

DETAILS1. Persons ContactedAP&L

- *G. Campbell, Vice President, Nuclear
- *J. Levine, Executive Director, Nuclear Operations
- *L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality
- *E. Ewing, General Manager, Plant Support
- *W. Pecks, Manager, Training
- *D. Boyd, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- *R. Gresham, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- *J. Bishop, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- *D. Smith, Lead Trainer, Unit 1 Simulator
- *F. Van Buskirk, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- *D. Snellings, Corporate Health Physicist
- *R. Carroll, Health Physics Specialist
- *D. Howard, Manager, Licensing

NRC

- *W. Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials and Emergency Preparedness Branch, Region IV
- *W. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, ANO
- *G. Dick, NRR ANO Project Manager

The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training, and emergency response organization.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

(Closed) Deficiency 313/8710-02: Emergency Classification Delay - The NRC inspector determined that the licensee's staff promptly declared emergency classifications during the 1988 emergency exercise. In addition, the inspector noted that procedures included the containment high range monitors in their accident evaluation and classification scheme. Additionally, the inspector determined that a method for evaluating core damage during accident conditions was in place.

3. Control Room (82301-1.0)

The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Control Room (CR) during the exercise. These activities included CR emergency response organization staffing, radiation protection, recordkeeping, communications, and information flow with other emergency response facilities (ERFs). In addition, the inspector observed turnover of

responsibilities, detection and classification of emergency events, formulation of action recommendations, notifications, interface with offsite officials and the NRC, and the general conduct of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.

Control Room operators promptly detected accident conditions and correctly classified the emergency. Licensee operators made emergency notifications timely. In addition, they promptly implemented procedural requirements and demonstrated resourcefulness (e.g., anticipating fluid requirements on shutdown). The staff established the habitability of the CR within 30 minutes of declaration of the Alert classification. Control Room personnel were thorough in implementing radiological controls (e.g., warning chemistry and health physics personnel when the reactor coolant activity increased). Communications and information flow from the CR to ERFs were good. Finally, CR personnel demonstrated efficient team coordination in responding to a major casualty requiring extensive control board manipulations.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

4. Technical Support Center (82310-2.0)

The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Technical Support Center (TSC) during the exercise. These activities included TSC emergency response organization staffing, radiation protection, recordkeeping, communications and information flow with other ERFs, turnover of responsibilities, and technical assistance and support to the control room. In addition, the inspector observed detection and classification of emergency events, formulation of action recommendations, communications and information flow with other ERFs, notifications, interface with offsite officials and the NRC, and the general conduct of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.

The NRC inspector noted that the Emergency Coordinator regularly updated TSC staff on plant status, and kept noise levels to a minimum. Staffing, activation, technical assistance, and support to the CR were adequate and timely.

The TSC staff failed to recognize that from 11:40 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. the containment spray pumps were not running. At that time, the TSC staff decided to start the spray pumps manually without flow from the sodium hydroxide tank to reduce excessive reactor building pressure. The inspector noted that because of this delay, more radioactive materials would have been released to the environment. This constitutes a deficiency (313/8309-01; 368/8809-01).

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

5. Emergency Operations Facility (82301-3.0)

The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) during the exercise. These activities included EOF emergency response organization staffing and facility activation. In addition, the inspectors observed offsite dose assessment, formulation of offsite protective action recommendations, notifications, interface with offsite officials and the NRC, and the general conduct of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.

The NRC inspector observed that the licensee activated the EOF, and was ready to assume command and control at declaration of site area emergency. The EOF Director provided routine status briefings to the EOF staff, and informed them of emergency conditions requiring prompt response actions. The EOF staff properly integrated dose assessment functions with the evaluation of plant conditions to ensure correct formulation of protective action recommendations. Environmental monitoring teams were dispatched to obtain field information. The EOF Director promptly detected General Emergency conditions, correctly classified the emergency, and properly made protective action recommendations to offsite agencies.

The NRC inspector noted that during the general emergency, the EOF director made protective action recommendations to the state of Arkansas in terms of radii and sectors. State officials did not understand these recommendations, because sectors and radii were not compatible with the state's evacuation zones. As a consequence, the state implemented evacuation measures less conservative than those intended. Protective actions implemented might have been inadequate to protect the health and safety of the public.

This constitutes a deficiency (313/8809-02; 368/8809-02).

The NRC inspector noted that this deficiency was identified during the licensee's post-exercise critique.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

6. Operational Support Center (82301-4.0)

The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Operations Support Center (OSC) during the exercise, including OSC emergency response organization staffing and facility activation. In addition, the inspector observed team briefings, equipment and instrumentation, status board upkeep, information flow with other ERFs, radiological controls, logistics and support of inplant teams, and the general conduct of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.

Communications and information flow in the OSC were adequate. The inspector noted that coordination and support of inplant activities required by the operations staff was efficient.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

7. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with the NRC resident inspector and licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 on March 24, 1988, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.