LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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Two 2-inch core drills containing one and a half inch conduit were found unlealed. A review of construction documentation identified that both core drills were installed under a field Change Request "B" that was initiated in May 1981. The electrical circuits contained in the conduits are identified on the E-series (electrical) drawings; however, the core drills were not identified on the composite (floor/wall layout) drawings. Immediately upon discovery, the Shift Supervisor was notified, a continuous fire watch established, and a Priority 1 Maintenance Work Request initiated for repair.

The consequences due to this event were minimal. The core drill penetrated fifty-one inches of concrete and each two inch core drill has a one and a half inch conduit passing through it which reduces the penetration opening to one quarter inch around the inside circumference. The fire loading in each area, as provided in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report, is such a small value that the required fire barrier between the areas would be less than thirty minutes. In addition, no safe shutdown equipment is located in the affected areas.

Two additional walls have been inspected with the Resident NRC Inspector present during the inspection of one and no discrepancies identified. As the result of the aforementioned inspection and the extensive walkdowns performed during turnover, the Licensee considers this to be an isolated event and plans no additional action other than scheduled maintenance and surveillance testing.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	0 5 0 0 0 3 9	5 8 8 - C 10 14 - 010 012 OF 0 13

TEXT (If more spice is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

PLANT IL NTIFICATION

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION

Fire Barrier - EIIS (KP)

IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT

Two "2 inch" Core Drills Found Unsealed: Root Cause Unknown

EVENT DATE

May 26, 1981 to October 8, 1981

DISCOVERY DATE

April 8, 1988

REPORT DATE

April 22, 1988

This report was initiated by Off-Normal Report 88015.

CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Mode 1 100% Power

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On April 8, 1988, Civil Maintenance found an unsealed 2-inch core drill during maintenance activity. On April 15, 1988, the Fire Protection Coordinator performed an inspection of the entire north wall of the Control Building 412' elevation and an additional 2-inch core drill was found unsealed.

Following the identification of each unsealed core drill, the Shift Supervisor was immediately notified, a continuous fire watch established, and a Priority 1 Maintenance Work Request initiated for repair.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OM8 NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31 85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER			
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	0 5 0 0 0 3 9	15 8 1 8 - 010 14 - 010 01	3 OF 0 3		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of this event is unknown. Investigation found that the two core drills were installed under the same document. Field Change Request "B" (FCR-B) 13,855 was initiated May 26, 1981 for the installation and was closed out October 8, 1981. The lighting system that passes through the core drills are identified on the E-series (electrical) drawings; however, the core drills were not identified on the appropriate composite (floor/wall layout) drawings. The failure to identify the core drills on the composite drawings contributed to the penetrations not being sealed or being identified during turnover from construction to operation. The core drills on the Control Building side are located at the 422' elevation and masked by a false ce'ling. On the Auxiliary Building side, one core drill was covered by an electrical junction box and the other was masked by a ventilation duct.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The consequences due to this event were minimal. The core drill penetrated fifty-one inches of concrete and each two inch core drill has a one and a half inch conduit passing through it which reduces the penetration opening to one quarter inch around the inside circumference. The fire loading in each area, as provided in the Fire Protection Evaluation Report, is such a small value that the required fire barrier between the areas would be less than thirty minutes. In addition, no safe shutdown equipment is located in the affected areas.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

As stated in the Description of Event, immediate action was taken to notify the Shift Supervisor of the as found condition, a continuous fire watch was established and a priority MWR initiated for the repair.

ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTION

On April 18, 1988, two additional walls were inspected with the Resident NRC Inspector present during the inspection of one and no discrepancies identified. As the result of the aforementioned inspection and the extensive walkdowns performed during turnover, the Licensee considers this to be an isolated event and plans no additional action other than scheduled maintenance and surveillance testing.

PRIOR OCCURRENCES

None



South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Jenkinsville, SC 29065 (803) 345-4041

Dan A. Nauman Vice President Nuclear Operations

April 22, 1988

Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

Docket No. 50/395

Operating License No. NPF-12

LER 88-004

Gentlemen:

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 88-004 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

RJB/DAN: 1cd Attachment

pc: J.G.Connelly, Jr./O. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.

E. C. Roberts

W. A. Williams, Jr.

J. N. Grace

J. J. Hayes, Jr.

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