
Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

January 1, 1990 Through December 31, 1997

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards



DF02
0/1

Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

January 1, 1990 Through December 31, 1997

This document was prepared in response to inquiries concerning the nature of safeguards-related events involving NRC and licensed material.

Manuscript Completed: June 1998
Date Published: July 1998

**Operations Branch
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001**



AVAILABILITY NOTICE

Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications

Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:

1. The NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555-0001
2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P. O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20402-9328
3. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161-0002

Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.

Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices; licensee event reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.

The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the Government Printing Office: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings, international agreement reports, grantee reports, and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are regulatory guides, NRC regulations in the *Code of Federal Regulations*, and *Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances*.

Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG-series reports and technical reports prepared by other Federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items, such as books, journal articles, and transactions. *Federal Register* notices, Federal and State legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.

Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC conference proceedings are available for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publication cited.

Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free, to the extent of supply, upon written request to the Office of Administration, Distribution and Mail Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001.

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, for use by the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the originating organization or, if they are American National Standards, from the American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018-3308.

NUREG-0525, Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), is comprised of two parts. Vol. 1, issued July 1992, summarizes events that occurred and were reported from pre-NRC through December 31, 1989. Vol. 2, Rev. 6, revised July 1998, summarizes events that occurred from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1997.

Events which involve only source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are not safeguarded under NRC regulations are not included, except for a few events included in the Miscellaneous category because of public interest. Information on events involving nonsafeguarded material is available in NUREG-1272, Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, published annually by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Arson events, formerly section VI, have been folded into Category I, Bomb-related events. An Executive Summary, page ix, has been added. The Index has been eliminated. The number of Statistical Charts has been reduced from sixteen to five, and they now include only the past ten years worth of data, as opposed to starting in 1976.

Page changes are as follows:

	Insert New Pages Issued July 1998	Remove Superseded Pages Issued July 1997
Page Change Information	i	i
Abstract	iii	iii
Table of Contents	v	v
Executive Summary	vii	First issuance
Introduction	ix through x	vii through viii
Bomb Device	IA-1	IA-1
Bomb Threat	IB-31 through IB-34	IB-31 through IB-32
Intrusion	II-1 through II-2	None
Missing/Allegedly Stolen	III-1 through III-3	None
Tampering/Vandalism	V-7 through V-9	V-7
Arson	Eliminated	VI-1
Firearms	VII-119 through VII-121	VII-119
Radiological Sabotage	VIIIA-1	VIIIA-1
Nonradiological Sabotage	VIIIB-1	VIIIB-1

Miscellaneous	X-71 through X-73	X-71
Appendix A - Statistics	A-1 through A-6	A-1 through A-16
Index - SSEL Events	Eliminated	1 through 51
Bibliographic Data Sheet	Vol. 2, Rev. 6	Vol. 2, Rev. 5

ABSTRACT

The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 6, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1997. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PAGE CHANGES	i
ABSTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	vii
INTRODUCTION	ix
I. BOMB-RELATED EVENTS	I-1
II. INTRUSION EVENTS	II-1
III. MISSING AND/OR ALLEGEDLY STOLEN EVENTS	III-1
IV. TRANSPORTATION-RELATED EVENTS	IV-1
V. TAMPERING/VANDALISM EVENTS	V-1
VII. FIREARMS-RELATED EVENTS	VII-1
VIII A. RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE EVENTS	VIII A-1
VIII B. NONRADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE EVENTS	VIII B-1
X. MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS	X-1
APPENDIX A - STATISTICS	A-1

Executive Summary

The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 6, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1997. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous.

The information contained in the event descriptions is reported primarily by the licensees, NRC resident inspectors or NRC Regional Information Assessment Team (IAT) personnel to the NRC Operations Center or the IAT in the Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. Recent changes to Section 831 of Chapter 39 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code regarding criminal activity includes a significant expansion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's jurisdiction to initiate criminal investigation for the malicious use of nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material. This change could result in increased reporting of these types of incidents.

