(RC For 9-8,3)	n 366				LIC	ENSE	E EVE	NT RE	PORT	(LER)		LEAR REGULATO	
ACILIT	-	0								0	OCKET NUMBER	2)	PAGE (3)
-		PL	ANT V	OGTLE - L	JNIT 1					(15 0 0 1	0 4 2 4	1 OF 0 15
		CTOR	TRIP	DUE TO LI	GHTNING	STRI	KE						
EV	ENT DATE			LER NUMBER		_	PORT DATE	E (7)		OTHER P	ACILITIES INVOL	VED (8)	
NONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR.	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		FACILITY NAM	es	DOCKET NUMBER	R(\$)
								-				0 5 0 0	10111
17	311	88	8 8	- 0/2/5	- 010	0 8	219	8 8				0 1510 10	
OPE	RATING				-		EQUIREME		CFR \$: /0	Check one or more o	and the second se	the second se	101 1 1
	ODE (9)	1	20.4	02(6)		20.406	ei		X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWE				06(a)(1)(i)	-	80.381c				50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
(10)	10.1	116		05(a)(1)(ii) 05(a)(1)(iii)		50.38(c			-	50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A		Delow and in 368.4	
			20.4	06(a)(1)(iv)		80.734			-	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8		2004	
			20.4	06(a)(1)(v)		50.734)(2)()))		_	50.73(a)(2)(x)			
AME					L	ICENSEE	CONTACT	FOR THIS	LER (12)				
											AREA CODE	TELEPHONE NUM	861
	J.	E. SV	wartzw	elder, Nu	Iclear Sa	afety	and	Comp1	iance	Manager	41014	812161-	13 16111
				COMPLETE	ONE LINE FOR	EACH C	OMPONENT	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPORT	T (13)		
AUSE	USE SYSTEM COMPONEN		COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABL			CAUSE			SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
В	ALA	IR	JIX	111	N			В	ILA	EICIBID	111	N	
C	ALA	EIC	BID	1.1.1	N				l mi	1.1.1	111		
				BUPPLEM	ENTAL REPORT	EXPECT	ED (14)		4		EXPECTE	MONTH	DAY YEA
						-	-				SUBMISSIC DATE IT	DN NC	2.00.
10				DIOXIMATELY IITEE		written lin	NO 140/ (16)						3 10 8 18
	a tr ir Ar st al pl ma oi	reac ne Au n acc n inv rike lowi ant ijor an	tor tr xilian ordance estiga shutc ng the system impact evalua	rip occur ry Feedwa ce with p ation rev down the e rods to ns were a t on plan	red. Th ter syst lant pro ealed th output o drop in ffected t operat the plan	e Ma em ac cedun at tl f the to the by th ions t sun	in Fee ctuate res. ne ele cont ne lig . Cor rge pr	dwate d. C ctric rol R e, ac htnin recti	r sys ontro al su od Dr desi g str ve ac	ntainment tem was is 1 room per rge from t ive Mechan gned. Set ike but t tion inclu o determin	solated an rsonnel r the light nism powe veral oth nese had udes perfo	nd esponded r supplie er no ormance	\$
		880 PDR	90700 ADI	021 8808 DCK 0500	329							TEA	12.
		2			PDČ								

.

.

LICENSEE F	EVENT	REPORT (L	ER)	TEXT	CONTINUATION
------------	-------	-----------	-----	------	--------------

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	L	ER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			
PLANT VOGTLE - UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 4	8 8 -	01215 - 010	012 050 15		

REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned actuation of the Reactor Protection System occurred.

Β. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at 16% rated thermal power. There was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On July 31, 1988 at 2014 CDT, the control room operators observed a flash on the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Computer screens, a blink of the control room overhead lights, and a subsequent automatic reactor trip. Control rods inserted and an annunciator indicated the reactor trip was the result of the nuclear instrumentation system sensing a high flux rate power range excursion (negative rate). The Main Feedwater system was isolated and the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated. Control room personnel responded appropriately and in accordance with plant procedures. Eyewitnesses contacting the control room reported that lightning had struck the low voltage switchyard and the containment building, then spread to various other power block buildings. No fires or obvious lightning damage were noticed. However, immediately after the lightning strike, the ERF computer became inoperable and the Security system primary computer and the Fire Protection system computer alarmed. There were no abnormal control room indications during the plant shutdown except that a low pressurizer pressure bistable spuriously alarmed.

After this event, an investigative team was formed and began troubleshooting. Several items were reviewed. One of these items attempted to find a correlation between the lightning strike and the failed components, specifically, the nuclear instrumentation system. It was speculated that the reactor trip was caused by a disturbance in the nuclear instrumentation, creating a spike and providing a simulated high negative flux rate. However, no correlation was found. Based on these findings, an attempt to move control rods was made to verify rod operability with no response by the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM). Therefore, troubleshooting of the CRDM and associated logic cabinets began. The effort revealed that the electrical surge from the lightning strike had caused the CRDM positive 24 volt DC and negative 24 volt DC power supplies to automatically shut down. These power supplies are designed to shut off their output whenever an excessive output voltage is sensed, and cannot be reset without first de-energizing the input, then re-energizing the input. All power supplies in the CRDM power supply cabinets were reset. Loss of these power supplies had caused power interruption to the CRDM thyristors, allowing the rods to drop into the core. After resetting the CRDM power supplies and replacing a Supervisory Logic III card (which was damaged as a result of the lightning strike), a control rod operability test was performed, and the rods responded as designed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REBULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OM8 NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: #/31.88

FACILITY NAME IT	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)			
		VILAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER				
PLANT VOGTLE - UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 4	8:8 - 025 - 010	013 OF 015			
TEXT /# more rysce is required, use additional NRC Form 3664's/ (17)	and the second	the state of the s				

During the CRDM troubleshooting, a 100 volt DC power supply in the logic cabinet was found to be defective and was replaced. This power supply is auctioneered with another redundant 100 volt DC power supply and therefore, it did not have any effect on this event.

