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September 24, 1998

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-317
1998 Refueling Outage; Summary of Completed Licensing Actions

Attachment (1) summarizes various open licensing actions for Baltimore Gas and Electric Company that were completed during the Unit 1 Refueling Outage, ending in June 8, 1998.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

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CHC/CDS/dlm

Attachment: 1998 Refueling Outage Summary

cc: R. S. Fleishman, Esquire
J. E. Silberg, Esquire
S. S. Bajwa, NRC
A. W. Dromerick, NRC

H. J. Miller, NRC
Resident Inspector, NRC
R. I. McLean, DNR
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ATTACHMENT (1)

1998 REFUELING OUTAGE SUMMARY

**Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant - Unit 1
September 24, 1998**

ATTACHMENT (1)

1998 REFUELING OUTAGE SUMMARY

SUBJECT: Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves (TAC Nos. M93444 and M93445)

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated February 13, 1996, 180-Day Response to NRC Generic Letter 95-07: Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves

During the 1998 refueling outage, we completed modifications to Unit 1 shutdown cooling return isolation valves (MOVs 651 and 652) to ensure they are not susceptible to pressure locking. This completes the action required for these valves.

SUBJECT: License Amendment Request: Use of Blind Flanges in Place of the Containment Purge Valves During Operation for Unit 1 (TAC No. M96515)

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse to NRC Document Control Desk, dated August 1, 1996, License Amendment Request: Use of Blind Flanges in Place of the Containment Purge Valves During Operation for Unit 1 (TAC No. M96515)

During the 1998 refueling outage, we modified the Unit 1 containment purge system. The modification consisted of installation of blind flanges in place of containment purge valves. The blind flanges establish containment integrity in Mode 5 prior to entering Mode 4 and maintain it in Modes 1-4. The subject containment integrity function was previously serviced by containment purge valves.

SUBJECT: Generic Letter 96-05; Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated March 13, 1997; 180-Day Response to Generic Letter 96-05; Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves

Calvert Cliffs has implemented the Motor-Operated Valve Joint Owners Group (JOG) methodology and completed two scheduled differential pressure tests for the 1998 refueling outage. Additional testing is scheduled through the 2003 outage per the JOG methodology. The JOG requirements have been captured in the controlling procedures for motor-operated valves.

ATTACHMENT (1)

1998 REFUELING OUTAGE SUMMARY

SUBJECT: Generic Letter 96-06; Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated January 28, 1997, 120-Day Response to Generic Letter 96-06; Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions

To resolve overpressurization concerns for piping that penetrates containment, we committed to install a pressure relief device or add insulation to the piping section of the reactor coolant pump seal control bleed-off lines that may be exposed to loss-of-coolant accident temperatures. During the 1998 refueling outage, insulation was added to the piping section between 1-CVC-506 and penetration 1C. This piping section is now adequately protected from overpressurization during a loss-of-coolant accident.

SUBJECT: Relief Request from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Requirements to Delay Repair of a Leak in a Piping Support Attachment on the Safety Injection Recirculation Piping (TAC Nos. M97438)

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated December 19, 1996; Request for Temporary Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Requirements IWA-5250

Letter from Mr. S. S. Bajwa (NRC) to Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE), dated February 7, 1997; Relief Request from American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Requirements to Delay Repair of Leak in a Piping Support Attachment on the Safety Injection Recirculation Piping, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (TAC No. M97438)

The weld defect in the Unit 1 safety injection miniflow piping was repaired during the 1998 refueling outage.

ATTACHMENT (1)

1998 REFUELING OUTAGE SUMMARY

SUBJECT: License Renewal - System 064, Reactor Pressure Vessel and Control Rod Drive Mechanism

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated July 30, 1997; Request for Review and Approval of Reactor Pressure Vessels and Control Element Drive Mechanism/Electrical System Report for License Renewal

In the referenced License Renewal submittal, we indicated that, during the next scheduled reactor pressure vessel inservice inspection, we would locate and remove a suction deflector capscrew and locking bar from a 1996 reactor coolant pump suction deflector failure and examine the affected area.

The reactor coolant pump suction deflector capscrew and locking bar were recovered during the refueling outage. The locking bar was found on the core support plate and the capscrew was found on the reactor vessel bottom head. No damage was evident from this debris.

SUBJECT: Relief Request: Performance Demonstration Initiative Program - Reactor Pressure Vessel Ten-Year Inservice Inspection

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated October 14, 1997; Reactor Pressure Vessel Second Ten-Year Inservice Inspection - Relief Request to Use Performance Demonstration Initiative Program as an Alternative to Code Requirement

As stated in the referenced letter, the reactor pressure vessel inspection was performed in accordance with the Performance Demonstration Initiative Program. The inspections satisfied 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) augmented reactor pressure vessel inspection requirements.

SUBJECT: License Amendment Request - 4kV Undervoltage Relay Setpoints (TAC Nos. M99849 and 99850)

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated October 22, 1997, License Amendment Request - 4kV Undervoltage Relay Setpoints

Letter from Mr. A. W. Dromerick (NRC) to Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE), dated March 17, 1998, Issuance of Amendment for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1 (TAC No. M99849) and Unit No. 2 (TAC No. M99850).

The 4kV undervoltage setpoints have been modified to incorporate both steady state and transient degraded voltage setpoints. The 4kV voltage range of the emergency diesel generators has been decreased to assure the new steady state degraded voltage relays are not actuated during testing.

ATTACHMENT (1)

1998 REFUELING OUTAGE SUMMARY

SUBJECT: License Amendment - Emergency Diesel Generator Upgrade (No. 1B)

REFERENCE: Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated October 2, 1997; License Amendment Request; Upgrade of No. 1B Emergency Diesel Generator

Letter from Mr. A. W. Dromerick (NRC) to Mr. C. H. Cruse, dated January 5, 1998, Issuance of Amendment for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 (TAC No. M99789)

In accordance with the amendment, Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1B has been modified to increase its rated capacity from 2700kW to 3000kW. Appropriate plant procedures were revised and implemented to return Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1B to an operable status at 3000kW prior to the end of the 1998 Unit 1 refueling outage.
