



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV
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ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011

NOV 26 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph J. Fouchard, Director
Office of Public Affairs

FROM: Clyde E. Wisner
Public Affairs Officer

SUBJECT: CRITIQUE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITY AT WOLF CREEK EXERCISE

Overall, the Public Affairs function performed satisfactorily. Our work space and telephone arrangements were adequate for the exercise and functioned as desired. Early in the exercise, the availability of an outside line for one of the PA extensions in the EOF was a minor problem, but the problem went away quickly. The Portabubbles were promptly and successfully setup to coordinate between the EOF at the site and the Media Release Center in Topeka, Kansas.

The licensee and State staffs were very cooperative and frequently checked with the PAO staff in both the EOF and the Media Release Center (MRC) to see if all logistical needs; e.g., space, telephones, and equipment were being met.

The Public Affairs staff at both the EOF and MRC were in place in a timely manner. Since the scenario was of such short duration the entire NRC was essentially pre-placed, which insured that the players would be in place promptly.

A press release prepared for the exercise by headquarters was done in a timely and efficient manner. The first press release done at the EOF, about the arrival of the site team, probably would have been more timely if it had been prepared, or had a simulated release, from headquarters. Both releases made from the EOF could easily have been a boiler-plate format with fill-in blanks and released to the media from the appropriate media center, depending upon whether the lead was still with headquarters or at the site.

Security at the MRC hindered the public affairs progress slightly. The Public Affairs' work area was in one building at the Kansas National Guard armory and the briefing area was in another. When the NRC spokesman went to the briefing area, he had to sign in and out through security each time. Sometimes he had to wait in line while others were being processed through. The security was very tight and worked well, but it definitely impacted upon efficient ingress and egress by briefing participants.

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Coordination of news releases between all organizations needs to be improved from the very beginning of an emergency. This also includes that period of time when parties are enroute to their emergency work stations. When headquarters has the Public Affairs lead, a copy of any news releases prepared

by them should also be forwarded to the Base Team Manager for informational purposes and, if possible, the information coordinated with the Base Team Manager in the event later information from the site may be available. The licensee did not coordinate their releases with headquarters PAO while the site team was enroute. This problem will be corrected prior to any future exercise with this Region IV licensee or any of the other Region IV licensees. All spokesmen should caucus briefly, no more than 10 minutes, prior to each briefing so that an orderly press conference can be conducted. This was not done, or done efficiently, during this exercise.

The information provided by the NRC spokesman was timely and consistent with the latest available status summaries. Most, if not all, site information was provided to the media by the licensee. However, their information was monitored by the NRC MRC staff to see if it was consistent with the information as they knew it.

Communications with headquarters was established in a timely manner without difficulty. However, late in the exercise communication could not be accomplished since the headquarters emergency center closed prior to the conclusion of the exercise.

All agency public information representatives were co-located in the EOF, which made coordination of news releases easy. The compressed scenario schedule made the coordination effort difficult and unrealistic.

The NRC Public Affairs staffing at the EOF is not adequate, at least for a very short exercise scenario, to allow the Public Affairs Coordinator to function efficiently. The amount of time needed to attend the entrance briefing, set up the Portabubble and printer, and prepare the first press release significantly delays the point at which he begins functioning efficiently. However, if the early site releases are boiler-plate as mentioned previously, the efficiency would be significantly enhanced. Various public information people are trying to make initial contact with the NRC representative to coordinate activities which hampers the setting-up process.

Since this was an exercise, monitoring of national and local news coverage was not done, but the license has made provisions for such coverage in the event of a real emergency.

As stated above, the number of telephones and service were adequate for this exercise. However, a minimum of three telephone lines would be required at the MRC for answering media calls and two working lines for the Public Affairs staff during an actual emergency. In my opinion, these requirements should be provided now at the emergency centers and not at some unknown future date.

The DSO did not conduct any press briefing since the scenario time would not permit a timely flight to Topeka and return. However, the possibility of such an event was discussed prior to the exercise and provisions would be made for the DSO to go to the MRC in Topeka as needed as events would permit.


Clyde E. Wisner
Senior Public Affairs Officer

cc: R. D. Martin
K. Clark, PAO, RII
R. Marabito, PAO, RIII

NOTE TO FILE:

SUBJECT: Wolf Creek Exercise Nov. 20, 1985

From the NRC Headquarters vantage point, while the NRC site team was travelling to the site the information being released by the utility to the press was moving far too slow. As nearly as we could determine, the Site Area Emergency was not announced until more than a hour after it was declared. It also appeared, according to the information we had available here, that the information being presented at the press conferences was far out of date.

