

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) H. B. Robinson, Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)  
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation During Plant Cooldown

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	30	86	86	006	00						0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) \_\_\_\_\_

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME George Honma	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 8 0 1 3   3 1 8 3 1 - 4 5 1 2 4
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 30, 1986, Plant cooldown was in progress from hot shutdown to cold shutdown in accordance with the Plant General Procedure (GP-007) in preparation for a refueling outage. At 1117 hours, a reactor trip (shutdown banks withdrawn during cooldown) was initiated as a result of an automatic actuation of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF). The ESF Actuation was initiated by a High Steam Line Differential Pressure Safety Injection (SI) signal from the "C" Steam Generator (S/G). The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown reduced the primary system temperature sufficiently to allow steam generator pressure to drop at least 100 psi below the 585 psig Steam Header bias. The Steam Header bias provides an artificial signal for purposes of steam line break protection when the main steam isolation valves are closed. Through oversight, the operator failed to block the SI feature as directed by GP-007.

At the time of the event, RCS pressure was above the shutoff head of the SI pumps; therefore, no SI flow entered the RCS. An Unusual Event was declared at 1125 hours.

The Plant was stabilized, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 1152 hours. Plant cooldown in accordance with the Plant General Procedure was resumed. The operator was counseled for his actions in the event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 6	- 0 0 6	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 30, 1986, Plant cooldown was in progress from hot shutdown to cold shutdown in accordance with the Plant General Procedure (GP-007) in preparation for a refueling outage. At 1117 hours, a reactor trip (shutdown banks withdrawn during cooldown) was initiated as a result of an automatic actuation of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF). An Unusual Event was declared at 1125 hours.

The ESF Actuation was initiated by a High Steam Line Differential Pressure Safety Injection (SI) signal from the "C" Steam Generator (S/G). The RCS cooldown reduced the primary system temperature sufficiently to allow steam generator pressure to drop at least 100 psi below the 585 psig Steam Header bias. The Steam Header Pressure bias provides an artificial signal for purposes of steam line break protection when the main steam isolation valves are closed.

GP-007 provides instructions and precautions to the operator to block the SI feature prior to achieving the setpoint conditions during the cooldown. However, through oversight, the operator failed to block the SI feature. At the time of the event, RCS pressure was above the shutoff head of the SI pumps; therefore, no SI flow entered the RCS.

The Plant was stabilized, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 1152 hours. The Plant cooldown in accordance with the Plant General Procedure was resumed.

Cause/Corrective Action

The Operator involved in this event acknowledged the oversight, and was counseled for his actions. Additionally, procedural enhancements have been identified and will be implemented to aid the operator in assuring this SI feature is blocked at the proper time.



Carolina Power & Light Company

Company Correspondence

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT  
POST OFFICE BOX 790  
HARTSVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA 29550

FEB 19 1980

Robinson File No: 13510C

Serial: RNP/86-742

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-261  
LICENSE NO. DPR-23  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 86-06

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirements for a written report within (30) days of a reportable event and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours,

R. E. Morgan  
General Manager  
H. B. Robinson S. E. Plant

SAG:ac

Enclosure

cc: INPO  
H. E. P. Krug  
J. N. Grace

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