

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/88002(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-409

License No. DPR-45

Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative
2615 East Avenue - South
La Crosse, WI 54601

Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR)

Inspection At: Regional Office

Inspection Conducted: March 21-23, 1988

Type of Inspection: Allegation Review

Inspector: *G. M. Christoffer*
G. M. Christoffer
Physical Security Inspector

4/25/88
Date

Approved By: *J. R. Creed*
J. R. Creed, Chief
Safeguards Section

4/25/88
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 21-23, 1988, (Report No. 50-409/88002(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Included a review of allegations received by Region III of: alarm operators were told to disregard alarms to clean their work area; the licensee's screening program was misused.

Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined during the inspection. The allegations were not substantiated.

DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

- *F. Evitch, Security Director, LACBWR
- *S. Bussian, Post Commander, Burns International Security Services Incorporated, (BISSI)

*These persons were telephonically contacted.

2. Entrance and Exit Interview (IP 30703)

There were no formal entrance or exit interviews conducted. However, a telephone exit interview was conducted with Mr. Frank Evitch on April 11, 1983. He was advised that the allegations were unsubstantiated.

3. Allegation Review (099014)

The following provided in the form of allegation, were reviewed by the inspector as specifically noted below:

- a. Background: (Closed) Allegation No. RIII-87-A-0162: The Region III office telephonically received information on December 9, 1987, from a security office at LACBWR, alleging that he had been required to take a psychological evaluation for some domestic problems he was experiencing with his wife. The security officer stated that the evaluation was not required and implied that the evaluation was based on management's wrong interpretation of NRC rules pertaining to psychological evaluations.

Allegation: A security officer at LACBWR was required to take a psychological evaluation because of some domestic problems. He thought the psychological evaluation was not required and implied that the evaluation was based on management's wrong interpretation of NRC rules.

Review: The inspector reviewed documentation provided by the licensee. Documentation included Viroqua Police Department Complaint for November 23, 1987; Viroqua Police Department Daily Activity Log with information dated November 9, 1987; MMPI Psychological Report for Armed Security Officer dated December 11, 1987; LACBWR Security Director's outline of events regarding allegation dated December 4, 1987. Additionally, on March 22, 1988, the inspector telephonically interviewed the Security Director and BISSI Post Commander.

The information provided to the NRC indicated that the LACBWR Security Director was initially informed in December 1987 that a security guard may have been referred to the Douglas Mental

Health Center. Since the security guard was assigned to a position requiring him to be armed the Security Director contacted the Douglas Mental Health Center. The Security Director found the center could not release any information. The Security Director also learned that a local law enforcement agency may have a record of an incident involving the security guard.

The Security Director obtained a copy of report, dated November 23, 1987 from the Viroqua, Wisconsin, Police Department. The police responded to a domestic complaint at the security officer's residence along with the on-call worker for the Douglas Mental Health Center. The Security Director also learned the Viroqua police had responded to the residence on other occasion for similar matters; however, only one report was written.

After obtaining the information, the Security Director contacted the BISSI Post Commander and a BISSI Regional Manager. A decision was made to suspend the individual, pending an investigation of the security officer being involved in possible aberrant behavior as indicated in the police report. The individual was suspended on December 4, 1987. As a result, the individual's access was suspended and he was later requested to take a psychological evaluation.

The psychological evaluation was requested because management concluded that the officer may have exhibited aberrant behavior according to the police report, and because they could not substantiate that the security officer was referred to the Health Center for psychological evaluation. Since the licensee could not attest that the security officer met the behavioral qualifications required by Part 73, Appendix B and the LACBWR Training and Qualification Plan, he was requested to take a psychological evaluation before being allowed to return to work. He took the test on December 9, 1987. The results were reviewed by a psychologist from Baker and Associates Incorporated on December 11, 1987. The psychological report conclusion was the officer met the criteria for unescorted status. The security officer was allowed to return to work at LACBWR on December 11, 1987.

Conclusion: This allegation was not substantiated. The security officer was requested to taken a psychological evaluation based on 1) information written in a police report for a domestic disturbance, 2) information based on hearsay information provided to the licensee and 3) the licensees determination that in order for them to attest the officer was mentally suitable to perform as an armed guard. The licensee was in compliance with the security plan. This allegation is considered closed.

