the proposed procedural change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident analyzed in the FSAR, nor will it impact the functioning of any safety related equipment important to safety. No new accident or malfunction of a different type will be created and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is decreased.

Date of Changes: June 8, 1988

Steam Generator FW control valves acceptance criteria was changed from 7) 5 seconds to 6.8 seconds. This includes the consideration of a conservative time between the SI actuation and the FW isolation signal. This change was made through the following procedure:

3(4)-OSP-074.2 S/G FW Control Valves Operability Test

Safety Evaluation Summary

Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) is the only FSAR safety analysis for which the FW isolation response time is critical. The delay time for FW isolation assumed in the current Turkey Point MSLB analysis is 7 seconds which was typically viewed as consisting of two seconds for signal processing and logic delay plus 5 seconds of valve stroke. There are no unreviewed safety questions because the proposed procedural change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident analyzed in the FSAR, nor will it impact the functioning of any safety related equipment important to safety. No new accident or malfunction of a different type will be created and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is decreased.

Date of Change: September 24, 1987

ii - 4

8) Operation of Main Steam (MS) radiation monitor (RAD-6426) requires that MS sample line valves be open during normal operation. However, FSAR requires these valves to be normally closed. In addition, blowdown sample line isolation valves are open during plant operation but a single failure can cause one of 'chese valves to remain open during accident conditions. The following procedure changes are made to allow the opening of these valves during normal operation with operator action specified in case of an accident:

3(4)-BOP-E-3 Steam Generator Tube Pupture

Safety Evaluation Summary

A detailed evaluation addressed that opening of the isolation valves and blowdown valves is acceptable with compensatory operator action because:

- 1. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been increased since any accident involving the sample lines would be bounded by the accident analyses discussed in the FSAR.
- 2. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been created because any postulated failure of the MS or SG blowdown sample tubing is similar to and bounded by accidents previously analyzed in the FSAR.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, has not been increased because the operation of any equipment addressed in the Technical Specifications is not adversely affected.

Date of Change: March 25, 1988

- 9) A safety evaluation was provided to allow the electrical conduit installation for monitoring RCS leaks in Unit 3 reactor head area. This evaluation provides justification and restriction for Unit 3 in Modes 5 or 6. PC/M 88-0_6 and 88-193 provided additional evaluation to support operation in other Modes for both units.
- 10) Instructions were provided for monitoring CCW heat exchangers so that cleaning of heat exchangers could be done in a timely manner. The following procedure was reviewed:

TP-419 CCW Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring

Safety Evaluation Summary

The CCW heat exchanger cleaning program assures adequate heat transfer

capability assuming CV-2201 fails to close. If ICW operability cannot be demonstrated with a failure of CV-2201 to close, an operator will be prepared to isolate ICW flow to TPCW heat exchangers. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis has not increased.

With valve 406 open, a single failure will not cause a loss of ICW flow to the CCW heat exchangers. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created.

The basis for the ICW system Technical Specification is that one pump provides sufficient flow to the CCW heat exchangers to remove heat created by a LOCA. Since opening valve 406 assures a single failure will not obstruct ICW flow to the CCW heat exchangers, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the ICW Technical Specification is not reduced.

Date of Change: December 31, 1987

11) Instructions were provided to perform the testing, analysis and data reporting of the containment structure post-tensioning system (15 year surveillance). The following procedures were reviewed to ensure that the instructions contained in the procedures do not involve any unreviewed safety questions:

a)	the second se	18712-106-CP-1	Tendon	Surv	veillance	Procedure	for
	(Rev. 2)		Containme		Structure	Post-Tens	ioning
			System (U-	-3)			

b) Procedure 18712-106-CP-1 Tendon Surveillance Procedure for (Rev. 2) Containment Structure Post-Tensioning System (U-4)

Safety Evaluation Summary

The use of the mobile crane for lifting the platforms and rams and the use of the PSAs for tendon surveillance do not damage any safety related equipment. Lifted loads by use of safe load paths were prevented from affecting any safety related equipment design features, and additional testing was bounded by the existing Technical Specifications and remain within the limits of FSAR provisions. Therefore, the proposed procedural change will not increase the probability or consequences or an accident analyzed in the FSAR, nor will it impact the functioning of any safety related equipment important to safety. No new accident or malfunction of a different type will be created and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is decreased.

Date of Change: April 29, 1988

ii - 6

12) To standardize the setupint for auxiliary oil pump autostart switch (PS-*-3607), emergency oil pump DC autostart switch (PS-*-3608) and turning gear oil pump autostart switch (PS-*-3609), the following procedure change was submitted and reviewed:

AP 0150.3 Changing Setpoints

Safety Evaluation Summary

This setpoint change will be performed in a non nuclear safety related system in the secondary plant. It cannot affect the probability of equipment malfunction nor increase the consequences of any accident whether or not described in the FSAR. It cannot affect the consequences of equipment malfunction as described in the FSAR and it will not decrease the margin of safety of any Technical Specification.

