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	20.406(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(v	(A)	below and in Text, NRC Form 366A/
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v	(L)(B)	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3654's) (17)

#### A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), because an unplanned actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS EIIS Code JC) occurred and because an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) failed to operate as expected. Specifically, one outboard isolation valve in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS EIIS Code JM) Group 1 failed to close in response to a planned isolation signal.

## B. UNIT(s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

Power Level/Operating Mode

Unit 2 was in the startup mode following the unit's seventh refueling outage at an approximate power level of 172 MWt (approximately 5 percent of rated thermal power). Reactor vessel pressure was at approximately 150 psig, and the main turbine was in the "tripped" condition.

2. Inoperable Equipment

There was no inoperable equipment that contributed to this event.

- C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
  - 1. Event

At approximately 0920 CST on 3/18/88, non-licensed plant Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technicians and licensed Operations personnel were performing surveillance procedure 34SV-C71-005-2S (Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Instrument Functional Test), Revision 1. This surveillance is required to demonstrate the operability of the turbine control valve fast closure instrumentation, which provides an activation signal for RPS. It is performed prior to reaching the run mode per Technical Specification Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, item 10, and Table 4.3.1-1, item 10. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

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NRC Form 366A

In order to perform this functional test, the scram bypass feature (when less than 30% rated thermal power) must be removed. Procedure 34SV-C71-005-2S, Revision 1, provided for this bypass to be removed by opening electrical link DD-61 in panel 2H11-P609 (RPS channel A) and electrical link DD-61 in panel 2H11-P611 (RPS channel B). However, the procedure did not require that the turbine trip be reset prior to performing these two steps.

With the turbine in the tripped mode, no electrohydraulic control oil pressure was available on the turbine control valves; consequently, the turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches were in the open position. With these pressure switches in the open position, RPS received a full scram signal at 0921 CST when opening the electrical links removed the scram bypass feature of the logic system.

Reactor vessel water level was controlled within its normal range by operations personnel through use of the Feedwater Control System (FCS EIIS SJ). Due to the low power level prior to the scram and the injection of cold Control Rod Drive (CRD EIIS AA) water, reactor pressure decreased in a controlled manner.

At 0940 CST, operations personnel reset the reactor scram. At 1050 CST, the NRC was notified of the actuation of RPS per 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements.

At approximately 1115 CST, operations personnel broke the main condenser vacuum because the main turbine steam seal could not be maintained due to low steam pressure. As a result, an expected PCIS Group 1 isolation occurred. All Group 1 valves responded to the isolation signal except the outboard main steam line drain isolation valve 2B21-F019 (EIIS Code SB), which failed to close. Operations personnel immediately closed isolation valve 2B21-F019 with the valve's manual switch (S-5) on panel 2H11-P602.

At 1327 CST, the NRC was notified per 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements of the failure of one valve to close in response to the expected Group 1 isolation.

NRC Form 366A (9-53)	LICENSEE	EVENT REPOR	T (I.ER) TEXT CONTINU	US	APPROVED OMB I EXPIRES: 8/31/88	NO. 3150-010
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2.	Dates/Times	;				
	Date	Time (CST)	Description			
	3/18/88	0920	<pre>1&amp;C personnel and personnel were per surveillance proce 34SV-C71-005-2S.</pre>	operations rforming cdure		
		0921	A full reactor sci electrical links of remove the scram b less than 30% rate The scram resulter control valve fas since the turbine condition.	ram occurred w were opened to bypass feature ed thermal pow d from a turbi t closure sign was in the tr	when (when wer). ne al ipped	
		0940	The reactor scram	was reset.		
		1050	The NRC was notif of RPS per 10 CFR requirements.	ied of the act 50.72 reporti	uation ng	
		1115	Upon loss of cond Group 1 valves is except isolation Operations person closed the valve switch (S-5).	enser vacuum, olated (as exp valve 2B21-F01 nel immediatel with its manua	all pected) 9. y 1	
		1327	The NRC was notif reporting require of one Group 1 va	ied per 10 CFF ments of the f lve to close.	50.72 Tailure	
3.	Other Syste	ems Affected				
	No safety s were affect functions.	systems, othe ted by this e	er than the RPS and event. These system	PCIS valve Gr ms have no sec	oup 1, ondary	

NRC FORL- 3684 (9-63)