Two things seemed to be happening. Spokesmen for the utility were not getting information quickly for dissemination. The utility did not have a smooth mechanism for clearing information. They appeared to be relying too much on having approved textual material. That material was apparently going through too many hands for approval. In an emergency the utility doesn't have the luxury of getting written material approved by a large number of people. The telephone or oral presentations can be used most effectively to get the word out immediately on such things as changes in plant status. A public affairs officer should be sitting next to the "horse's mouth" and should be able to get the word to the press center quickly, often without sitting down to write a press release.

Also, while the utility PR people were on their way to the news center in Topeka, the contact point for us in Wichita was not a PR person. We surmised that part of the slowdown might have been due to him not putting enough pressure on utility management to get good information to him rapidly. There seemed to be no PR person at the helm until the PR staff arrived at the news center. Those hours that went by without good information handling were crucial hours. The utility's performance was not satisfactory because of these problems cited.

Bob Newlin

Enclosure 2

Assessment of Region IV
Implementation of the Emergency
Preparedness Inspection Program

ENCLOSURE 2

ASSESSMENT OF REGION IV IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION PROGRAM

ASSESSMENT SCOPE

The assessment of the Emergency Preparedness Inspection Program for 1985/86 focused upon the implementation of IE Inspection Procedure (IP) 82301, "Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors." The assessment was conducted by D. Perrotti, DEPER/EPB and L. Cohen, DI/ORPB during the full participation exercise held at Wolf Creek the week of November 18, 1985.

ASSESSMENT DEPTH

The assessment consisted of the following activities:

- ° Accompaniment of inspectors during the inspection of the Wolf Creek exercise.
- ° Review of selected documents (e.g., previous inspection reports, SALP report, and exercise scenario review).
- ° Interviews with the Region IV team leader and contract support personnel.

QUALIFICATIONS AND COORDINATION

Team Makeup and Qualifications

The exercise inspection team consisted of one NRC Region IV inspector and five contractor support personnel. The Region IV inspector served as the team leader and was the NRC spokesperson for all meetings with the licensee. The team observed the control room, Operations Support Center (OSC), Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Media Release Center (MRC) in Topeka, Kansas, and offsite monitoring.

The contractors were well qualified for the assigned areas of observation. The training of the Region IV inspector conformed to MC 1231. //

Coordination

Scenario review: The inspector's review and approval of the scenario did not conform to the recommended time frame of 35 days prior to the exercise as stated in IP 82301. However, the licensee had received and addressed the comments to the satisfaction of the inspector.

FEMA: There was sufficient coordination between the team leader and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with regard to the exercise scope, objectives and scenario.

Team: The team leader provided excellent briefings to the team. Pertinent licensee and NRC documents were provided to the team in a timely manner, including information on followup items needed by contract support personnel for closing out previously identified inspection findings. As a result, all but one open exercise item was closed. The team leader briefed the resident inspector prior to the exit meeting.

EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS

Team members appeared to follow the guidance of IP 82301 in observing licensee activities at the control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, offsite monitoring, and the MRC in Topeka, Kansas. Assigned tasks were adequately covered. In addition, the team performed followup reviews during the exercise and closed out eight previously identified open items.

A team debriefing was held immediately following the exercise. Team members were given the opportunity to adequately express their findings. As a result of the team effort, four exercise weaknesses were identified which require corrective action. The team leader was able to obtain satisfactory licensee commitments prior to the exit meeting for correcting three of the items. The fourth item, related to the number of deployed field teams, was identified as an unresolved item by the team leader during the exit meeting. The licensee was informed that this item may be changed to an open item once the number of monitoring teams required to adequately demonstrate capability was reviewed by Region IV management.

On November 21, 1985, the team leader, as the NRC spokesperson at the FEMA public meeting, responded very well to the questions raised by a media representative.

DOCUMENTATION AND FOLLOWUP

Assessment of the inspection report and followup of the unresolved and open items will be provided in the future consistent with the issuance of the inspection report.

CONCLUSIONS

The Region IV inspection team demonstrated its capability, using IP 82301, to adequately evaluate the licensee's emergency response capability during an exercise.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Region IV should strive toward a more timely review of the licensee's scenario to allow adequate time for the licensee to incorporate significant changes into the final scenario. //