GE Nuclear Energy

JE09



• •

1997 - 1997 - 1997 1986 - 1996 - 1997 1987 - 1997 - 1998 - 1997

AUGUST 24, 1988

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION DIVISION OF REACTOR INSPECTION AND SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC 20555

ATTENTION: E. WILLIAM BRACH, CHIEF VENDOR INSPECTION BRANCH

REFERENCE: NRC LETTER - DOCKET 99900403/88-01 AUGUST 4, 1988

DEAR MR. BRACH:

THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR AUGUST 4, 1988 LETTER WHICH CONTAINED THE RESULTS OF THE NRC INSPECTION AT GE NUCLEAP ENERGY FACILITIES IN SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA DURING THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 1-10, 1988. THE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, B. WOLFE, HAS REQUESTED THAT I RESPOND TO YOUR LETTER ON HIS BEHALF.

THE INSPECTION REPORT IDENTIFIES ONE NONCONFORMANCE. THE STATEMENT OF NONCONFORMANCE AND OUR RESPONSE IS CONTAINED IN THE ATTACHMENT TO THIS LETTER.

SINCERELY,

T. m. Jase

J. M. CASE, MANAGER NUCLEAR QUALITY ASSURANCE

MW ATTACHMENT

CC: B. WOLFE

8609020226 880824 PDR 04999 EMVGENE 99900403 PNU

## ATTACHMENT

AUGUST 24, 1988 PAGE 1 OF 1

## NRC STATEMENT OF NONCONFORMANCE

CONTRARY TO SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF GE TOPICAL REPORT NEDO-11209-04A, AND GE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEDURE QAP 2.4 AND 2.7, GE PROCURED 100 REPLACEMENT METRIC PHILLIPS FLAT MEAD SCREWS FOR USE IN THE REACTOR MODE SWITCH HOUSING ASSEMBLY WITHOUT PURCHASE DOCUMENTS AND WITH NO VERIFICATION OF THE QUALITY OF THE MATERIAL RECEIVED BY INCOMING RECEIPT INSPECTION. (REFER TO NONCONFORMANCE NO. 88-01-01.)

## GE RESPONSE TO NONCONFORMANCE

THE 100 FLAT HEAD SCREWS WERE PURCHASED ON 3-31-80 BY THE RESPONSIBLE MODE SWITCH DESIGN ENGINEER (MR. MILAM) WITHOUT A WRITTEN GE SPECIFICATION OR PURCHASE ORDER AND WITHOUT A RECEIVING INSPECTION BY OWALITY ASSURANCE. GE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS ACTION WAS IN TECHNICAL NONCONFORMANCE WITH GE PROCEDURES; HOWEVER, THE RESPONSIBLE ENGINEER TOOK PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VERIFICATION OF THE ADEOLACY AND OWALITY OF THE MATERIAL RECEIVED, AND TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION TO FORMALLY DOCUMENT THE FLAT HEAD SCREW REQUIREMENTS ON A GE DRAWING SO THAT SUBSEQUENT PURCHASES COULD BE MADE IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH GE PROCEDURES. OC INSPECTION AT SWITCH/CAN ASSEMBLY AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF QUALIFICATION TEST ASSURED ADEOLACY OF THE SCREWS FOR THEIR FUNCTION IN THE MODE SWITCH.

SUBSEQUENTLY, THE MODE SWITCH DESIGN WAS CHANGED (IN 1983) TO DISCONTINUE USE OF THESE SCREWS. THIS FACT WAS CONFIRMED BY THE NRC IN THEIR REPORT 99900403/87-03.

THE 100 FLAT HEAD REPLACEMENT SCREWS PURCHASED BY THE GE RESPONSIBLE DESIGN ENGINEER WERE BOUGHT AS IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL MODE SWITCH SCREWS EXCEPT FOR LENGTH. WE CONSIDER THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS NONCONFORMANCE TO GE PROCEDURES IN 1980 WERE HIGHLY UNUSUAL AND AN ISOLATED CASE. NO EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR GE PURCHASES HAS BEEN DETECTED DURING THE MULTIPLE GE, CUSTOMER AND NRC INSPECTIONS AND AUDITS OF GE PRODUCTS. THIS 1980 PROCEDURAL NONCONFORMANCE IS NOT CONSIDERED TO HAVE ANY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE. THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE SCREWS ON A GE DRAWING (COMPLETED IN APRIL 1980) WAS AN APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ACTION FOR THIS ISOLATED CASE.