

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-62
ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY
CLINTON POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-461

Introduction

By letter dated October 30, 1987, the Illinois Power Company (the licensee) proposed changing the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Clinton Power Station to:

1. Lower the safety/relief valves low-low set function setpoint tolerance to match the value in the design specifications.
2. Allow a main steam isolation valve-leakage control system (MSIV-LCS) instrument channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to two hours for the performance of surveillances provided the other channel(s) monitoring that parameter are operable.

A Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing related to the requested action was published in the Federal Register on January 27, 1988 (53 FR 2318 and 53 FR 2320). No requests for hearing and no public comments were received.

Evaluation

1. Safety/Relief Valves Low-Low Set Function Setpoint Tolerance

The licensee proposes to change Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.2.2 Low-Low Set Function Setpoint tolerance associated with the safety/relief valves (SRVs) from the presently specified $\pm 2\%$ to a value of ± 15 psi. The latter amounts to approximately $\pm 1.5\%$ of setpoint value. The staff has determined that the proposed tolerance value of ± 15 psi is consistent with the tolerance specified in TS 3.4.2.1 for the relief portion of the SRVs, agrees with General Electric's design specification 22A4622AV, and is a more conservative tolerance than the presently specified value. Based on the above, the staff finds the licensee's proposed new tolerance value of ± 15 psi acceptable.

2. Main Steam Isolation Valves - Leakage Control System (MSIV-LCS)

The licensee proposes to add the following footnote to TS 3.6.1.4 (page 3/4 6-7) OPERABILITY requirements, "An MSIV leakage control system instrumentation channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to two hours for required surveillance without placing the channel in the tripped condition provided the other channel or channels monitoring that parameter are OPERABLE."

The staff has determined that the MSIV-LCS meets the requirements of Industry Standard IEEE-279. As a result the:

- a. system's redundant and separate instrumentation, and controls, have been designed to perform their safety function following a LOCA and an assumed single active failure;
- b. sensors can be checked one at a time by application of simulated signals during plant operation;
- c. system can be initiated manually from the main control room;
- d. parts of the system which have been deliberately made inoperative for test, calibration, or maintenance provide an indication in the control room of their condition.

IEEE-279 also provides for the violation of the single failure criterion during channel bypass provided that the bypass time interval required for the test, calibration, or maintenance can be shown to be so short that the probability of failure of the active channel would be commensurate with the probability of failure of the system during its normal interval between tests. The present TS 3.6.1.4 ACTION statement allows plant operation for up to 30 days with an inoperable MSIV-LCS subsystem. Therefore, the time being proposed by the licensee (two hours) for the channel to be inoperable for testing is insignificant relative to the out-of-service time allowed for the subsystem under the ACTION statement. Based on the above, the staff finds the licensee's proposed footnote to TS 3.6.1.4 acceptable.

3. Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves changes to the surveillance requirements in the use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4. Conclusion

The staff has further concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the

Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public.

5. Acknowledgement

This evaluation was prepared by F. Maura.

Dated: August 3, 1988