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SUMMARY/MINUTES OF THE
SEPTEMBER 11, 1985 MEETING
OF THE ACRS GESSAR II SUBCOMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

A meeting was held by the ACRS GESSAR II Subcommittee on September 11, 1985 at 1717 H St. NW., Washington, D. C. in Room 1167. The purpose of this meeting was to continue the Subcommittee's review of GESSAR II for a Final Design Approval applicable to future plants. Selected Items from SSER #4 as well as other outstanding ACRS review items were discussed. Portions of the meeting that dealt with plant security and General Electric Company (GE) proprietary information were closed to public attendance. Notice of this meeting was published in the Federal Register on Thursday, August 22, 1985 (Attachment A). The meeting schedule is Attachment B. Richard Major was the cognizant staff member for the meeting.

Participants

ACRS

- D. Okrent, Chairman
- J. Mark, Member
- C. Wylie, Member
- C. Michelson, Member
- J. Ebersole, Member
- R. Major, Staff

NRC Staff

- D. Scaletti
- R. Frahm
- B. Hardin
- R. Hernan
- M. Rubin
- M. Spangler
- W. Pratt, Consultant BNL
- R. Youngblood, Consultant BNL

GE

- P. D. Knecht
- N. Pfeffbrlen
- D. Hankins
- D. Foreman
- K. Holtzlaw
- R. Villa
- L. Gifford
- G. Sherwood

Open Session

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Certified By BAR

Mr. Dino Scaletti, NRR GESSAR II Project Manager, presented an update on the review of GESSAR II and commented on the day's agenda. He noted that in a September 6, 1985 letter to R. Fraley, Executive Director, ACRS from H. Denton, Director NRR, written responses were presented to a number of the agenda items. He noted he was not in a position to discuss safety goals at this time. Responses were provided to items that had direct implications or direct reference to safety goals that were directly applicable to GESSAR II. Clarifications to these responses would be made as necessary.

It was explained that Amendment 1 to the GESSAR II FDA was issued on August 9, 1985. This amendment allows the GESSAR II design to be referenced in new application. However, there is a condition in the FDA that prohibits the issuance of a CP or OL on an application that references the GESSAR II design until the completion of the severe accident review. In summary, the design can be referenced, but it is not approved.

Mr. Scaletti explained that the GESSAR II Standard Safety Analysis Report, its amendments and referenced documents, plus the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report along with its amendments, create the basis for issuance of a FDA. Mr. Rosenthal stated that referenced information in GESSAR II includes design details such as drawings in the structural and mechanical areas.

Mr. Rubin, NRC Staff, noted that estimated core melt values presented in the staff's SER supplements are essentially mean values. In their

evaluation of the GESSAR II PRA, Staff consultants BNL calculated mean core melt frequencies for the dominant sequences of the internal events. BNL also prepared a limited statistical uncertainty analysis. Core melt estimates for the seismic events were described as mean values, but in a somewhat more limited sense. Structure and component fragilities were combined to form the mean system fragility curve. However, without a definite site there was a lack of detail in the site hazard function. It is believed large uncertainties exist in this area. Lacking an actual site, it was not possible to develop a meaningful hazard function and associated uncertainty distribution. For calculational purposes, the GESSAR II site hazard function was assumed to represent a mean value. Aware of the limitations of this approach the Staff/BNL provided sensitivity analyses to attempt to bound the likely seismic core melt contribution, presented in SSER #4. An interface item has been specified to perform a site specific function analysis, and justify that the mean and mean plus one standard deviation of the site specific hazard are bounded by the GESSAR II seismic hazard function.

The Staff did not consider or include onsite costs in their cost/benefit considerations. It was felt these considerations would not affect results by more than a factor of 2. Staff recommendations were based on screening potential design improvements to within a factor of 10 to 100 based on cost/benefit and final selection of design improvements based on engineering judgment.

Mr. Scaletti stated that there is not a threshold for core melt frequency for future plants. The Staff has endeavored to review GESSAR very

thoroughly with the understanding that future plants, based on the Commission's policy, should be safer. The results of the staff's review to date has given the Staff the belief that GESSAR II is a safe plant, safer than existing plants.

Dr. Okrent asked if there was merit in allowing no single scenario to contribute more than one tenth of the design objective? The Staff replied they had not used such a philosophy on GESSAR. The Staff has no current position on this reasoning.