The document is divided into two major sections: a chronological listing of events by category, and a short statistical analysis. This year the format has been changed to produce a shorter, more useful document. First, the Arson category has been folded into bomb-related events as there has been only one Arson event in the last ten years. Second, an executive summary was added. Third, the statistical analysis is now limited to the last ten years (1987-1997), as opposed to starting in 1976, as was done in previous reports. Finally, the events index has been eliminated.

For the third straight year, the overall number of Safeguards Events dropped. In 1997, there were only 24 events, as opposed to 32 the previous year (Figure 1). Since the reporting requirements changed in 1995, there has been a dramatic drop-off in the number of incidents. The highest number of incidents last year were in the Miscellaneous category (6), followed by Firearms and Tampering/Vandalism (5 each) (Figure 2). Reactor Events continue to outpace non-reactor events by a wide margin (Figures 3 & 4). Over the past ten years, Firearms (501), Bomb-related (194), and miscellaneous events (305) dominate the overall number of safeguards events, with the other four categories combined accounting for the 77 remaining incidents (Figure 5). The number of power reactors remained steady in 1997 (Figure 6), but will likely drop by up to a half-dozen in 1998 due to plant decommissionings.

- The most serious incident occurred on August 22, 1997, when it was discovered that an individual responsible for killing four persons in New Hampshire before being killed in a police shoot-out was a contractor with unescorted access at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim, and Indian Point 3 while they were in an outage status. Furthermore, numerous incendiary devices were

discovered in his residence after it was destroyed by fire. Investigation by NRC and law enforcement revealed no indications that the subject had any malevolent intent towards any of the facilities to which he had access.

- There were several notable incidents of tampering. For example, on December 1, 1997, cuts in the door seals were found during leak testing of a containment door at McGuire Nuclear Power Plant. On December 4, 1997, additional cuts were found in the seals. The perpetrator(s) were not apprehended. On October 17, 1997, 11 of 14 instrument cables were discovered damaged in a Sequoyah Unit 2 containment electrical penetration which was being replaced. Preliminary investigation results indicated the cables were deliberately cut and that none of the wires had any safety significance.

INTRODUCTION

The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear materials or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The SSEL is comprised of two parts. Vol. 1, issued July 1992, summarizes events that occurred and were reported from pre-NRC through December 31, 1989. Vol. 2, Rev. 6, issued July 1998, summarizes events that occurred January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1997. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either byproduct material, source material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. As the list is intended to provide a broad perspective on the nature of safeguards incidents in the licensed nuclear industry, both unusual and routine events are described. Events have been placed in the several categories described below. Each listing is included in a single category unless it is transportation-related, in which case it is cross-referenced in the Transportation category.

- I. Bomb-Related: Events concerned with explosives, incendiary devices or arson.

Section A: Events in which a bomb or explosive material was located or an explosion occurred at a licensed facility.

Section B: All other bomb-related events (e.g., hoax bomb threats).
- II. Intrusion: Incidents of attempted or actual penetration of a facility's barriers or safeguards systems.
- III. Missing or Allegedly Stolen: Events in which safeguarded material was stolen, alleged to be stolen, discovered missing, or found.
- IV. Transportation-Related: Events typically include incidents where safeguarded material was misrouted or involved in an accident. Material reported missing or stolen during transport, for example, would be included in Category III and cross-referenced in the Transportation category.
- V. Tampering/Vandalism: Incidents of destruction or attempted destruction of property, parts, and equipment which do not directly cause a radioactive release.
- VI. Arson: These events have been moved to Category I effective this report.
- VII. Firearms-Related: Events typically describe the discharge, discovery, or loss of firearms at a licensed facility.
- VIIIA. Radiological Sabotage: Deliberate act directed against a safeguarded activity which could endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

VIII B. Nonradiological Sabotage: Events characterized by the FBI as sabotage but which could not endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

IX. Alcohol and Drugs: These events have been dropped from this document and are now contained in NUREG/CR-5758.

X. Miscellaneous: Events which hold some interest to safeguards and the public but which do not fit into any of the previously described categories.

