NRC FORM 366 (MMM-YYYY)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

' (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

20503. If a document used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, Information collection. Docket Number (2)

05000-361

estimate

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FACILITY NAME (1)

San Onofre Muclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 2

TITLE (4): Manual Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Actuation

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6)					ER (6)	REPORT DATE			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIA NUMBER	AL REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME None	DOCKET NUMBER		
08	28	1998	1998	017	00	09	22	1998	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER		

OPERATING	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check One or More) (11)									
MODE		20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)	7	50.73(a)(2)(viii)				
POWER	100	20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)				
LEVEL (10)		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71				
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER				
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50,36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	Sp	ecify in Abstract below				
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	02	in NRC Form 366A				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES MM/DD/YYYY Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatary information collection request 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the

licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC

to the information and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33) U.S.

R.W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation

949 368-6255

C	OMPLETE	ONE LINE	FOR	EACH	COMPON	ENT	FAILU	RE DESC	RIBED IN	THIS	REPOR	r (13)
CAUSE				CTURER		LE			COMPONENT			REPORTABLE TO EPIX
	SUPI	PLEMENTAL I	REPORT	EXPE	TED (14)			EXI	PECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)					1	x	No	SUBMISSION DATE (15)				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines (16)

On August 28, 1998, at about 1840 PDT, an operator investigated a faint chlorine odor and discovered a line from sulfuric acid storage tank 2T194 was leaking. Acid from the tank was spraying into the bermed area surrounding the adjacent sodium hypochlorite and lube oil vault - white smoke and chlorine gas odor were observed in the bermed area. Upon discovery, the immediate area was evacuated and barricaded with flagging and postings. As a precautionary measure, at 1921 PDT, control room operators manually isolated the control room air intake by actuating the control room Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS). In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii), SCE reported this event to the NRC at 2225 PDT. SCE is submitting this 30 day follow-up report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). To repair the acid leak, SCE has weld repaired the affected areas of tank 2T194. SCE is planning an inspection of the unit 3 bulk acid storage tank and will weld repair any damaged areas identified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) 05000-361 2 OF 3 1998 -- 017 00

Plant:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 2

Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering

Event Date:

August 28, 1998

Event Time:

7:21 p.m.

Mode:

Mode 1 - "Normal Operations"

Power:

100%

Description of Event:

On August 28, 1998, at about 1840 PDT, an operator [utility, non-licensed] noticed a faint chlorine odor while standing outside the control building. The operator investigated the odor and discovered a line from sulfuric acid storage tank 2T194 was leaking. Acid from the tank was spraying into the bermed area surrounding the adjacent sodium hypochlorite and lube oil vault—white smoke and chlorine gas odor were observed in the bermed area. SCE immediately began evacuating the area surrounding the tanks and isolated the nitrogen supply to the 2T194 tank (to reduce tank pressure and the acid leak). As a precautionary measure, at 1921 PDT, control room operators (utility, licensed) manually isolated the control room air intake by actuating the control room Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS). In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii), SCE reported this event to the NRC at 2225 PDT. SCE is submitting this 30 day follow-up report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Cause of the Event:

This event (manual actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature) was a precautionary action taken by plant operators in response to the sulfuric acid leak. Chlorine fumes were caused by the reaction between the leaking sulfuric acid and residual sodium hypochlorite in the bermed area surrounding the sodium hypochlorite tank.

Sulfuric Acid leaked from a hole on the manway nozzle of tank 2T194. SCE found circumferential grooving leading to a single deep crevice at the apex of the inside top surface of the manway nozzle. The grooving continued vertically approximately 14 inches along the tank shell. This is similar to the hydrogen grooving phenomenon previously reported by the National Association of Corrosion Engineers. The leak developed where the single groove at the top of the nozzle penetrated the nozzle tube adjacent to the tank shell. Following an examination of tank 2T194, SCE found no other indications of localized corrosion, pitting or porosity in the base metal or welds.

Corrective Actions:

- Upon discovery, the immediate area was evacuated and barricaded with flagging and postings.
- 2. Emergency response personnel donned SCBAs and Level B personnel protective equipment for splash protection and entered the area to identify and evaluate the leak.
- 3. As a precautionary measure, the TGIS was manually actuated.
- 4. SCE weld repaired the affected areas of tank 2T194.
- 5. SCE is planning an inspection of the unit 3 bulk acid storage tank and will weld repair any damaged areas identified.

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FACII	DOCKET		LER NUMBER	(6)	PAGE (3)	
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Unit 2	seneracing beating (50M35)	00000 301	1998 017		00	

6. Evaluations will be performed to mitigate the long term effects of hydrogen grooving.

Safety Significance:

The manual TGIS actuation was precautionary and not the result of high concentrations of toxic gas, and all TGIS components functioned correctly. Therefore, there was no safety significance associated with this event.

Additional Information:

In the past three years, there have been no manual or automatic TGIS actuation initiated or required by actual plant conditions.