UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-44

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

INDRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION

By letter dated January 15, 1986, the licensee proposed to change Technical Specification Table 3.3-9, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation, by deleting the transfer switches associated with auxiliary feedwater system valves 3FWA-AOV-61A, B and 62 A, B. The purpose of the change is to correct an error in Table 3.3-9; with the change, the table will reflect actual plant configuration.

During plant startup and normal plant shutdown, operation of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system involves using the safety-related, air operated valves in each motor driven AFW pump suction line (valves 61A, B). The suction valves 61A and 61B are normally open and receive a safety signal to open on AFW pump start, safety injection or loss of power to assure proper alignment with the safety grade demineralized water storage tank (DWST). The discharge line cross-connect valves 62A and 62B are normally closed, and receive a safety signal to close on AFW pump start, safety injection or loss of power to assure independence between the two motor driven pump trains during hot standby. This allows each motor-driven pump train to feed a pair of steam generators directly from the DWST. During normal plant startup and shutdown operations, these valves are repositioned to allow use of the nonsafety grade condensate water storage tank to preserve the water inventory in the safety grade DWST.

The full capacity turbine-driven AFW pump, which supplies water to all four steam generators from the DWST, contains only locked-open manual suction valves thereby assuring pump availability for all safe shutdown operations. In the event that the control room must be evacuated, the steam driven AFW pump is the primary means of removing decay heat. Control over this pump is from the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP).

Technical Specification Table 3.3-9 and FSAR Table 7.4-1 currently indicate that valves 3FWA-AOV 61A, B and 62 A, B can be operated from the ASP. This, however, is not a prerequisite for the AFW system to satisfy safe shutdown and Appendix R requirements because of the capability at the ASP to control the steam-driven AFW pump. The applicant stated that the existing error in the Technical Specifications (and FSAR drawings) is due to a late system design change.

During development of the final design drawings, it was determined that control of the subject AFW system valves for the ASP was not necessary. However, through an oversight, a design drawing showing these switches removed from the ASP was not incorporated into the FSAR. As a result, the Technical Specifications were prepared under the supposition that the switches were located at the ASP.

EVALUATION

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The control over the four AFW system valves in question is not necessary from the remote shutdown panel to satisfy safe shutdown or Appendix R requirements since alternate safe shutdown capability is provided for at the ASP.

Therefore, the deletion of the four transfer switches associated with valves FWA-AOV-61A, B and 62 A, B from Table 3.3-9 is being done to correct an identified error in the Technical Specifications.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5 (d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal, need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The state was informed by telephone on January 17, 1986 of our proposed no significant hazards consideration and had no comments. Based on our review of the licensee's submittal as described in our above evaluation and for the reasons stated below, we have made a final determination that the licensee's amendment request does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has provided guidance for the application of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing examples of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations (48 FR 148 70); example (i) lists administrative changes. The application corrects an administrative error which allowed an erroneous FSAR change to be incorporated into the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the Commission has determined that the application does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: JAN 22 1986

The following NRC personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation:

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