Each event listed in the body of the report is identified by an alphanumeric code composed of the appropriate category Roman numeral, the last two digits of the year in which the event occurred, and a sequential number for that specific year and category. Each incident listing includes the appropriate date and location and a brief description of the event. Descriptions vary in detail according to the amount of data available through NRC reporting channels.

I. BOMB-RELATED EVENTS

SECTION A. Events in which an explosive, incendiary device, or explosive material was located or an explosion occurred at or in the vicinity of a licensed facility.

There were no reported events meeting the bomb-related events Section A criteria during 1990 through 1997.

Action: The vital areas and the owner-controlled areas were searched.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The licensee and the local law enforcement agency evaluated the threat as noncredible.

Source: Licensee

IB-96-01	Date: 05/05/96	Site: Oyster Creek GPU Nuclear Corporation Ocean County, NJ
----------	----------------	---

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Bomb threat. Hoax. At 12:38 a.m., the 911 operator received a telephonic threat, which originated from a pay telephone north of the plant, from an anonymous female who stated that six bombs would go off "any minute now." At 12:55 a.m., the operator received a second call, made from a pay telephone south of the plant, from an anonymous female who stated that the devices would explode in 15 minutes.

Action: Searches were conducted, and the sheriff's department made copies of the 911 tapes for State and Federal law enforcement agencies and allowed site security management to listen to the tapes.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The licensee determined that the threat was noncredible.

Source: Licensee

IB-96-02	Date: 07/27/96	Site: Oyster Creek GPU Nuclear Corporation Ocean County, NJ
----------	----------------	---

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Bomb threat. Hoax. At 12:45 a.m., the Ocean County Sheriff's Department received a 911 telephone call from an individual at a pay telephone booth who said that several bombs were placed around Oyster Creek. The Ocean County Sheriff's Department analyzed the taped call, and they believe the caller is the same person who had made the threat on May 5, 1996 (See IB-96-01).

Action: The licensee searched vital areas and instituted their bomb threat procedures as a precautionary measure.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The licensee determined that the threat was noncredible.

Source: Licensee

IB-96-03	Date: 07/28/96	Site: Oyster Creek GPU Nuclear Corporation Ocean County, NJ
----------	----------------	---

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Bomb threat. Hoax. At 10:46 p.m., the Ocean County Sheriff's Department received a 911 telephone call from an individual who stated that the plant was going to explode. The Ocean County Sheriff's Department said that the call was by the same person who called on May 5, 1996, and on July 27, 1996 (See IB-96-01 and IB-96-02).

Action: The licensee searched vital areas and instituted their bomb threat procedures as a precautionary measure.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The licensee determined that the threat was noncredible.

Source: Licensee

IB-96-04	Date: 07/28/96	Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison Company San Diego County, CA
----------	----------------	--

Plant Status: Unit 1, Decommissioned
Unit 2 and 3, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Bomb threat. Hoax. At 4:35 p.m., the Ocean Side Police Department received a telephone call from a person, identifying himself as "the Supreme Being," who stated that an "insurance policy package had been left at San Onofre."

Action: The licensee conducted a search of the vital areas.

Resolution: The search of the vital areas was negative. A bottle containing a note was found in front of the main gate which was closed and locked. The note, however, did not mention anything about bombs. The licensee determined that the incident was a noncredible bomb threat.

Source: Licensee

IB-97-01	Date: 01/21/97	Site: Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus, OH
----------	----------------	---

IAT

Plant Status: NA

Event: Bomb threat. Hoax. A written bomb threat which said that a bomb would explode in a rest room after business hours tomorrow

(Wednesday) was found in a rest room. It was signed "anonymous terminated employee."

