APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Arkansas Power & Light Company
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1

Docket: 50-313
License: DPR-51

During an NRC inspection conducted during the period June 1-30, 1988, two violations of NRC requirements were identified. The violations involved failure to properly control the design criteria of a plant modification and failure to provide timely corrective action. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the violations are listed below:

A. Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, "Design Control," states, in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and design basis . . . are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions."

Contrary to the above, on June 13, 1988, the NRC inspector found that the design basis for Plant Change No. 88-1919 for installation of a larger diameter hinge pin on Service Water Check Valve SW-1A was not correctly translated into instructions. The engineering justification for a material change for the pin was based on increasing the new pin diameter by 1/8 inch to offset the reduced yield strength of the new material. The fabrication instructions did not specify a 1/8-inch increase in pin diameter, but instead required the new pin be machined to fit the smallest dimension of the mating parts. The incorrect instructions resulted in the installed pin diameter only being increased by 1/16 inch.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation. (Supplement I)(313/8820-02)

B. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, "Corrective Action," states, in part, "Measures shall be established to assure conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Paragraph 16.2.2 of the Arkansas Power & Light Company's Quality Assurance Manual for Operations requires that cognizant supervisors review discrepancies discovered during the course of station operations and take appropriate action to resolve the discrepancies and evaluate their safety significance.

Contrary to the above, on June 8 and 14, 1988, the NRC inspector observed two examples of failure to promptly identify and correct deficiencies and evaluate their safety significance. These examples are as follows:

1. On June 8, 1988, the NRC inspector observed higher than normal fuel oil pressure during a surveillance test of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2K4B. A job request was initiated in January 1987

for correction of the high fuel oil pressure, but no evaluation of safety significance was performed to address the possible affects of high fuel oil pressure on EDG operation.

2. On June 14, 1988, the NRC inspector observed caution cards that were dated June 19, 1986, attached to breakers 0123 and 0124 on 125 volt DC bus, D01. The caution cards stated the breakers could not be operated with the outer breaker lever. This condition is significant in that breaker 0124 is used for remote shutdown purposes, and the operator would be required to remove the breaker cover for internal operation of the breaker under conditions that require plant shutdown outside the control room. A further review revealed that this condition has existed for these breakers since April 11, 1985.

This is a Severity Level IV violation. (Supplement I)(313;368/8820-01)

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Arkansas Power & Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to this office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation if admitted, (2) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Dated at Arlington, Texas,
this 29th day of July, 1988.