NRC Form 364 19-83)	6.4	LICENSEE	EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT	CONTIN	UATIO	N	U.S.	APPROVED C EXPIRES: 8/31	MB NO 3	150-0	104
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	4.	Method of D	iscovery									
		The procedu reactor scr failure of discovered condenser v	ral deficien am during pe Group 1 isol during the p acuum was br	cy was disc rformance o ation valve lanned Grou oken.	overed f the p 2B21-F p 1 isc	as a proced 019 t platic	resu lure. to cl	ult of The lose wa nen the	the is e main			
	5.	Operator Ac	tions									
		Operations	personnel pe	rformed the	follow	ving a	ctio	ons:				
		1.	Following t 31EO-EOP-OO reactor con shutdown.	he reactor 1-2S (Path ditions and	scram, 2 Flow procee	initi Chart d wit	ated :) to :h re	d proce o stabi eactor	edure ilize			
		2.	Following t manually cl failure to	he expected osed valve close autom	Group 2B21-FC aticall	1 isc )19 fc y.	olati	ion, ving it	ts			
		3.	Initiated a investigati AG-MGR-31-0	n event rev on per plar 787N.	iew tea t admir	um (ER nistra	(T) ative	e guide	eline			
		Nuclear Saf following a	ety and Comp ction:	liance (NSC	) perso	onnel	per	formed	the			
		١.	Participate reported pe	d in the ever r 10 CFR 50	ent inv .73 rec	vestig quirem	gatio nents	on and s.				
	6.	Auto/Manual	Safety Syst	em Regronse								
		An unplanne per design. occurred wh Specificall 2B21-F019, closed the	d RPS actuat A planned ere the ESF y, outboard failed to is valve.	tion occurre PCIS valve failed to o main steam colate so op	d and s Group 1 operate drain 1 peration	scramn isol as ex line i ns per	ned tic (pec) isola rson	the rea on actu ted. ation w nel man	actor uation valve, nually			

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D.	CAUSE 1.	OF EVENT Immediate Cause								1	
		The immediate cause of root cause.	f the RPS actuation	is th	ie sa	ame a	s the				
		The immediate cause of 2B21-F019 to close was of the Group 1 isolati	f the failure of iso determined to be t ion signal. Condense	latio he la	ick o	alve of re swit	ceipt				

The immediate cause of the failure of isolation valve 2B21-F019 to close was determined to be the lack of receipt of the Group 1 isolation signal. Condenser vacuum switches 2B21-N056C and 2B21-N056D are designed to open on low condenser vacuum. When these vacuum switches are opened by low condenser vacuum, an isolation signal circuit is available to isolate valves 2B21-F019 and 2B31-F020 on a valve Group 1 isolation signal. The ERT determined that neither valve could have received an isolation signal since relays in the circuit that would have opened upon receipt of a Group 1 isolation signal remained closed. Valve 2B31-F020 was already in a closed position so its failure to receive an isolation signal had not been immediately apparent.

#### 2. Root/Intermediate Cause

1.1.4

The root cause of the RPS actuation is a procedural deficiency. Surveillance procedure 34SV-C71-005-2S, Revision 0, (Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Instrument Functional Test) was developed and issued on 4/21/86 for the purpose of meeting the reactor protection instrumentation testing requirements of Unit 2 Technical Specifications Table 3.3.1-1, item 10, notes I and K, and to give the procedure an Operations department number.

The ERT determined that procedure 34SV-C71-005-2S, Revision 0 (and subsequently, Revision 1), failed to provide the proper procedural steps necessary for procedure performance with the turbine in the "tripped" mode. When plant personnel removed both electrical link DD-61 in panel 2H11-P609 (RPS channel A) and electrical link DD-61 in panel 2H11-P611 (RPS channel B), the "less than 30 percent reactor power" scram bypass feature was removed. Consequently, a full reactor scram occurred on a turbine control valve fast closure signal.

Procedure 34SV-C71-005-2S replaced procedure 57SV-C71-002-2 (Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Instrument Functional Test). Surveillance procedure 57SV-C71-002-2 was properly written so that the surveillance could have been performed with the turbine in any mode of operation without scramming the reactor.

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However, the ERT also determined that Revision 2 of procedure 34SV-C71-005-2S had just become effective on 3/18/88. Revision 2 had been developed by the Procedure Upgrade Program, a long term program to upgrade procedure format and and correct any possible procedure deficiencies. Following the scram, the ERT reviewed Revision 2 and determined it was written satisfactorily in that it could be performed in any turbine mode without actuating the RPS (i.e., if the turbine is in the "tripped" mode each logic channel will be tested separately).