Action: A search was conducted.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The licensee determined that the threat was noncredible.

Source: Licensee

IB-97-02	Date: 05/08/97	Site: Harris Carolina Power and Light Company Wake County, NC
----------	----------------	---

Event 32303

Plant Status: Unit 1, Refueling Shutdown
Fuel present at site.

Event: Bomb threat. Hoax. At 7:30 p.m. the facility notified the Wake County Sheriff that a bomb threat had been received.

Action: Appropriate notifications were made.

Resolution: The licensee determined that the threat was noncredible.

Source: Licensee

IB-97-03	Date: 07/22/97	Site: Monticello Northern States Power Company Wright County, MN
----------	----------------	--

IAT

Plant Status: Unit 1, Maintenance Outage
Fuel present at site.

Event: Bomb threat. Hoax. At approximately 3:30 a.m., as a patrolling security officer approached the training center, about a mile from the plant, the officer spotted a white van leaving the area. An examination of the training center revealed no damage, but a message was found on a window which stated: "I'm ... (expletive). I planted a bomb."

Action: Security was heightened as a conservative precaution.

Resolution: The licensee determined that the threat was noncredible.

Source: Licensee

IB-97-04	Date: 11/20/97	Site: Callaway Union Electric Company Callaway County, MO
----------	----------------	---

PN-IV-97-069

IAT

Plant Status: Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Bomb threat. At 11:20 a.m., a Union Electric Company customer, angry because the customer service representative denied his request for another extension to pay his overdue electric bill, threatened to blow up the Callaway plant with a remote controlled device.

Action: Plant security personnel, along with local and federal law enforcement officials investigated the threat.

Resolution: The individual who made the threat was apprehended by the FBI. The individual did not have any bomb making materials, nor was he affiliated with any organizations. Therefore, the licensee determined the threat was noncredible.

Source: Licensee

II-93-01	Date: 02/07/93	Site: Three Mile Island GPU Nuclear Corporation Dauphin County, PA
----------	----------------	--

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: At 6:53 a.m., an unauthorized vehicle drove through the open, but manned, north gate in the owner-controlled area, drove through the parking lot to the protected area, crashed through a gate in the protected area fence, smashed into the turbine building roll-up doors, and eventually came to a halt approximately 63 feet inside the turbine building. The driver exited the vehicle and fled; his whereabouts were not immediately known.

Action: Immediately after the intruder passed through the north gate, security notified the central alarm station who, in turn, notified the control room. Designated vital areas were secured with armed personnel and vital access restricted via key cards. A security emergency was declared at 6:55 a.m., a site area emergency was declared at 7:05 a.m., and appropriate notifications were made. At 7:20 a.m., the Pennsylvania State Police arrived on site. At 8:38 a.m., the first search and clear operation began in the turbine building with negative results. At 9 a.m., the U.S. Army 56th Explosive Ordnance Team initiated a check of the vehicle for explosives with negative results. At 10:57 a.m., during the conduct of the second turbine building search and clear operation, the intruder was found underneath circulating water piping on the bottom floor of the turbine building and apprehended by site security. He was released to the Pennsylvania State Police.

Resolution: Augmented security measures have been implemented by the licensee. In addition, because of this event and the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided to revise the design basis threat for radiological sabotage, 10 CFR 73.1, to include land-based vehicles against which nuclear power plant licensees would develop protection systems.

Source: Licensee

II-95-01	Date: 08/14/95	Site: Washington Nuclear Washington Public Power Supply System Benton County, WA
----------	----------------	--

Plant Status: Unit 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A female plant visitor activated the intrusion alarms when she inadvertently entered a protected area by opening and passing through two doors which a guard had failed to properly secure.

Action: Security personnel were immediately dispatched to the site, but the

individual had exited the building and driven away in her automobile.

