NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3	1 OF 0 15

TITLE (4)
INOPERABLE CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITOR

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1 0	0 8	8 5	8 5	— 0 2 5	— 0 0	0 2	1 2	8 6		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	2	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
WILLIAM J. KELLY, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER	AREA CODE 8 0 5 — 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 13, 1986, Instrumentation and Controls technicians performing Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) I-46A, "Channel Calibration (zero & span) Containment Hydrogen Monitor Ch. 82 (83)" discovered the sample line vent valves to Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 82 were open and the sample lines were uncapped. With these valves open and lines uncapped, an accurate containment atmosphere sample could not be obtained, which rendered Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 82 inoperable. However, redundant Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 83 was fully operable and capable of providing an accurate reading if the need had arisen.

A review of plant records indicates these valves were verified closed and the lines capped on October 4, 1985. Because the date that these valves were opened could not be established, PGandE conservatively assumed that they were open and lines uncapped since the last date they were confirmed closed. Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.6.4.1 requires two independent containment hydrogen analyzers/monitors to be operable in Modes 1 (Power Operation) and 2 (Startup). T.S. 3.0.4 prohibits entry to an Operational Mode unless the Limiting Condition for Operation is met without reliance on Action Statement allowances. With startup testing in progress, the unit entered Mode 2 on October 8, 1985 and changed operating modes several times thereafter.

The sample valves were closed and sample lines capped on January 13, 1986.

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* U.S.GPO:1984-0-454-481/18750

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3	8 5	— 0 2 5	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 5

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Initial Conditions

The unit was in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) with a Reactor Coolant System temperature of approximately 547 degrees fahrenheit and pressure of approximately 2235 psig. During the period when this event occurred, the unit was operated in Modes 1 (Power Operation) to 5 (Cold Shutdown).

II. Description of Event

A. Event:

On January 13, 1986, Instrumentation and Controls technicians performing Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) I-46A, "Channel Calibration (zero and span) Containment Hydrogen Monitor Ch. 82 (83)" discovered the sample line vent valves VAC-2-100 and VAC-2-103 to Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 82 (IK)(SMV) were open and the sample lines were uncapped. With these valves open and lines uncapped, an accurate containment atmosphere sample could not be obtained, which rendered Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 82 inoperable. However, redundant Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 83 was fully operable and capable of providing an accurate reading if the need had arisen.

A review of plant records indicates these valves were verified closed and the lines capped on October 4, 1985. Because the date that these valves were opened could not be established, PGandE conservatively assumed that they were open and the lines uncapped since the last date they were confirmed closed. Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.6.4.1 requires two independent containment hydrogen analyzers/monitors to be operable in Modes 1 (Power Operation) and 2 (Startup). T.S. 3.0.4 prohibits entry to an Operational Mode unless the Limiting Condition for Operation is met without reliance on Action Statement allowances. With startup testing in progress, the unit entered Mode 2 on October 8, 1985 and changed operating modes several times thereafter.

The sample valves were closed and the sample lines capped on January 13, 1986.

B. Inoperable structures, components, or systems that contributed to the event:

None

C. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

1. October 4, 1985: Last date that sample line vent valves were confirmed closed.

2. October 8, 1985: Event date - Change from Mode 3 (Hot Standby) to Mode 2 (Startup)

3. January 13, 1986: Discovery date

4. January 13, 1986: Valves closed and sample lines capped

D. Other systems or secondary functions affected:

None

E. Method of discovery:

The Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 82 sample line vent valves were discovered open and the lines uncapped by Instrumentation and Controls technicians during the performance of STP I-46A.

F. Operator actions:

None required. The unit was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at the time of discovery and the system was not required to be operable. However, the sample valves were closed and the sample lines were capped upon completion of surveillance testing.

G. Safety system responses:

None

III. Cause of Event

Indeterminate.

IV. Analysis of Event

The Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 82 operability was indeterminate between October 4, 1985 and January 13, 1986. With the sample valves open and the lines uncapped, an accurate containment atmosphere sample could not be obtained due to the potential for outside air intrusion. However, Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 83 was fully operable during this event period and would have provided an accurate reading of containment atmosphere hydrogen concentration. Normal system configuration is with the hydrogen monitors off-line and their respective containment isolation valves closed.

A potential release path could have existed if, following a LOCA, a containment hydrogen sample was taken using Cell 82 in the as-found condition. The release path would be from containment, through the containment isolation valves (2FCV-235 and 2FCV-236), through Containment

Hydrogen Analyzer Cell 82, through the open manual sample valve VAC-2-103 and its associated uncapped vent line, and into the piping penetration area between the containment and auxiliary building. Any potential releases to the environment from this release path would be insignificant when compared to releases from a design basis LOCA.

V. Corrective Actions

Units 1 and 2 sample line vent valves VAC-1-100, VAC-1-103, VAC-2-100, and VAC-2-103 will be added to the system alignment checklist for mode transition for Units 1 and 2.

The checklists for STP I-46A, "Channel Calibration (zero & span) Containment Hydrogen Monitor Ch. 82 (83)," and STP V-678, "Penetrations 52 & 78 Containment Isolation Valve Leak Testing", will be modified to include a "verification of action" column to be filled in as an independent check.

Since the exact cause is indeterminate, these corrective actions may not be directly related to the cause, but will be implemented to improve managerial control of these work activities.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed components:

None

B. Previous LERs on similar events:

None



HYDROGEN MONITOR CELL 82

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E — 77 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94106 • (415) 781-4211 • TWX 910 372-6587

JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

February 12, 1986

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-86-031

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Unit 2
Licensee Event Report 2-85-025-00
Inoperable Containment Hydrogen Monitor

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning an inoperable containment hydrogen monitor.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,

J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: L. J. Chandler
R. T. Dodds
J. B. Martin
B. Norton
H. E. Schierling
CPUC
Diablo Distribution
INPO

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