

## ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 551 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000 July 29, 1988

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555

Attn: Mr. Jose A. Calvo, Director Project Directorate IV Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects

> SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 Correction of Typographical Error ANU-1 Bases, Section 3.5

Dear Mr. Calvo:

By Letter dated September 12, 1984, AP&L requested a change to the ANO-1 Technical Specifications to reflect changes in the Emergency Feedwater System. Amendment Number 91 incorporates these changes. As a result of the amendment, the Bases (Section 3.5) to the ANO-1 Technical Specifications were also revised. During the revision the following typographical error was incorporated into the Bases, page 43b:

First paragraph, line 7, the word "feedwater" should have read "feeder".

Since the Bases are not considered a part of the Technical Specifications pursuant to 10CFR50.36, we are issuing the attached revised page 43b to the ANO-1 Technial Specifications Bases.

Very truly yours,

Dan R. Howard Manager, Licensing

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Attachment-ANO-1 Tech. Spec., page 43b

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The Degraded Voltage Monitoring relay settings are based on the short term starting voltage protection as well as long term running voltage protection. The 4.16 KV undervoltage relay setpoints are based on the allowable starting voltage plus maximum system voltage drops to the motor terminals, which allows approximately 78% of motor rated voltage at the motor terminals. The 460V undervoltage relay setpoint is based on long term motor voltage requirements plus the maximum feeder voltage drop allowance resulting in a 92% setting of motor rated voltage.

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

The OPERABILITY of the chlorine detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in the event of an accidental chlorine release. This capability is required to protect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.

## REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 7.1