Mr. Rosenthal explained the Staff does not have a containment performance guideline. The Staff has deterministically re-reviewed the GESSAR II containment. GE and the Staff and its consultants have examined containment threats due to steam and non-condensable gas production, hydrogen deflagarations, diffusion flames, hydrogen detonations and the potential for containment bypass such as seal failure and leakage. After assessing the risk due to these potential containment failure modes, it has been concluded that the risk to the public is small. The most probable failure mode is predicted to be slow overpressurization due to non-condensable gas production. For this failure mode, suppression pool scrubbing of radionuclides effectively reduces the consequences to the public.

It was noted that hydrogen igniters force containment failure scenarios to a later overpressure failure mode. Postponing containment failure is worth an order of magnitude savings in person-rem predicted from the event. The reason given for battery backup on the igniters, is not that

the risk is unacceptable without them, but rather to force an accident scenario along a known, more benign course.

Dr. Okrent noted that there was not a sophisticated analysis of the effect of core melt on the structural behavior of the drywell. However, there is attached to a core melt event some unspecified likelihood that both drywell and wetwell integrity can be lost. It was noted a philosophical question remains as to whether or not a containment design should be required that has a reasonably high degree of confidence that it will maintain its integrity through all scenario with the exception of venting through deliberate filtering systems.

Mr. Rosenthal explained that the Staff is requiring that the hydrogen igniter system have dc battery powered backup because station black-out dominates risk. This requirement is based on prudence not cost/benefit analysis. He explained containment sprays are not placed on battery power since passive heat sinks will maintain containment pressure with margin before failure. In addition containment temperature rises to 600^oF. are acceptable from a materials standpoint. In a severe accident situation without sprays, vital equipment could be lost. However, the core is already in a state (severe accident) the vital equipment was to prevent; and preserving the equipment becomes moot.

Mr. Scaletti explained that the Staff's list of interface requirements which it believes necessary to assure the PRA performance requirements, are achieved, are identified in Section 1.10 of the SER and its supplements. The severe accident interfaces are listed in SSER-2,3, and 4.

Quantitative requirements for these interfaces, if required, are identified in an appropriate SER section identified in Table 1.10. Specific areas of interface requirements were presented and discussed.

The NRC Staff presented a discussion on a number of generic items that were resolved for GESSAR II in SSER #4. USI A-43: Containment Emergency Sump Reliability: was resolved on GESSAR II because the ultimate plant protection system provides an independent source of core cooling, regardless of whether or not debris blocks the RHR strainers in the containment sump.

USI A-47: Safety Implications of control systems to a large extent is outside the scope of GESSAR. Overfill transient protection from a hardware point of view appears adequate on GESSAR.

GSI B-6: Loads, load combinations, and stress limits were the concern in the coupling of LOCA and SSE events for mechanical systems. Removal of pipe restraints will improve access to equipment areas and result in reduced occupational exposures. Currently GE has a leak before break application under review by the Staff. Removal of pipe restraints resolves this issue.

GSI B-58: Passive Mechanical Failures gets a medium priority rating due to the high cost savings to the industry. At issue is the passive failure of mechanical valves between surveillance testing. GE has indicated this is not a substantial problem, and the Staff has accepted

this issue as having limited safety significance. It is resolved for GESSAR II.

GSI 82: Beyond Design Basis Accident in Spent Fuel Pool concerns large inventories of fission products in the pool. With the higher concentrations of spent fuel and increased heat load, there is a threat of fire propagation between assemblies in an air environment. This item was resolved on GESSAR due to the fact the pool is a below grade seismic Category 1 structure. This reduces the likelihood of pool drainage and makes manual filling of water easier to accomplish.

GSI 105: Interfacing System LOCA at BWRs concerns over-pressurization occurring between high pressure systems and low pressure emergency core cooling systems. If not mitigated this could lead to a LOCA outside primary containment. This issue does not directly relate to GESSAR, but rather to BWRs licensed before 1980. However Staff review assured that adequate precautions to prevent and mitigate such an event had been taken.

It was noted that prioritize generic issues (USI's and medium and high GSIs) would be considered specifically on a standard plant until the FDA is issued. After the FDA is issued, the backfit procedure would be used to make design changes.

Mr. Knecht of GE discussed containment venting criteria and objectives. He noted that containment venting procedures are outlined in the Emergency Procedure Guidelines. Venting would only be attempted after

normal methods of pressure control, e.g. standby gas system, or containment sprays had been attempted. Specific venting procedures will be defined by an utility applicant that references the GESSAR II design. Venting could take place either from the control room (using the normal ventilation exhaust line) or from the UPPS station.