- b. Background: (Closed) Allegation No. RIII-87-A-0169: The Region III office telephonically received information on December 28, 1987, from a security officer at LACBWR, alleging that in mid December 1987,

the day shift CAS and SAS operators were told to disregard all routine job functions in order to clean up the CAS and SAS stations. While the CAS and SAS operators were in the process of cleaning their stations, one of the intrusion alarms went into an alarm condition; however, due to the CAS and SAS operators being involved in cleaning the CAS and SAS areas, they failed to observe the alarm. The alarm was subsequently discovered by a security supervisor approximately 44 minutes later. The CAS and SAS operators were suspended for one day for not taking appropriate corrective action.

Allegation: An intrusion alarm from a perimeter of the plant was not responded to by the security force until 44 minutes after the alarm was received. The alarm station operators were allegedly told to disregard all routine job functions in order to clean the alarm stations.

Review: The inspector reviewed documentation that was provided by the licensee. Documentation included "LACBWR Security Guard Activity Report," dated December 20, 1987; "Burns International Security Services Incident Reports," dated December 20, 1987; computer printout of alarms for December 20, 1987; and "LACBWR Safeguards Event Log," which included information for December 20, 1987. This documentation was reviewed in-office by the inspector. Additionally, the inspector telephonically interviewed the Security Director on March 21-22, 1988, and interviewed the BISSI Post Commander on March 22, 1988.

The information provided indicated that on December 20, 1987, the licensee experienced a problem with the alarm system. Since technicians were not readily available, a Sergeant knowledgeable of the alarm system, took the necessary actions to fix the problem. The Sergeant was authorized to perform the actions.

After notifying the appropriate persons, at 8:36 a.m. the Sergeant opened a Tamper Box located in a building in the protected area, to work on the interior of the box. When the tamper box was opened an alarm was generated in the alarm stations. Since the Sergeant was already present and it was a prearranged alarm, it was not necessary for other guards to physically respond. The Sergeant closed the tamper box within one minute. Although the alarm station operators were aware of the alarm, it was not cleared until 44 minutes later.

The SAS operator did not clear the alarm until, he later ran a check of the system and found that the alarm on the tamper box was not cleared. The SAS operator cleared the alarm at 9:20 a.m. and notified the Sergeant of the incident. The CAS operator did not clear the alarm. He was notified at 9:20 a.m. by SAS that the alarm was not cleared. Access control computer printouts showed that there were no entry or exits from the building since the Sergeant opened the tamper box and, there were no further alarms on the tamper box. Additionally, the building doors were under observation by a guard that was posted in the area.

In the BISSI Incident Report written by the SAS operator, he replied he did not know how he missed clearing the alarm. The SAS operator was given a written reprimand for failing to properly/timely clear an alarm. The CAS operator was given a one day suspension because in July 1987, he had received a written reprimand for failure to "follow proper procedures in CAS/SAS, missing alarms in CAS." Both officers were retrained and recertified in proper clearing of an alarm.

Additionally, telephonic interviews with the Security Director and Post Commander indicated that guards were requested to clean the duty areas, but if the guards felt that cleaning interfered with their job functions, it could be done after the guard was relieved from his post. Security officers were not told to disregard all routine job functions in order to clean the alarm stations.

Conclusion: The allegation regarding response to an alarm was not substantiated. With the alarm operators knowledge, a Sergeant opened a tamper box and caused an alarm. The box was closed within the minute. However, the SAS operator did not clear the alarm until 44 minutes after the alarm was received. This did not have an adverse effect on the facility's protection, in that, the doors to the building were under observation by a guard and, computer printout documentation showed no further entry or exit activity from the area. Additionally, if the box was reopened, it would cause an alarm. This allegation is considered closed.

The allegation regarding the alarm station operators being told to disregard all routine job functions in order to clean alarm stations, is not substantiated. Guards were requested to clean their work areas, but if they felt that these duties interfered with their assigned job functions, they could wait until they were relieved from their post. The inspector determined that this policy does not have an adverse effect on the facility protection. This allegation is considered closed.