The root cause of the failure of isolation valves 2B21-F019 and 2B31-F020 to receive an isolation signal could not be conclusively identified. Plant technicians completed procedure 57SV-B21-005-2S (Condenser Vacuum Instrument FT&C) at approximately 1500 CST on 3/18/88 and found condenser vacuum switches 2B21-N056C and 2B21-N056D to be within procedure tolerance. Concurrent with the calibration check of the vacuum switches, plant technicians removed the vacuum switch sensing lines and purged them with approximately 25 psig air pressure in the event that debris had accumulated.

Additionally, the isolation root valves, on the vacuum switch sensing lines for condenser vacuum switches 2B21-N056 A, B, C, and D, were disassembled and inspected to assure that the valve discs were securely attached to their respective valve stems. All the discs were found to be securely attached.

At approximately 2155 CST on 3/18/88, operations personnel functionally tested the vacuum switches by unbypassing the condenser low vacuum trip logic system in order to receive a Group 1 valve isolation actuation. An isolation signal was successfully generated for both valves 2B21-F019 and 2B31-F020, and isolation valve 2B21-F019 satisfactorily isolated.

Since the vacuum switches functioned properly after the switch sensing lines were purged, it appears possible that the lines may have been restricted with debris. However, it should be noted that vacuum switches 2B21-N056C and 2B21-N056D had previously tested satisfactorily on 3/9/88 per procedure 57SV-B21-005-2S.

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### E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The turbine control valve fast closure scram signal anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from fast closure of the turbine control valves. Fast closure of the turbine control valves, with the reactor at power, can result in a significant addition of positive reactivity to the core as the reactor pressure rise collapses steam voids. The turbine control valve fast closure scram signal initiates a scram earlier than either the neutron monitoring system or the reactor high pressure scram signals. As an anticipatory signal, this scram provides a greater margin in the limitation of the heat flux of the fuel to acceptable thermal hydraulic limits.

In this specific event, since all systems responded to a valid RPS signal as designed and the reactor was not at a high power level, there were substantial margins to thermal limits.

The main objective of the containment isolation system is to provide protection by preventing releases to the environment of radioactive materials. This is accomplished by complete isolations of system lines penetrating the containment. Redundancy is provided in design aspects to satisfy the requirement that any failure of a single valve or component does not prevent containment isolation. Only one closed valve in each penetration line is necessary to maintain the integrity of the containment.

The PCIS Group 1 isolation signal on a low condenser vacuum condition isolates the main condenser from the primary system. This isolation would be needed if the integrity of the main condenser were compromised. With the main condenser breached, radioactive materials could escape. The low condenser vacuum isolation signal ensures that potential radioactive releases will not occur via this pathway.

In this event, all of the PCIS Group 1 isolation valves except for one were either already closed or functioned correctly in response to a valid isolation signal. The one valve that did not function correctly was backed up by another PCIS Group 1 valve that did close upon receipt of the Group 1 isolation signal. Since the penetration was effectively sealed by the second valve closure, the integrity of the primary containment was ensured. Additionally, plant operations personnel, upon seeing that one valve had not responded to the isolation signal, took prompt corrective action by closing the valve manually.

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This LER described an event where a root valve's (RV-1) disc had become disconnected, due to normal valve wear, from its stem and blocked the condenser vacuum line between the main condenser and vacuum switches 2B21-N056C and 2B21-N056D. The corrective action taken was to replace the bonnet, stem, and valve disc of root valve RV-1.

Since this previous event had an identifiable cause (root valve failure) which did not exist in the event described in LER 50-366/1988-006, the associated corrective action could not have prevented occurrence of that event.

Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526

Mailing Address: Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302

L. T. Gucwa Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing



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SL-4537 0212I X7GJ17-H310

April 18, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

> PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2 NRC DOCKET 50-366 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY CAUSES SCRAM AND ONE VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE ON GROUP 1 ISOLATION

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning the unanticipated actuation of some Engineered Safety Features (ESFs). The event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 2.

Sincerely,

AT Share

L. T. Gucwa

CLT/1c

Enclosure: LER 50-366/1988-006

c: (see next page)



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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 18, 1988 Page Two

c: <u>Georgia Power Company</u> Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President - Plant Hatch GO-NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

<u>U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II</u> Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

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