Mr. Knecht also discussed isolation valves on system piping that leads from the containment to the outside environment. The concern was had the valves been tested to ensure they are capable of closing under blowdown conditions. The isolation valves are within the GESSAR II scope of supply. Purchase requirements specify the valves work in a LOCA environment, be able to close against normal operating flows, and be able to close against break flows.

Mr. Pfefferlin, GE, discussed the control rod drive scram discharge volume. It was noted there are two scram discharge volumes, each with its own instrument volume. The two volumes are cross connected. The cross connect allows either set of sensors to detect system conditions. It was noted that the control rod scram system on the ABWR eliminates the discharge as associated volumes. However, you lose the ability to scram using reactor system pressure, so a trade-off is involved.

The Subcommittee took up the topic of the UPPS. GE believed both the UPPS and fire protection system could operate coincidentally. GE was unsure about the effect sharing fire protection and UPPS functions would have, for example, after an earthquake. Concern was expressed over the present level of design of the UPPS at the FDA stage. GE stated they

would be the designer and that a detailed design would take place with the first GESSAR II utility-applicant.

System interactions were discussed. It was noted this issue would become an interface requirement for a utility applicant. Concern was raised over how seismic interactions (nonseismically designed systems failing and interacting with seismically designed systems) would be specified in the interface requirements. The Staff noted spatially coupled interactions are investigated following plant construction.

Regarding external floods, GE explained that applicants are not required to calculate the frequency of the probable maximum flood. The Staff's position is that for any plant whose safety related systems, components, and structures are located above the level of the design basis flood (DBF) the risk from external flooding is acceptably low. Presently, the Staff believes any assignment of a probability to the DBF will be arbitrary and of limited value.

General Electric explained that the fire protection system is not seismically qualified. As a consequence of this fact no seismic fragilities were produced. The staff noted that portions of the fire protection system within the GESSAR II scope are reviewed deterministically and the results reported in the Staff SER.

The NRC Staff noted that relay chatter is still an open item at this time.

Mr. Knecht, GE, discussed the water hammer potential for the core spray system. Analyses show that the maximum pressure during a water hammer in this system is on the order of 20 psi. This pressure differential does not create a problem.

(Closed Session)

The Committee went into a closed session to discuss safeguards details of a bunkered decay heat removal system used at a foreign plant.

Open Session

The Staff and GE agreed to review the materials used in the chilled water piping. The concern was a brittle fracture of this piping at operating temperatures. The Subcommittee discussed the capability for inservice inspection of the lower reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head. It was noted there are nine welds in the reactor pressure vessel lower head. Most are accessible for ultrasonic testing however some are not. Control Rod drives and their housings have been exempted from inservice inspection because any leakage produced would be small. Rod catchers would limit the leakage areas around the control rods to a level that could be replaced by the plant ECCS.

GE was questioned over how assurance could be sought that cracks would not form in the bottom of the RPV head, between different penetrations, over the forty year life of the plant. Some regions are not normally subjected to inservice inspection over the plants life. GE believes

that many cases are acceptable since failures in these regions can be controlled and do not lead to unacceptable consequences. It was, however, explained that some failures, such as a vessel rupture between penetrations would lead to core melt. A group of four rods ejected from the core could lead to a novel accident scenario. A more global discussion of quality assurance and fabrication techniques might be appropriate.

Mr. Ebersole went through a number of his concerns on the GESSAR II case. Concerns included the present plant scram system and its interconnected scram dump volume. He also had concerns over various interface items. He also expressed some concern over perceived inaccuracies in the FSAR.

Dr. Okrent and the Subcommittee gave the Staff and applicant instructions regarding presentations to the full Committee.

The meeting was adjourned at 5:47 p.m.

(Meeting handouts are appended to the transcript.)

NOTE: A complete transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D. C. or can be obtained at cost from Ann Riley & Associates, Court Reporters, 1625 I St., NW., Suite 921, Washington, D. C. 20006 (202) 293-3950.

Date and time: September 5 and 6, 1985;
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. each day.

Place: The National Science Foundation,
Room 1242B, 1800 G Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20550.

Type of meeting: Open: 9/5—8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. Closed: Remainder of scheduled

Contact person: Ms. Sandra D. Toys, Head,
Oceanographic Centers and Facilities Section
(OCFS), Division of Ocean Sciences, Room
813, National Science Foundation,
Washington, DC 20550. Telephone: 202/357-
7837.