Additionally, when the primary Security system computer shutdown, the back-up computer exhibited perturbations, but these did not affect system operability. They were caused by a circuit board which was apparently defective prior to the lightning strike.

On August 1, 1988, prior to beginning restart of the unit, the containment building was visually inspected for lighting damage (burn marks, lightning rods and ground wire integrity, etc.) The main generator controls were checked. The ERF, Security, and Fire Protection computers were verified operable. Visual inspections were performed in the unit protection cabinets (Process Control System and Solid State Protection System), to verify no power supplies were damaged. On August 2, 1988, the low pressurizer pressure instrumentation channel was tested and shown to be operable. In addition, a Solid State Protection System operability test was performed on August 9, 1988, and revealed no problems.

On August 11, 1988, an inspection found that the Containment building lightning protection did not meet design criteria because only one down conductor had been connected to the station ground grid. The existing down conductor was found to be undamaged after this event. A thorough review of the containment lightning protection is in progress.

D. CAUS OF EVENT

The direct cause of this event is attributed to a lightning strike which resulted in an electrical surge in several plant area which caused computers to shut down, CRDM power supplies to shut down, and a subsequent reactor trip.

The root cause of this event is not definitively known at this time. A supplemental report will be submitted to discuss the root cause.

C Form 366A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.J. NUCLEAR REGULATION COMMISSIO

A	HUY	20	- 4	MB	NO.	-90	N 1	
EVE			44	18.4				

FACILITY HAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	T	LEP NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)			
	计推荐性心 法被理任	YEA	•	NUMB	TIAL ER	1	NUMBER		T	T		
PLANT WOGTLE - UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 2	818	8	012	15	-	010	01	4	DF	01	5

E. AMALYSIS OF EVENT

Fram 206.4

Immediately after the reactor trip, the Main Feedwater Pump A was manually tripped (Pump B was already tripped), which in turn initiated an automatic start of the A and B Train Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The reactor trip breakers opened, main steam isolation valves closed, and the main generator tripped as designed. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that there was no adverse effect on plant safety or public health and safety as a result of this event. Because safety systems performed as designed, the results of this event would not have been more severe had it occurred at a higher power level.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- A 100 volt DC power supply and a supervisory logic card were replaced in the CRDM system.
- 2. A circuit board was replaced in the security system back-up computer.
- The Containment Bldg. lightning protection was inspected for damage and found to be satisfactory.
- The ERF computer, Fire Protection computer, low pressurizer pressure instrumentation channel, main generator countrols, Process Control system and Solid State Protection system were checked and found to be operable.
- A re-evaluation of the plant's lightning surge protection will be performed to determine if and what further corrective actions may be necessary. This is expected to be completed by October 1, 1988.
- Further corrective actions will be discussed in a supplemental LER.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORM-

- 1. Failed Components
 - a) CRDM 100 volt DC Power Supply manufactured by Westinghouse Electric. Part #LMCC100
 - b) CRDM Supervisory Logic Card manufactured by Westinghouse Electric. Part #3360CR0G01
 - c) Security computer circuit board manufactured by Computrol. Part #30-0056-1-1 Type: CDC Common Logic II

189C Form 386A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION													
FACILITY MAME (1)	and in the set of the	OOCKET NUMBER	(2)		T	LE	R NUME	ER (R)			PAGE (3)			
					YEAR		SEQUE	MAL SA	RENU	MBER		7	T	
PLANT VOGTLE -	UNIT 1	0 15 10 10	0 14 1	2 4	818	-	012	15.	_0	10	01	5 0	0	15
TELT IN more space & required, use add	Romal NRC Form Middl's) (57)						h d	*****		-			-	+
2.	Previous Similar	Events												
	None													
3	Energy Industry I	dentification (vetem	Code										
э.	chergy mousery i	denerricación	y s cem	cour	ç									
	Control Rod Drie Main Feedwater Sy Auxiliary Feedwat Containment Bldg Main Generator Sy Fire Protection S Security System - Switchyard System Solid State Prote Reactor Coolant S Process Control S Emergency Respons	stem - SJ er System - BA - NH stem - TB ystem - KP IA - FK ction System - ystem - AB ystem - JC												

Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526

1. 4. 4

Mailing Address Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30307

W. G. Hairston, III Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations

the southern electric system.

NON-00264

August 29, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

PLANT VOGTLE - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-424 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE

Gentlemen:

In accordence with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits a Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning a reactor trip due to lightning strike.

Sincerely,

C.K. M'GFOR

W. G. Hairston, FII

TEW:11h

Enclosure: LER 50-424/1988-025

c: <u>Georgia Power Company</u> Mr. P. D. Rice Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. Mr. M. Sheibani Mr. J. P. Kane GO-NORMS Vogtle/NORMS

> U. S. Nuclear Richatory Commission Dr. J. N. Grace, Legional Administrator Mr. J. B. Hopkins, Licensing Project Manager, NRR (2 copies) Mr. J. F. Rogge, Semior Resident Inspector - Operations, Vogtle