



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 REGION II  
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-321/85-38 and 50-366/85-38

Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
 P. O. Box 4545  
 Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: December 21, 1985 through January 17, 1986

Inspectors:	<u>A. J. Ignatonis</u>	<u>2/5/86</u>
for	Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector	Date Signed
	<u>A. J. Ignatonis</u>	<u>2/5/86</u>
for	G. M. Nejjfelt, Resident Inspector	Date Signed
Approved by:	<u>A. J. Ignatonis</u>	<u>2/5/86</u>
	A. J. Ignatonis, Acting Section Chief	Date Signed
	Division of Reactor Projects	

SUMMARY

Scope: This inspection involved 134 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, and surveillance activities.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*H. C. Nix, Site General Manager
- \*T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager
- \*H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- \*T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager
- \*C. T. Jones, Engineering Manager
- R. W. Zavadski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- \*S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

\*Attended exit interview

### 2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 17, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the General Manager and his assistants concerning inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

(Open) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 366/85-38-01, Procedure Incorporation of Design Changes - paragraph 4.

(Open) IFI 321, 366/85-38-02, Procedure Revision Practices - paragraph 9.

### 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

Not inspected.

### 4. Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible

material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts and weekends.

The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ECCS systems. Valve and breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room. During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas of the Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory.

On January 16, 1986, during a walkdown of the Unit 2 RCIC system, the following items were noted by the resident inspector:

- ° A discrepancy in procedure 34SO-E51-001-2S, Revision 1, was noted for the breaker location of RCIC inboard steam isolation valve, 2E2151-F007. Procedure 2E2151-F007 indicates that this breaker is in frame number (FN) 19C of Motor Control Center (MCC) 2R24-S012. Instead, the actual location for this breaker is FN 4B of MCC-2R24-S012B, which is in agreement with "As Built Notification" (ABN) 85-321. These MCCs are on different elevations in the Reactor Building.
- ° The name plates on the MCC for the breakers of barometric condenser condensate pumps 2E51-C002-1 and 2E51-C002-2 were found to be reversed. Procedure 34SO-E51-001-S2, Revision 1, indicates that these pump breakers, 2E51-C002-1 and 2E51-C002-2 are installed, respectively in FN 4B and FN 4A of MCC-2R24-S021.

Upon further investigation of ABN 85-321 that was approved May 7, 1985, it was found that the breaker location for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inboard steam isolation valve, 2E41-F002, was also moved from FN 14B in MCC-2R24-S011 to FN 4A in MCC-2R24-S011A. These MCCs are on different elevations in the Reactor Building; and the breaker location was not corrected in the HPCI system alignment procedure, 34SO-E41-001-2, Revision 0 that was effective October 28, 1985. However, the failure to revise procedures to reflect design changes has been previously cited as violation 50-321/85-32-02; and implementation of design changes are actively being inspected by the licensee's Quality Assurance Group. Therefore, the items noted above will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-366/85-38-01, Procedure Incorporation of Design Changes.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

5. Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors periodically reviewed the shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at acceptable levels. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

7. Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

8. Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideration. The following LERs are considered closed:

Unit 1: 85-16, 85-19, 85-21, 85-22, 85-25\*, 85-29\*, 85-36\*

Unit 2: 85-11, 85-15, 85-16, 85-18, 85-21\*, 85-29

LER 321/85-21 was issued due to missed surveillance of fire suppression valves caused by an inadequate procedure. Technical Specifications (TS) require cycling the valves once every 12 months, but the procedure allowed an 18 month frequency.

LER 366/85-29 was issued due to missed surveillance on the settlement of the main stack. This TS required surveillance was missed because an inadequate procedure allowed the settlement measurements not to be taken, if excessive radiation was present. No such relief was recognized in TS.

These LERs are two more examples of inadequate procedures resulting in TS requirements not being met. The last citation issued for inadequate procedures was in report 321,366/85-34 and the corrective action for this violation has not yet been reviewed therefore no violation is to be issued for these additional examples.

#### 9. Maintenance Procedure Observations

On January 7, 1986, it was noted by the resident inspector that Revision 0 of 52PM-E11-004-2, concerning a residual heat removal (RHR) system preventative maintenance procedure, had been reissued with the same revision number. The reissued Revision 0 corrects the transposition of surveillance sheets between the procedure two data packages, and was authorized by Procedure Review Group (PRG). After a review of procedure transmittal sheets for the past three months, this was the only instance identified with information in a procedure changed.

The practice of correcting a procedure after signature by the plant management, although not specifically prohibited by the procedure controlling procedure revision, 10AC-MGR-003-0, does represent a potential problem of procedural control, however, it will be tracked as IFI 321,366/85-38-02.

\*In-Depth review performed.