This setpoint change does not create an unreviewed nuclear safety question.

Date of Change: June 23, 1988

(iii) TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS

This section contains the results and conclusions for special tests that were completed during the reporting period. Special tests still in progress at the end of the reporting period are also described.

No special tests were completed during the reporting period.

APPENDIX A

ANNUAL REPORT OF SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE CHALLENGES

By letter dated June 18, 1980 (L-80-186), Florida Power and Light stated the intent to comply with the requirements of item IIK.3.3 of Enclosure 3 to the commission's letter of May 7, 1980 (Five Additional TMI-2 Related Requirements for Operating Reactors).

The following is a list of safety valve and power operated relief valve (PGRV) actuations for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 from July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988.

PROCEDURE TITLE KEY

3-OP-041.4 and 4-OF-04	1.4 "Overpressure Mitigating System"
3-05P-041.4 and 4-05P	-041.4 "Overpressure Mitigating System Nitrogen Backup Leak and Purctional Test"
OP 0209.1	"Valve "Liciary Procedure"
Unit 3	
July 1, 1987	PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
July 24, 1987	PORV 455C and 156 were cycled per 3-OSP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
August 7, 1987	PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-CP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
August 11, 1987	PORV 455C was opened per OP 0209.1 after maintenance was performed to correct dual indication (limit switch out). PORV operation was satisfactory.

August 15, 1987 (0410 to 0510) 3-OSP-041.4 was performed satisfactorily, however, PORV 455C and 456 annunciators were locked in, eg...Annunciator A4/1 not cleared. Valves were open for a vent path per comments made in the procedure,

3-OP-041.4 was performed over the same time period. PORV 455C and 456 were cycled satisfactorily.

September 27, 1987 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OP-041.4 PORV operation was satisfactory.

PORV 455C and 456 were also cycled per CP 0209.1. PORV operation was satisfactory.

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 Report of Safety and Relief Valve Challenges

- October 6, 1987 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OP-041.4 PORV (0100 to 0200) operation was satisfactory. 3-OSP-041.1 was performed over the same time period. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- November 3, 1987 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OSP-041.4 PORV operation was satisfactory.
- December 8, 1987 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OSP-041.4 PORV operation was satisfactory.
- January 15, 1988 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OP-041.4 PORV operation was satisfactory. PORV 455C and 456 were also cycled per OP 0209.1. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- January 31, 1988 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OSP-041.4 PORV operation was satisfactory. PORV 455C and 456 were also cycled per 3-OP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- March 25, 1988 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 3-OP-041.4 PORV operation was satisfactory.

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 Report of Safety and Relief Valve Challenges

Unit 4

- October 13, 1987 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per OP 0209.1. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- October 19, 1987 PORV 456 was cycled per OP 0209.1 as part of postmaintenance testing. Valve was leaking through and required a spring bench adjustment. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- October 21, 1987 (0930 TO 2150) PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 4-OSP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory. 4-OP-041.4 was also performed on PORV 455C and 456 during this period. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- October 29, 1987 POR' 456 was cycled per OP 0209.1 as part of postmaintenance testing. Valve was leaking through and had the internals replaced. PORV operation was satisfactory. PORV 456 was also cycled per 4-OSP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- November 2, 1987 PORV 456 was cycled per OP 0209.1 as part of postmaintenance testing. Valve was leaking and was repacked. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- November 5, 1987 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 4-OSP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- November 20, 187 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 4-OP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- November 27, 1987 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 4-OP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- February 8, 1988 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 4-OP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- February 18, 1988 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per OP 0209.1. PORV operation was satisfactory.
- May 1, 1988 PORV 455C was cycled per 4-OSP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.

PORV 456 was not cycled during this procedure because MOV-4-535 (PORV stop valve) could not be closed. I and C Department was contacted for troubleshooting. Re: Plant Work Order C404738. PORV 456 was subsequently cycled per 4-OP-041.4 under OTSC 5850 which allowed a one-time-only test of PORV 456 with MD72-4-535 inoperable. PORV 456 operation was satisfactory.

May 4, 1988 POR! 155C and 456 were cycled per 4-OP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory.

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 Report of Safety and Relief Valve Challenges

May 6, 1988 PORV 455C and 456 were cycled per 4-OSP-041.4. PORV operation was satisfactory. PORV 455C and 456 were also cycled per OP 0209.1. PORV operation was satisfactory.

APPENDIX B

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS

Unit 3 steam generator tube inspection results for the inspection performed between June 8, 1987 and June 13, 1987. Unit 4 did not perform an inspection during this reporting period.

