



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

AUG 17 1988

Docket No. 50-424  
License No. NPF-68  
EA 88-167

Georgia Power Company  
ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston, III  
Senior Vice President -  
Nuclear Operations  
Post Office Box 4545  
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION  
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-424/88-24)

This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted at the Vogtle facility on June 7-9, 1988. The inspection included a review of the circumstances surrounding the June 3, 1988, event where water leakage through the upper cable spreading room penetrations occurred. The report documenting this inspection was sent to you by letter dated June 29, 1988. As a result of this inspection, a significant failure to comply with NRC regulatory requirements was identified, and accordingly, NRC concerns relative to the inspection findings were discussed in an Enforcement Conference held on July 5, 1988. The letter summarizing this Conference was sent to you on July 21, 1988.

The violation described in the enclosed Notice of Violation involved a failure to adequately design the upper cable spreading room penetration sealing system to be water tight. The event that resulted in this violation included water leakage into the control room which in turn caused the spurious operation of safe shutdown components and the subsequent identification of an unreviewed safety issue. This water leakage into the control room occurred as a result of inadequate hydrostatic prototype design testing of the upper cable spreading room penetrations to assure a water tight seal.

A postulated fire in the "B" train cable spreading room with either automatic actuation of the cable spreading room sprinkler system and/or manual fire suppression activities as a result of a fire could have rendered the "B" train of safe shutdown equipment inoperable. As demonstrated by the June 3, 1988 event, the condition of the penetration seals with respect to their inability to preclude water from entering the control room could have rendered the "A" train instrumentation inoperable due to water leaking through the "B" train cable spreading room penetration seals and infiltrating into the associated "A" train instrumentation panels located in the control room immediately below the "B" train cable spreading room. There is an increased importance of maintaining the "A" train components in an operable status because a fire in

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the "B" train cable spreading room would render the auxiliary shutdown panel required to meet the fire protection shutdown criteria inoperable.


In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the violation described in the enclosed Notice has been classified as a Severity Level III violation. Normally, a civil penalty is considered for a Severity Level III violation. However, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations, I have decided that a civil penalty will not be proposed in this case because of your prompt and extensive compensatory measures and short term corrective actions in response to the June 3, 1988, event; your proposed corrective actions associated with the redesign of the penetration sealing system; and your prior good performance with respect to design control.

You are required to respond to this letter and the enclosed Notice and should follow the instructions specified therein when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. In particular, describe the final design of the penetration seals to ensure a water tight seal. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

The responses directed by this letter and its enclosure is not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511.

Sincerely,



J. Nelson Grace  
Regional Administrator

Enclosure:  
Notice of Violation

cc w/encl:  
R. P. McDonald, Executive Vice  
President, Nuclear Operations  
P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project  
Director

cc w/encl: (cont'd on page 3)

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cc w/encl: (cont'd)  
C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality  
Assurance Manager  
G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager,  
Nuclear Operations  
L. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety  
and Licensing  
J. A. Bailey, Project Licensing  
Manager  
B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw,  
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge  
D. Kirkland, III, Counsel,  
Office of the Consumer's Utility  
Council  
D. Feig, Georgians Against  
Nuclear Energy