

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station
P. O. Box 402
Mineral, Virginia 23117

September 22, 1998

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Serial No.: 98-550
NAPS: MPW
Docket No.: 50-338
License No.: NPF-4


Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 1.

Report No. 50-338/98-004-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours,


W. R. Matthews
Site Vice President

Commitments contained in this letter: None

Enclosure

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Mr. M. J. Morgan
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (1-6133), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000338

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE MISSED SURVEILLANCE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCUMENT NUMBER
09	02	98	98	004	00	09	22	98	FACILITY NAME	05000
									FACILITY NAME	05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)				
1	100%	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	or in NRC Form 366A

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

W. R. Matthews, Site Vice President

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(540) 894-2101

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 2, 1998, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, it was determined that two boron injection tank (BIT) outlet isolation valves were not tested in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.5. The TS requires inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves. During a change to the testing frequency for the BIT inlet isolation valves the outlet valves were removed from the procedure without another procedure in place to ensure required testing was accomplished. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

The cause of the missed surveillance is due to personnel error during the procedure revision process. Since both BIT outlet isolation valves tested satisfactorily on September 2, 1998 and had tested satisfactorily on the previous PT, the valves would have performed their design function during the period of the missed surveillance. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station, Unit 1	DOCKET 05000338	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3) 2 OF 3
		YEAR 98	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER -- 004 --	REVISION NUMBER 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

Technical Specification 4.0.5 requires inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted. Five ASME Code Class 2 valves (two inlet, two outlet and one check valve for the boron injection tank) included in the Inservice Testing program had a test frequency of once every three months or following valve maintenance. Relief from the testing frequency was initiated since testing the inlet valves during power operations was causing a significant hydraulic transient in the boron injection tank (BIT) (EIS Component-TK, System- BQ) and the reactor coolant pump seal injection system (EIS Component-P, System- AB). As such, an Inservice Inspection Program (ISI) Change was developed to change testing of the two BIT inlet isolation valves (EIS Component-ISV) and the BIT inlet recirculation header check valve (EIS Component-ISV) from quarterly to once every cold shutdown, but not more frequently than every three months. The relief request was subsequently approved to perform full stroke testing during cold shutdown.

With the approval of the relief request, a change to the implementing test procedure was necessary. The existing periodic test procedure (PT) was deleted and a new PT was developed to coincide with the numbering system used for cold shutdown PTs. During the procedure change process the two BIT outlet isolation valves were removed from the cold shutdown PT since they were not included in the approved ISI Program Change. At this point it was noted that a new PT was needed to test the outlet isolation valves however, it was not pursued. The cold shutdown PT was subsequently approved.

On July 28, 1998, the period to complete the TS surveillance test on the two BIT outlet isolation valves expired. During a review of the Unit 1 Refueling Outage test procedures it was noted that the two BIT outlet isolation valves were not covered by a PT. On September 2, 1998, at 1419 hours the station entered the 24 hour action of TS 4.0.3 and a deviation report was submitted to identify the missed surveillance. A new PT was developed and the valves were tested satisfactorily that day. The 24 hour action was cleared at 2013 hours on September 2, 1998.

2. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

Since both BIT outlet isolation valves tested satisfactorily on September 2, 1998 and had tested satisfactorily on the previous PT, the valves would have performed their design function during the period of the missed surveillance. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

3.0 CAUSE

Cause of the missed surveillance was due to inadequate revision of the periodic test procedure. Cause of the inadequate PT was due to personnel error during the procedure change process. Failure to ensure a procedure existed to test the two BIT outlet isolation valves when they were being deleted from the cold shutdown PT resulted in the missed surveillance.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

The station entered the 24 hour action of TS 4.0.3 and a station deviation report was initiated to document the condition. A PT was developed and the BIT outlet isolation valves were tested satisfactorily.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Once the BIT outlet isolation valves were satisfactorily tested no other actions were necessary. Unit 2 requirements were reviewed and were noted to be different than Unit 1. Unit 2 TS do not require testing the BIT outlet isolation valves at power.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

Based on a review of previously submitted LER's this event appears to be an isolated incident and no further actions are required.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS

A review of LER's written since 1984 did not identify any cases where TS requirements for IST Program tests were deleted from the controlling PT procedures resulting in a missed surveillance.

8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Unit 2 was operating at 100% and was not affected by this event.