(This report was previously submitted in accordance with ASME code requirements.)

FORM NIS-88 OWNERS' DATA REPORT FOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION RESULTS As required by the provisions of the ASME Code Rules

page 1 of 7

PLANT: T	URKEY POINT NUC	LEAR POWER PL	ANT UNIT NO. 3	1				
EXAMINATIO	N DATES: J	UNE 8, 1987	THRU JU	WE 13, 1987				
STEAM SENERATOR NUMBER	TUBES		TIONS	TOTAL INDICATIONS > DR = TO 40% TO 1001				
E210A	324	(16)	2	0	0	0		
E2108	332	(8)	()'	0	0	0		
E210C	373	(15)	3	1	1 2+	3		
STEAM	AVB BARS	DR1/LED SUPPORT 1 THROUGH 6		TOP OF TUBE SHEET TO 1 DRILLED SUPPORT				
STEAM								
	-	HOT LEG	COLD LEG	HOT LEG	1 COLD LE			
E210A	0	(7) 0	(6) 2	(1) 0	(2) 0			
E2108	(1)	(3) 2	(2) 1	(2) 1	: (0) 0			
E210C	(3)	(5) 1	(5) 1	(2) 1	1 (0) 1			
		*********		*****	******			
				ON OF RECORD		11 1		
	ce with the req				getter mere tester fi	iii tengu		
				FLORIDA POWER	and LISHT COMPANY			
				Organ	ization)			
Date: 8/2	alaz	By:	.1	Y C	_			
8/2	6/0/		-	1-ran				

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STEAM GENERATOR TUBES PLUGGED page 2 of 7									
STEAM GENERATOR JE210A			STEAM GENERATOR 3E210B			STEAM GENERATOR 3E210C			
RON	COLUMN	REMARKS	ROW	COLUMN	REMARKS	ROW	COLUMN	REMARKS	
0	0	*********	0	0		7	5	SHORT TUBE	
		************	*******			7	13	SHORT TUBE	
*****		*****				14	84		
		*********					********		
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FORM NIS-B8 OWNERS' DATA REPORT FOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION RESULTS As required by the provisions of the ASME Code Rules

page 3 of 7 EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION RESULTS PLANT: TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 3 STEAM GENERATOR: 3E210A EXAMINATION DATES: JUNE 8, 1987 THRU JUNE 13, 1987 ------1 I TUBE WALL ROW : COLUMN : PENETRATION :-ORIGIN LOCATION 28 1 20 12 : HOT LES ABOVE FIRST SUPPORT -----...... 37 1 21 11 : HOT LES ABOVE SIITH SUPPORT ------..... ----37 1 22 : HOT LES 1 13 ABOVE SIITH SUPPORT 17 : 32 19 1 COLD LES ABOVE FIRST SUPPORT and and an 37 1 35 11 I HOT LEG ABOVE SIITH SUPPORT ****** ******** 23 1 48 4 : COLD LES SLUDGE PILE annes because ***** ------...... 15 55 1 15 : COLD LEG SLUDGE PILE 13 SLUDGE PILE 9 : 59 11 I HOT LES ADOVE THIRD SUPPORT 15 29 1 59 8 : COLD LES ABOVE FIFTH SUPPORT 9 1 60 19 : HOT LES ABOVE SIITH SUPPORT 22 : 60 13 : COLD LEG ABOVE THIRD SUPPORT 27 1 63 7 : COLD LES ABOVE FIRST SUPPORT 1 40 : 63 2 : COLD LES ABOVE THIRD SUPPORT

HOT LES (INLET)

COLD LEG (OUTLET)

FORM NIS-BB OWNERS' DATA REPORT FOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION RESULTS As required by the provisions of the ASME Code Rules page 4 of 7

			DWER PLANT UNIT NO. 3 STEAM 1 1987 THRU JUNE	
		I TUBE WALL	DRIGIN	LOCATION
4	74	19	HOT LEG	ABOVE THIRD SUPPORT
29	59	37	COLD LEG	ABOVE FIFTH SUPPORT
33	77	27	COLD LES	ABOVE SIXTH SUPPORT
1		1		······
1		**************************************		

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FORM NIS-88 OWNERS	DATA REPORT FOR EDDY	CURRENT EXAMINATION	RESULTS
As require	by the provisions of	the ASME Code Rules	0400 S 0