Summary minutes: May be obtained from
the contact person listed above.

Purpose of advisory group: To provide
advice to the Head, OCFS, on the disposition
of proposals and recommendation affecting
the composition and distribution of the
academic research fleet.

Agenda: Open: Presentations on the
benefits and consequences of alternative
actions. Closed: To review and evaluate
proposals as part of the selection process for
awards.

Reason for closing: The proposals being
reviewed include information of a proprietary
or confidential nature, including technical
information, financial data, such as salaries,
and personal information concerning
individuals associated with the proposals.
These matters are within exemptions (4) and
(8) of 5 U.S.C. 552b(c), Government in the
Sunshine Act.

Authority to close meeting: This
determination was made by the Committee
Management Officer pursuant to provisions
of section 10(d) of Pub. L. 92-463. The
Committee Management Officer was
delegated the authority to make such
determinations by the Director, NSF, on July
2, 1985.

Dated: August 19, 1985.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 85-20077 Filed 8-21-85; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7530-01-2

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards; Subcommittee on General
Electric Standard Safety Analysis
Report (GESSAR II); Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on General
Electric Standard Safety Analysis
Report (GESSAR II) will hold a meeting
on September 11, 1985, Room 1187, 1717
H Street, NW, Washington, DC.

To the extent practical, the meeting
will be open to public attendance.
However, portions of the meeting may
be closed to discuss proprietary
information relating to the GESSAR
probabilistic risk assessment and plant
security.

The agenda for the subject meeting
shall be as follows:

Wednesday, September 11, 1985—8:30
a.m. until the conclusion of business.

The Subcommittee will continue its
review of GESSAR II for a final design
approval applicable to future plants.

Oral statements may be presented by
members of the public with the
concurrence of the Subcommittee
Chairman; written statements will be
accepted and made available to the
Committee. Recordings will be permitted
only during those portions of the
meeting when a transcript is being kept,
and questions may be asked only by
members of the Subcommittee, its
consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring
to make oral statements should notify
the ACRS staff member named below as
far in advance as is practicable so that
appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the initial portion of the
meeting, the Subcommittee, along with
any of its consultants who may be
present, may exchange preliminary
views regarding matters to be
considered during the balance of the
meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear
presentations by and hold discussions
with representatives of the General
Electric Company, NRC Staff, their
consultants, and other interested
persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics
to be discussed, whether the meeting
has been cancelled or rescheduled, the
Chairman's ruling on requests for the
opportunity to present oral statements
and the time allotted therefor can be
obtained by a prepaid telephone call to
the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr.
Richard Major (telephone 202/834-1413)
between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Persons
planning to attend this meeting are
urged to contact the above named
individual one or two days before the
scheduled meeting to be advised of any
changes in schedule, etc., which may
have occurred.

Dated: August 19, 1985.

Morton W. Libarkin,

Assistant Executive Director for Project
Review.

[FR Doc. 85-20145 Filed 8-21-85; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7530-01-2

[Docket No. 80-352]

Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick
Generating Station, Unit 1); Order
Suspending Operation Above 5
Percent Power

In its Memorandum and Order of
August 8, 1985, the Commission declined
to stay the effectiveness of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board's Fourth
Partial Initial Decision in the Limerick
operating license proceeding and
authorized the Director of the Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue the
Philadelphia Electric Company
(Licensee) a full-power operating license
for Unit 1 of the Limerick Generating
Station. Accordingly, the Director issued
Facility Operating License No. NPF-39
which, among other things, authorized
the Licensee to operate the facility at
reactor core power levels not in excess
of 3,293 megawatts thermal (100% rated
power). Licensee No. NPF-39 superseded
Facility Operating License No. NPF-27,
which was issued on October 28, 1984,
and which authorized the Licensee to
operate the facility at levels not to
exceed 5% of rated power.

Limerick Ecology Action and Thomas
Martin appealed the Commission's
decision and sought a stay of the
Commission's Order from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. On August 15, 1985, the court
stayed the Commission's Order pending
further order of the court. The effect of
the court's order is to suspend operation
above 5% of rated power, pending
further order of the court. The Licensee
has informed the NRC Staff that it is
proceeding to reduce the power level of
the facility to 5% or less of rated power.
The purpose of this Order is solely to
effectuate the court's order and confirm
the Licensee's actions. This Order will
be rescinded upon action of the court to
lift its stay.

Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103,
161, and 166 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, and the Court of
Appeals' order of August 15, 1985, it is
hereby ordered that the Licensee shall
reduce the operating power level of the
facility to 5% or less of rated power by
8:00 p.m., August 16, 1985, and shall not
thereafter operate Limerick Unit 1 above
5% of rated power until such restriction
is rescinded by the Director of the Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

This Order is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 19th day
of August, 1985.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Harold E. Denton,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.

[FR Doc. 85-20144 Filed 8-21-85; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7530-01-2

PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER AND CONSERVATION PLANNING COUNCIL

Establishment of Mainstem Passage
Advisory Committee

AGENCY: Pacific Northwest Electric
Power and Conservation Planning

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR THE
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE
ON GESSAR II
SEPTEMBER 11, 1985
WASHINGTON, D.C.

- | | | | |
|----------|-----|---|--------------|
| 8:30 AM | 1. | Chairman's Opening Remarks
a. Objectives
b. Goals
c. Schedule | (10 min) |
| 8:40 AM | 2. | Update by NRC Staff, current status of the GESSAR II FDA. Future Activities planned | (15 min) |
| 8:55 AM | 3. | Staff Discussion - Using mean estimates of risk and following the recommendations of the Safety Goal Evaluation Steering Group, chaired by T. Murley, for the consideration of onsite costs:
How would these assumptions affect cost/benefit results?
(written reply prior to meeting requested) | (30 min) |
| 9:25 AM | 4. | Staff Discussion - H. Denton has proposed a core melt frequency of 10^{-5} reactor/year for present plants. Is this also an objective for future plants?
(written reply prior to meeting requested) | (15 min) |
| 9:40 AM | 5. | Staff Discussion - Has the Staff considered requiring a more stringent overall design objective for core melt frequencies for future reactors? The approach used in many countries is to not allow any single scenario to contribute more than 1/10 of the design objective. Does the Staff feel there is merit in this approach?
(written reply prior to meeting requested) | (15 min) |
| 9:55 AM | *** | B R E A K | (10 min) *** |
| 10:05 AM | 6. | What is the Staff's best estimate on Containment Performance Behavior? In a discussion the Staff should describe how they would characterize their review of containment performance. What is the drywell vulnerability to core melt sequences?
(written reply prior to meeting requested) | (20 min) |
| 10:25 AM | 7. | What is the Staff position on back-up power supplies for hydrogen ignitors? What is the rationale for requiring Containment | (20 min) |

- Sprays to be powered from emergency diesels, but no requirement for back-up power supplies? (written reply prior to meeting requested)
- 10:45 AM 8. Staff estimate for mean core melt frequency, allowing for appropriate uncertainty distribution. Details on basis for estimate. (See July 17, 1985 ACRS Report on proposed NRC Safety Goal Evaluation Report for discussion on use of mean, not median values.) (written reply prior to meeting requested) (20 min)
- 11:05 AM 9. Staff Discussion, centered on a written list of NRC Staff requirements which will assure that PRA performance requirements are achieved, to include
 - equipment fragilities
 - reliability criteria that must be met in an effort to ensure assumptions made in the PRA are accurate.
 In general what quantitative requirements are placed on GE and on an applicant? How are uncertainties included? (written reply prior to meeting requested) (20 min)
- 11:25 AM 10. Discussion by General Electric - Containment Venting - When is it proposed? Discussion of criteria and objectives. (20 min)
- 11:45 AM 11. Discussion with GE and Staff (CLOSED SESSION) (15 min)
 What has General Electric done to reduce the risk from sabotage for GESSAR II beyond current levels. Why is this appropriate for a future plant?
 What are the details involved in pricing previously discussed bunkered system?
 What are the costs associated with specific areas of the system? What would be the difference in price between a forward fit system and a backfit system?
- 12:00 Noon * * * L U N C H (1 hr) * * *
- 1:00 PM 12. NRC Staff and GE Discussion of (1 hr)
 ° MAJOR Review Results and conclusions from the PRA (from SSER 4)
 - Consequences and Risk from Internally Initiated Severe Accident Events
 - Areas most critical to Internal Events Consequences
 - Consequences and Risk from Externally Initiated Severe Accident Events (seismic)
 - Areas Most Critical to the External Events Consequences

What are the largest uncertainties and why?