Resolution: Security contacted the intruder who stated that she had gotten lost and had gone into the building, opened the doors to find herself in a closed vestibule with the inner doors locked, and then left. There was no malicious intent. The security officer who improperly secured the doors was counseled and subjected to disciplinary action.

Source: Licensee

II-97-01	Date: 05/11/97	Site: Zion Commonwealth Edison Company Lake County, IL
----------	----------------	--

Event #32,313

PN3-97-0069 IAT

Plant Status: Unit 1, Refueling
Unit 2, Cold Shutdown
Fuel present at site.

Event: At 4:40 a.m., an individual was observed in the isolation zone between the outer and inner protected area fences, and, concurrently, the intruder set off the detection equipment between the fences.

Action: Contingency response was initiated, and the individual was apprehended, searched, and handcuffed. The local police department and an ambulance were called because the individual had cut his head open when he fell off the barbed wire fence.

Resolution: The individual was a drunken 18-year-old sailor celebrating his graduation from the Great Lakes Naval training facility. He thought he was climbing the fence back into the training facility. He was charged with trespassing. No hostile action or intent was involved.

Source: Licensee

III-92-01	Date: 10/23/92	Site: Texas A and M University Brazos County, TX
-----------	----------------	---

Plant Status: NA

Event: A fission chamber detector containing 3.85 milligrams of U-235 was discovered missing from the 1 MW Triga reactor facility during a semiannual inventory.

Action: A search was conducted.

Resolution: The search results were negative; however, the licensee does not believe the detector was stolen. As a result of this event, the licensee has changed the special nuclear material accountability process.

Source: Licensee

III-93-01	Date: 10/04/93	Site: Harris Carolina Power and Light Company Wake County, NC
-----------	----------------	---

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: During efforts to consolidate radioactive material for future burial shipment, the licensee discovered the loss of ten in-core fission detectors with a total combined special nuclear material weight of approximately 0.03 grams.

Action: An extensive search for the missing material was conducted.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The licensee believes that the material was probably shipped to an off-site processing facility, processed, and shipped to the burial site.

Source: Licensee

III-94-01	Date: 02/02/94	Site: Beaver Valley Duquesne Light Company Beaver County, PA
-----------	----------------	--

Plant Status: Units 1 and 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: An audit of the locations of all in-core detectors procured by the licensee since the start of plant operations has determined that the location of 5 of the total of 55 in-core detectors utilized by the facility could not be documented.

Action: The licensee conducted an investigation.

Resolution: The licensee has concluded that these detectors were probably used early in the plant life and were probably disposed of properly. Assuming that they were of the Westinghouse design, approximately 0.0205 grams of U-235 have not been documented.

Source: Licensee

III-97-01	Date: 01/20/97	Site: Pilgrim Boston Edison Company Plymouth County, MA
-----------	----------------	---

IAT

Event #31625

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: In 1986-1987, the licensee performed a paper inventory of the amount of SNM they had in the spent fuel pool and used the amount for the baseline of SNM present at the site. The licensee reported that in the fall of 1996, a physical inventory of the spent fuel pool was conducted. When the physical inventory was compared against the baseline, a discrepancy of 0.056 grams was detected.

Action: On January 20, 1997, the licensee notified the NRC.

Resolution: The licensee determined that the missing material is equivalent to 14 monitors and 4 probes. The licensee cannot prove at this time that the material has been lost, but believes the probes were probably lost or disposed of improperly.

Source: Licensee

III-97-02	Date: 04/17/97	Site: Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Columbia) Richland County, SC
-----------	----------------	---

Event 32168

Plant Status: NA

Event: The licensee reported that two low-enriched uranium fuel rods, fabricated in late 1996, were found missing on March 20, 1997.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: On April 5, 1997, the licensee determined that the two fuel rods may have been inadvertently included in two replica (non-fuel containing) assemblies manufactured by Westinghouse and sent to the Czech Republic for training purposes. On April 17, 1997, the licensee confirmed that the two rods were located in the replica assemblies at the Temelin reactor in the Czech Republic.

