



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775
AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346-8651

August 26, 1988
RBG- 28572
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Enclosed is Gulf States Utilities Company's Special Report concerning an invalid failure of the division II diesel generator during surveillance testing at River Bend Station. This report is being submitted pursuant to River Bend Station Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker
J. E. Booker *ujw*
Manager-River Bend Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB
JEB/TFP/PDG/RRS/ch

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

8809010305 880826
PDR ADOCK 05000458
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SPECIAL REPORT

REPORTED CONDITION

During reviews being performed by Gulf States Utilities (GSU) Field Engineering as corrective action for invalid diesel generator (DG) failure reported in GSU's special report dated 6/2/88 (RBG-28012), it was discovered on 8/9/88 at 1030 hours that at 1653 hours on 5/21/88 an invalid failure of the division II DG, 1EGS*EG1B, occurred during the performance of surveillance testing. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, the following information is provided.

INVESTIGATION

After starting the division II DG at 1640 hours on 5/21/88, the generator was synchronized to offsite power, and the output breaker was closed in accordance with steps 7.6.7 and 7.6.8 of surveillance test procedure (STP) 309-0202. Shortly thereafter, the output breaker (1ENS*ACB27) tripped open, and the annunciator alarmed indicating that a potential transformer (PT) fuse had blown. At the time of the synchronization there was an operator trainee at the local control panel working under the direction of a duty operator.

CAUSE OF FAILURE

The night shift operations crew completed the "Diesel Generator Trending and Failure Reporting" procedures (PEP-0026) for the 1640 and 1932 hours DG starts. The cause of the DG trip has been attributed to an operator trainee apparently not raising voltage quickly enough to overcome reactive load causing the DG to trip on reverse power. It should also be noted that grid disturbances, caused by thunderstorms in the general vicinity, occurred during the 1640 diesel start. Grid disturbances during this time period have been confirmed by the load dispatcher's office. These disturbances may have contributed to the trainee's error.

Therefore, in accordance with Regulatory Guide Position C.2.e.2, this failure is considered to be invalid since it was the result of operator error.

Additionally, this trip is not operative in the emergency operating mode per Regulatory Guide 1.108 position C.2.e.2, this failure should not be considered a valid failure.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As a result of the alarm, maintenance work order request (MWOR) 056161 was initiated by the day shift operations crew. The day shift crew suspected that the actual cause of the trip may have been operator error; however, due to the PT fuse alarm, they initiated the troubleshooting MWOR for confirmation. Troubleshooting under the MWOR revealed that the PT fuse was not blown and no circuitry abnormalities were discovered; therefore, no cause for the annunciator alarm could be determined. The DG was

successfully retested at 1932 hours with satisfactory start, load, and run results.

The two invalid failures reported in GSU's special report dated 6/2/88 involved breaker failures on the diesel room exhaust fans (1HVP*FN2A and 2B). It was not immediately recognized at the time of these events occurring on 3/13/88 and 5/3/88 (and the case being reported here) that special reports were required. Additional corrective action for the first two reported events was implemented on 6/16/88 via a temporary change notice (TCN) to PEP-0026 adding a note stating all STP diesel starts and load attempts that are not completed acceptably must be considered valid or invalid failures and hence require submitting a special report. This procedure change enhances the identification process of the required reporting for identified DG failures.

LENGTH OF TIME DIESEL GENERATOR WAS UNAVAILABLE:

0 - The DG was available at all times.

CURRENT SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL:

Division I	Weekly
Division II	Monthly
Division III	Monthly

TEST INTERVAL CONFORMS TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

Yes

FAILURES FOR DIVISION I:

0 Valid failure in last 20 valid tests
5 Valid failures in last 100 valid tests

FAILURES FOR DIVISION II:

1 Valid failure in last 20 valid tests
4 Valid failures in all 68 valid tests conducted

FAILURES FOR DIVISION III:

0 Valid failure in last 20 valid tests
0 Valid failure in all 63 valid tests conducted

FAILURES OF ALL DIESEL GENERATORS AT RIVER BEND:

1 Valid failure in last 100 valid tests