- 2:00 PM 13. NRC Staff and GE Discussion of Unresolved Safety Issues and Generic Safety Issues (from SSER 4) (1 hr)
- USI A-43: Containment Emergency Sump Reliability
 - USI A-47: Safety Implications of Control Systems
 - USI A-48: Hydrogen Control Measures
 - GSI B-6: Loads, Load Combinations, Stress Limits
 - GSI B-58: Passive Mechanical Failures
 - GSI 82: Beyond-Design-Basis Accident in Spent Fuel Pool
 - GSI 105: interfacing System LOCA at BWRs
- How are those identified generic issues that are yet to be prioritized handled in the GESSAR II review? What would be the "cut-off" date when new generic items would no longer be considered?
- 3:00 PM * * * B R E A K (10 min) * * *
- GE and NRC Staff Discussion of the Following Topics:
- 3:10 PM 14. Systems interaction will become an interface requirement for a utility applicant. How will this interface requirement be specified (in detail)? (10 min)
- 3:20 PM 15. Discussion and documentation to show piping lines leading from the containment to the outside environment were equipped with isolation valves that have been specified and tested to ensure they are capable of closing under blowdown conditions. The effects of valve aging have been raised as a concern; how is this addressed? The reactor water cleanup system was mentioned as a specific example of this issue. (10 min)
- 3:30 PM 16. Issues related to Control Rod Drive Scram Discharge Volume (10 min)
- Brief description of system
 - Ability to vent and drain discharge volume
 - Ability to vent and drain individual drives
 - Comparison to ABWR scram system
- 3:40 PM 17. Has an evaluation of the pros and cons associated with the UPPS been conducted? What are the results? Could this system initiate or exacerbate an off-normal situation? What performance requirements are specified, what allowance for uncertainties (10 min)

are made?

- 3:40 PM 18. Regarding the threat from an external flood, does the interface information provided to an applicant who purchases GESSAR II instruct him to not only calculate the probable maximum flood (PMF) but also evaluate the frequency of the probable maximum flood? Will an applicant be encouraged to consider the chance of exceeding the PMF and decide if it is acceptable? (10 min)
- 4:00 PM 19. Discussion of the fire protection system. What are the seismic fragilities of various components in the fire protection equipment? (10 min)
- 4:10 PM 20. Status of open items related to relay chatter (Staff) What are the quantitative requirements that must be met by plant equipment? (10 min)
- 4:20 PM 21. General Electric discussion of an assessment of the water hammer potential of the core spray system. Additional discussion of water hammer potential for a pump start logic control and sequencing procedure for starting a pump with an open discharge. (10 min)
- 4:30 PM 22. Brief discussion on possible adverse effects associated with entrained air on RHR pump performance. The assumption is small well-mixed air bubbles in the suppression pool being drawn into the pump suction. (5 min)
- 4:35 PM 23. Staff discussion of details of review strategy and materials considerations for the following systems:
- non-safety-grade chilled water system
- non-safety-grade drywell chilled water
- safety-grade control building chilled water system
How comprehensive is SRP Section 9.2.2? (10 min)
- 4:45 PM 24. What is the capability for Inservice Inspection of the lower reactor pressure vessel head? Why is this sufficient? (10 min)
- 4:55 PM 25. Closing Remarks

The full Committee session is currently scheduled for the following morning, September 12, 1985 from 10:30 AM to 3:30 PM.

Please PRINT RETURN TO
R. MAJOR

ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON GESSAR II

LOCATION Rm. 1167

DATE SEPT. 11, 1985

ATTENDANCE LIST

PLEASE PRINT: NAME

AFFILIATION

PLEASE PRINT: NAME	AFFILIATION
D. OKIANT	CHAIRMAN
J. MARK	Member
C. Wylie	
C. MICHALSON	
J. EGGSOTE	
R. MAJOR	ACRS STAFF
R. FRAHM	NRR/DST
D. SCALETTI	NRR/DL
P.O. KACHT	G.E.
N.C. PFEFFERLEN	GE.
B. Hardin	NRR/DSI
Deborah Hankins	G.E.
TREVOR PRATT	BNL
RON HERNAN	NRR/PPAS
Mark P. RUBIN	NRR/DST
MILLER B. SPANGLER	NRR/DSI
J.E. ROSENTHAL	NRR/DSI
D.L. FOREMAN	GE
KEVIN W. HOLTECLAW	GE
R. Villa	GE