Source: Licensee

III-97-03	Date: 05/01/97	Site: Millstone Northeast Nuclear Energy Company New London County, CT
-----------	----------------	--

Event #3225

Plant Status: Unit 1, Refueling Shutdown
Fuel present at site.

Event: A small check source (Serial #8089), containing less than one gram of plutonium, was unaccounted for during an audit of the quality assurance program at Unit 1.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: The licensee believes that the check source was lost in the 1970's and was probably disposed of as radioactive material.

Source: Licensee

Resolution: The licensee determined that the fluid was from various sources, including a lubricant, with metal particle traces and that deliberate tampering had occurred. However, the investigation was not able to identify a motive or perpetrator.

Source: Licensee

V-96-06	Date: 11/09/96	Site: Brunswick Carolina Power and Light Company Brunswick County, NC
---------	----------------	---

Plant Status: Units 1 and 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: At 8 p.m., the doors of vital areas were inspected by security and found to be operable. At 10:45 p.m., security rechecked the same doors and discovered that wire had been inserted into the door locks causing keys to jam and making the locks inoperable.

Action: The local police were notified and responded to the site. All shift workers were searched for traces of wire.

Resolution: No perpetrator was identified.

Source: Licensee

V-97-01	Date: 01/27/97	Site: Dresden Commonwealth Edison Company Grundy County, IL
---------	----------------	---

Event #31759

IAT

Plant Status: Units 2 and 3, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A padlock that secured a vital area hatch was found unlocked by a security officer.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: The investigation concluded that the security officer who reported the incident was also the individual who had tampered with the padlock and unlocked it. The individual's access was revoked.

Source: Licensee

V-97-02	Date: 04/04/97	Site: River Bend Gulf States Utilities Company West Feliciana Parish, LA
---------	----------------	--

IAT

Plant Status: Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A number of "High Radiation Area" warning signs posted next to the locked access doors to the actual high radiation area were removed.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: The licensee determined that the signs were taken by a young fire watch patrol officer for posting in his home. There was no malicious intent, and no one was harmed. The officer's employment was terminated.

Source: Licensee

V-97-03	Date: 04/09/97	Site: Hatch Georgia Power Company Appling County, GA
---------	----------------	--

IAT

Follow up status

Plant Status: Units 1 and 2, Refueling
Shutdown
Fuel present at site.

Event: Three breakers and one valve, not collocated, were found to be out of position, causing the loss of spent fuel cooling capability on the shutdown unit.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: Cause was service-work related. Switches were inadvertently changed by workers.

Source: Licensee

V-97-04	Date: 10/17/97	Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority Hamilton County, TN
---------	----------------	---

PN-II-97-057

Follow ongoing investigation.

Plant Status: Refueling Outage
Fuel present at site.

Event: Eleven of 14 instrument cables were discovered damaged in a Unit 2 containment electrical penetration which was being replaced and re-wired.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: Preliminary investigation results indicated the cables were deliberately cut and that none of the wires had any safety significance.

Source: Licensee

V-97-05	Date: 12/01/97	Site: McGuire Duke Power Company Mecklenburg County, NC
---------	----------------	---

IAT

Event 33349

Follow up

Plant Status: Unit 2, Refueling Shutdown
Fuel present at site.

Event: On December 1, 1997 seal cuts were found during leak testing of a containment door. On December 4, 1997, additional cuts were found in the seals.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: Investigation was unable to determine the cause of the cuts.

Source: Licensee

VII-96-10	Date: 12/22/96	Site: Grand Gulf Energy Operations, Inc. Claiborne County, MS
-----------	----------------	---

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A semiautomatic pistol was found in a truck undergoing inspection prior to entry into the protected area.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: The licensee does not believe that there was any malicious intent on the part of the driver.