PLANT	: TURKEY	POINT NUCLEAR P	DWER PLANT UNIT NO. 3 STEAM	GENERATOR: JE210B
EIAMI	NATION DATES	5: JUNE 8,	1987 THRU JUNE	13, 1987
RON		I I TUBE MALL PENETRATION	ORIGIN	LOCATION
5	8	12	HOT LEB	ANOVE BAFFLE
28 1	14	11	HOT LEG	ABOVE FIRST SUPPORT
39	25	6	HOT LEB	U-BEND
40 1	25	10	COLD LES	ABOVE FLETH SUPPORT
13	29	11	HOT LEB	ABOVE FOURTH SUPPORT
12	38	13	HOT LES	SLUDGE PILE
45	45	6	HOT LES	ABOVE FIFTH SUPPORT
5	8	22	HOT LES	ABOVE FOURTH SUPPORT
12	37	27	HOT LEG	SLUDGE PILE
44 1	39	36	COLD LEG	ABOVE FIFTH SUPPORT
43	41	29	HOT LEB	ABOVE FIFTH SUPPORT
1				

		STEAM 8	SENERATOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMIN	ATION RESULTS
PLAN	T: TURKEY	POINT NUCLEAR PO	DWER PLANT UNIT NO. 3 STEAM	GENERATOR: SE210C
EIAM	INATION DATES	S: JUNE 8,	, 1987 THRU JUN	E 13, 1987
RON		I TUBE WALL PENETRATION	ORIGIN	LOCATION
2	2	11	HOT LEG	ABOVE FIRST SUPPORT
37	21	,	HOT LEB	U-BEND
40	25	18	HOT LES	ป-BEND
27	30	15	HOT LEG	U-BEND
31	32	3	COLD LEG	ABOVE FOURTH SUPPORT
2	35	2	HOT LEG	SLUDGE PILE ABOVE SECOND SUPPORT
22	36	19	HOT LES	ABOVE FOURTH SUPPORT
45	44	17	HOT LEB	ABOVE FOURTH SUPPORT
28	58	11	HOT LES	ABOVE FIRST SUPPORT
28	58	8	COLD LEG	ABOVE FIRST SUPPORT
40	64	13	HOT LES	ABOVE SINTH SUPPORT
22	67	15	COLD LEG	ABOVE FOURTH SUPPORT
20	77	1 19	COLD LE6	ABOVE FIFTH SUPPORT

FORM NIS-BE OWNERS' DATA REPORT FOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION RESULTS

6

FORM MIS-BB OWNERS' DATA REPORT FOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION RESULTS As required by the provisions of the ASME Code Rules page 7 of 7

PLANT: TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 3 STEAM GENERATOR: 3E210C EXAMINATION DATES: JUNE 8, 1987 THRU JUNE 13, 1987							
	•••••	I I TUBE WALL	ORIGIN	LOCATION			
5	1	38	A CONTRACTOR OF	ABOVE FIFTH SUPPORT			
7	13	36	HOT LES	SLUDGE PILE			
3	88	28	1	ABOVE BAFFLE			
1							

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APPENDIX C

RELOAD SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY

Turkey Point Unit 3 is operating in Cycle 10 with 112 Westinghouse optimized fuel assemblies and 45 Westinghouse 15 x 15 low parasitic (LOPAR) fuel assemblies. For Cycle 11 (expected startup mid-May, 1987) and subsequent cycles, it is planned to refuel the Turkey Point Unit 3 core with Westinghouse 15 x 15 optimized fuel assembly (OFA) regions. In a licensing submittal to the NRC, approval was requested and later received for the transition from LOPAR fuel to OFA and the associated proposed changes to the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications. The licensing submittal justified the compatibility of Optimized Fuel Assemblies (OFAs) with LOPAR fuel assemblies in a mixed-fuel core as well as a full OFA core. The licensing submittal contained mechanical, nuclear, thermal-hydraulic, and accident evaluations which are also applicable to the Cycle 11 safety evaluation. Approval of the license application for the OFA transition was granted by the NRC in a SER, dated December 9, 1983.

A significant number of Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) rods are being used for the first time in Turkey Point Unit 3* as part of the Region 13C and 13D fuel assemblies. A more detailed description and evaluation of IFBAs for 14 x 14, 15 x 15 and 17 x 17 fuel arrays are given in WCAP-10445-NP-A. The NRC has approved the use of IFBAs for Westinghouse fuel rods in 15 x 15 fuel assemblies.

The effects of the reload on the design basis and postulated incidents analyzed in the FSAR have been examined. In all cases, it was found that the effects can be accommodated within the conservatism of the initial assumptions used in the previous applicable safety analysis.

*Turkey Point Unit 3 did have demonstration IFBA rods in Cycles 8 and 9.

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SEPTEMBER 1 1988

L-88-366

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 10 CFR 50.59 Report

Florida Power & Light Company's Report on "Changes, Tests and Experiments Made Without Prior Commission Approval" for the period July 1, 1987 through June 30, 1988 is attached.

Very truly yours,

Wyenvo

W. F. Conway Senior Vice President - Nuclear

WFC/SDF/gp

Attachment

CC: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

SDFCFR.RPT