Source: Licensee

VII-97-01	Date: 01/07/97	Site: Pilgrim Boston Edison Company Plymouth County, MA
-----------	----------------	---

Event 31551

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A loaded semiautomatic handgun was found, in clear view, in the cab of truck during a routine vehicle entry search.

Action: An investigation was conducted.

Resolution: The licensee determined that the weapon was properly licensed and that the individual had forgotten to remove the weapon before making a delivery. There was no malicious intent involved.

Source: Licensee

VII-97-02	Date: 08/29/97	Site: Cooper Nebraska Public Power District Nemaha County, NE
-----------	----------------	---

Event No. 32849

See HDO Log for details.

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Licensee reported unaccounted ammunition for a security weapon. One round of shotgun ammunition was found on the roof of the plant.

Action: Compensatory measures were implemented.

Resolution: Special seals were placed on weapons lockers to increase accountability.

Source: Licensee

VII-97-03	Date: 09/14/97	Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service Company Maricopa County, AZ
-----------	----------------	---

Event No 32925

See HDO Log for details.

Plant Status: Unit 2, Refueling Shutdown
Fuel present at site.Event: Licensee reported the discovery of unattended security weapon.Action: Immediate compensatory measures were taken.Resolution: New employee was given retraining.Source: Licensee

VII-97-04	Date: 09/18/97	Site: Quad Cities Commonwealth Edison Company Rock Island County, IL
-----------	----------------	--

MR 3-97-0099

Plant Status: Units 1 and 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.Event: At approximately 1:55 p.m., a security officer found a loaded .22-caliber pistol under a mattress in the rear cab of an over-the-road truck. The weapon belonged to the driver.Action: The driver and the vehicle were denied access.Resolution: The licensee determined that there was no malevolent intent. The Illinois State Police were notified, and the driver was arrested for multiple weapon violations.Source: Licensee

VII-97-05	Date: 12/11/97	Site: LaSalle Commonwealth Edison Company LaSalle County, IL
-----------	----------------	--

PNO-II-97-096

Plant Status: Unit 1, Maintenance
Shutdown
Unit 2, Refueling Shutdown
Fuel present at site.Event: An unloaded handgun and ammunition were found in the brief case of an Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) resident inspector during a routine security check.Action: The licensee notified the police. An investigation was conducted. The IDNS placed the inspector on administrative leave pending the results of a police investigation.

Resolution: The licensee's initial investigation revealed no malevolent intent. The inspector stated that he had put the gun in his brief case while offsite and failed to remove it when he arrived at the site.

Source: Licensee

RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE

There have been no reported events meeting the radiological sabotage criteria during the period 1990 through 1997.

NONRADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE

There were no reported events meeting the nonradiological sabotage criteria during the period 1990 through 1997.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The threat was determined to be noncredible.

Source: Licensee

X-96-12	Date: 11/12/96	Site: Clinton Illinois Power Company DeWitt County, IL
---------	----------------	--

Plant Status: Unit 1, Refueling Shutdown
Fuel present at site.

Event: Threat. At 11:30 p.m., the security guard in the badge office received a telephone call from an anonymous individual who said the following and then hung up: "Need to speak to Yes, this is We're going to kill you."

Action: Security questioned the guard as to whether he had any known enemies.

Resolution: The guard's response was negative. He stated that his brother was a detective for the County Sheriff. No perpetrator was identified.

Source: Licensee

X-97-01	Date: 03/28/97	Site: Three Mile Island GPU Nuclear Corporation Dauphin County, PA
---------	----------------	--

PN1-97-018

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Demonstrators arrested. At 6:10 a.m., on the 18th anniversary of the TMI Unit 2 accident, three of six protestors blocking the front gate were arrested by State Police for causing a public endangerment. The other three left the area without a disturbance.

Action: Security monitored the front gate, and as an added protection, the heavy duty steel gate was closed to prevent an intruder from crossing the bridge onto the island.

Resolution: Plant workers were able to drive around the protestors and enter the plant. By 6:30 a.m., plant access was unrestricted and all protestors had left the area.

Source: Licensee

X-97-02	Date: 04/17/97	Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service Company Maricopa County, AZ
---------	----------------	---

PN-IV-97-02
Event #32171

Plant Status: Units 1, 2, and 3,
Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Contract employee arrested offsite. A contract foreman with unescorted access was arrested by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department for the April 14, 1997, offsite murder of another contract employee with unescorted access

Action: The licensee made the appropriate notifications.

Resolution: Unescorted access was withdrawn upon notification of the arrest. The criminal act did not involve or adversely affect the public, and there was no threat to public health and safety.

Source: Licensee

X-97-03	Date: 04/26/97	Site: Seabrook Public Service Company of New Hampshire Rockingham County, NH
---------	----------------	--

PN-97-025A

Plant Status: Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Protestors arrested. Forty protestors were arrested for trespassing after climbing the owner-controlled fence during the Clamshell Alliance 20th anniversary civil-disobedience rally.

Action: The NRC resident inspectors observed the licensee's control of and response to the demonstration.

Resolution: The demonstration and arrests were conducted in an orderly manner.

Source: Licensee

X-97-04	Date: 05/08/97	Site: Shearon Harris Carolina Power and Light Company Wake County, NC
---------	----------------	---

IAT Call

Plant Status: Unit 1, Refueling Shutdown
Fuel present at site.

Event: Threat. A maintenance worker received a voice mail from an unknown young woman that was an obscene, vague veiled threat.

Action: The Wake County Sheriff was notified and assistance requested. A search was conducted.

Resolution: The search results were negative. The threat was determined to be noncredible.

Source: Region IV

X-97-05	Date: 08/15/97	Site: St. Lucie Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie County, FL
---------	----------------	--

PNO II-97-045

Plant Status: Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A contract security supervisor was arrested and charged for an event unrelated to the plant operation.

Action: The individual's unescorted facility access was suspended.

Resolution: Charges were dropped and the supervisor returned to work.

Source: Licensee

X-97-06	Date: 08/22/97	Site: Vermont Yankee Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Windham County, VT
---------	----------------	--

PNO-1-97-053

Follow Up Resolution

Plant Status: Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: The licensee reported that an individual responsible for killing four persons in New Hampshire before being killed in a police shootout had unescorted access at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim, and Indian Point 3. Numerous incendiary devices were discovered in his residence after it was destroyed by fire.

Action: The individual's personnel files and documentation were reviewed by the FBI and NRC staff.

Resolution: Investigation by NRC and law enforcement personnel revealed no indications that the subject had any malevolent intent towards any of the facilities to which he had access.

Source: Licensee

Safeguards Events

1987-1997

NUMBER OF EVENTS




Figure 1

Safeguards Events by Category (24)

1997




Figure 2

Reactor Safeguards Events

1987-1997

■ Power □ Nonpower




Figure 3

Nonreactor Safeguards Events

1987-1997





Figure 4

A-4

Safeguards Events by Category (1077)


1987-1997



A-5

Figure 5

U.S. Commercial Power Reactors Licensed to Operate 1987-1997



Note: Regions IV and V were merged in 1993.

Figure 6

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

(See instructions on the reverse)

1. REPORT NUMBER
(Assigned by NRC. Add Vol., Supp., Rev.,
and Addendum Numbers, if any.)

NUREG-0525
Vol. 2, Rev. 6

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)
January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1997

3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

MONTH YEAR

July 1998

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

5. AUTHOR(S)

A. A. Danis

6. TYPE OF REPORT

Informational Listing

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if contractor, provide name and mailing address.)

Operations Branch
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type "Same as above"; if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address.)

Same as above.

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.)

Safeguards Events
Reactors
Fuel Cycle Facilities
Bomb Threats

13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

unlimited

14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(This Page)

unclassified

(This Report)

unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE



Federal Recycling Program